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Abstract: 
 
This thesis provides a thorough examination of the institutional theories and 
definitions of Arthur C. Danto and George Dickie, and assesses the pros and cons of 
their respective approaches. This account of Danto‟s and Dickie‟s theories differs 
from previous ones, because it organises their ideas and works chronologically and 
by periods, rather than in terms of topics or of an analysis of a single work. In this 
way it is possible to follow the development and later modifications of their 
theories, as well as to assess whether the account they provide in retrospect of their 
own previous ideas is completely correct or not. It also identifies those received 
interpretations of Danto‟s and Dickie‟s theories that seem to be generally endorsed 
but that do not provide a correct or fair interpretation of their theories. As a result, 
this thesis presents an interpretation of Danto‟s and Dickie‟s theories that 
substantially differs from the received interpretations of these theories.  
 
Although the received interpretations of Danto‟s and Dickie‟s theories have not yet 
undergone any programmatic process of standardisation, nevertheless many of the 
standard interpretations challenged in this thesis can be traced back to Stephen 
Davies‟s book Definitions of Art. Given the fact that this book specifically 
addresses this topic and because its title is so compelling, the ideas summarised in 
this book have been endorsed also by major figures such as Carroll, Levinson and 
Dickie. As a result, the last chapter of this thesis also challenges Davies‟s quasi-
programmatic standardisation of these received interpretations, and his organisation 
of the debate about definitions of art in terms of a divide between functionalists and 
proceduralists, which reinforces these received misinterpretations.   
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1. TOWARDS INSTITUTIONAL DEFINITIONS OF ART 
 
1.1 Underlying perspectives in the production and understanding of art 
 
To speak about art today, is to speak not only about painting, sculpture, music, 
poetry, theatre and dance but also about such new disciplines as video art, audio art, 
site-specific art, happenings, land art, computer-generated art and conceptual art. 
Moreover, while previous attempts to explain art could neatly classify the different 
instances of art (e.g., this is a sculpture, that is a painting, etc.), nowadays the 
experimental and hybrid character of many works makes such a way of 
compartmentalizing artworks into separate or discrete disciplines almost 
impossible. Thus today it is possible to find in art galleries and museums, amongst 
the myriad of new forms, hybrids of painting and sculpture (e.g., Ron Mueck‟s 
hyperrealist sculpture) of performance and painting (e.g., Jackson Pollock‟s 
paintings) or of sculpture and audio art (e.g., Janet Cardiff and George Bures 
Miller‟s works).  
 
Often, in front of an exhibit, it is easy to understand why some works (a Giotto, for 
example, or a Leonardo, a Dalí or a Lucian Freud) are to be considered works of art. 
At times, however, other pieces or performances (Davies calls them „hard cases‟ – 
see Chapter 7) raise serious questions about whether they are really art or not. It is 
then the work of art historians, curators, artists, art critics and even philosophers to 
explain why these works ought to be regarded as works of art or not. 
 
In fact, the diversity of art forms and art disciplines that can be found today – not 
only in museums and galleries but also in theatres, auditoriums or even in literature 
– obliges the theoreticians to elaborate a coherent synthesis of this huge corpus of 
practices and theories that constitutes art. However, at the same time, this 
diversified panorama of art often also pushes these same experts to favor 
accidentally, in their theories, some particular art forms rather than others. This 
arises from the difficulty of being a specialist in all the diverse types of existing art 
forms at once. As a result, any attempt to examine the current debate about 
definitions of art should be accompanied by a critical examination of the 
standpoints that different theoreticians may be taking when they reflect on their 
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subject (e.g., is an author X writing from the perspective of his knowledge of 
music? From his knowledge of literature and poetry? From his knowledge of 
Modern or Contemporary art?)  
 
In part, this huge diversity of instances of art and art disciplines, led theorists to 
support the idea that works of art could be regarded as such, not owing to their 
intrinsic merits, but because of their mere institutional placement or by virtue of 
their dependency upon some normative factors that have become institutionalized – 
in order to see the different versions of the institutional theory, see Chapters 2, 5 
and 7 respectively on Danto‟s, Dickie‟s and Davies‟s early formulations of their 
institutional theories.  
 
Yet, even if it seemed plausible to accept that some instances, or „hard cases‟ of art 
seemed to imply the existence of purely institutional decisions, this position soon 
became hotly disputed: the institutional theory not only seemed to counter many of 
the intuitions so far accepted concerning artmaking. It also seemed to render the 
explanation vacuous because a simple institutional decision could place any object 
whatsoever into the category „work of art‟ without the need to provide any reason 
why such a decision was taken. As a result, the institutional theorists entered a 
second period of reformulation in order to avoid the main criticisms that they had 
received so far – see Chapters 3 and 6 on Danto‟s and Dickie‟s respective 
reformulations of their theories.  
 
However, the current diversity of artworks that Danto celebrates in his papers on the 
end of the teleological narrative of art – see Chapter 4 on Danto‟s theory about the 
end of art – is something more characteristic of late 20th and early 21st century art 
than of the art of all periods. How is it then possible that the relatively unified set of 
practices of art that go from Phidias to Leonardo and even to Henry Moore, would 
one day lead to accepting, not without reluctance, the idea that a urinal (i.e., 
Duchamp‟s Fountain) could become a work of art? In order to explain this, the 
different theoreticians suggested different explanations which will be summarized 
and examined in the course of this thesis.  
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Even if the current diversity of art is a relatively recent phenomenon, however, a 
closer inspection will also bring to light the fact that the previous panorama of art 
was not so homogeneous, let us say, as to be subsumed by mimetic, expressionist or 
aesthetic theories of art. Neither is it completely true that there has been a 
teleological evolution in the art practices from an obsolete mimeticism to the 
current condition of „relational‟ art.1  
 
In fact, much art today is still based on ideas of imitation, such as the above-
mentioned hyperrealism in sculpture or painting, and many artworks  have 
important elements coming from expressionist ideas (those of Jackson Pollock, for 
example, or of Francis Bacon). In fact M.H. Abrams, in his book The Mirror and 
the Lamp (Abrams, 1969 [1953]) often advises against endorsing the idea that the 
history of art suddenly shifted from mimeticism to expressionism in a single move: 
he is aware that expressionist ideas already existed in Roman times and that 
mimetic theories were still supported long after the image of the expressionist artist 
as a lamp or a well was conceived. He even acknowledges elements of a position 
mainly developed after the 18
th
 century, which he names „objectivism‟, in a work as 
early as Aristotle‟s Poetics.  
 
Furthermore, Abrams‟s book reveals a more complex development of the history of 
art than that conceived by Danto and Dickie, for example, in their reflections on the 
development of aesthetic theories. Such an understanding of the development of art 
is particularly useful in searching for a more detailed explanation and critical 
assessment of the institutional theories of art. In order to do this, Abrams presents a 
simplified scheme of the main coordinates used in art theory and practice, to 
understand better the development of art production and art criticism. I will use (and 
slightly modify) such coordinates to locate also in them the different analytic 
theories of art that play a relevant role in the debate concerning the institutional 
definitions of art. 
                                                 
1
 By „relational art‟ I mean both as understood by the institutional theory, highlighting the relational 
nature of artworks, and as understood by Bourriaud in his Relational Aesthetics, where he attempts 
to explain the current tendency of many artists to promote the interaction between their artworks and 
their publics.  
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1.2 Framing the debate: on Abrams’s scheme 
 
In The Mirror and the Lamp, Abrams attempts to provide a clear scheme to account 
for the different currents in art theory and art criticism. He is aware that such a 
scheme, though useful, is nevertheless just an introductory and simplified way to 
orient the reader towards the complex panorama that he is going to examine in a 
more detailed manner in the next chapters of his book. 
 
He argues that, so far, in art theory and art criticism, the different theorists and 
artists have focused mainly on one of the following four elements when producing 
and/or attempting to understand art: the universe (or Nature), the artist, the audience 
and the work. He structures the scheme in the following way: 
 
                     Universe (or Nature) 
                             I         
                         Work 
                     /              \ 
             Artist               Audience  
 
Abrams claims that while any given theory has usually taken into consideration 
several of these elements at the same time (e.g., work and universe, or audience and 
artist, etc.), each still tends to emphasize one of these aspects at the expense of the 
others. Thus, for example, mimetic theories emphasized the element „Universe‟ (or 
Nature) because mimetic artists attempted to imitate or reproduce naturalistically 
different elements constituting external reality (note that Abrams uses the term 
„Universe‟ to include all elements of external reality, not just Nature).  
 
However, Abrahams tells us that later historical developments, and notably, the 
progressive influence of Roman rhetoricians in art theory, promoted a displacement 
of the interest in the production and understanding of art. This, in the first place, led 
from a conception emphasizing the central aspect of naturalistic representation in 
art, to the idea that works of art are produced mainly to be presented to an audience. 
Abrams calls this theory „pragmatic‟ because it asserts that the main purpose of art 
is to influence this audience, morally or sentimentally. Pragmatists supported this 
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position, Abrams argues, even though most of them still claimed, in a pseudo-
conservative manner, that the main aim of art was to promote and improve mimetic 
representation.  
 
A later development of this position would displace the relevance of the audience in 
art, to emphasize the relevance of the artists‟ expressions of their feelings and 
emotions. This position, following Abrams, is also characterized by a shift from the 
metaphor of the mirror used by Plato and recovered by later mimetic theorists, to 
the metaphor, based on Plotinus‟s Neoplatonic theory, of the artist as a lamp or as a 
well, who, by means of an overflow of feelings, gives the reality represented a new 
(sentimental) aspect.  
 
Finally, Abrams also identifies a position developed after Romanticism, even 
though this goes beyond his own interests, because his book is centered on 
Romantic theory and criticism. This further position, Abrams claims, no longer 
focuses on the role of the sentimental artist, but mainly upon the work itself and its 
intrinsic aspects. He calls this later current „Objectivism‟ 
 
Now, the idea of introducing this scheme suggested by Abrams is to locate the other 
theories that follow 18
th
 century Romantic expressionism that play a major role in 
the current debate concerning definitions of art. Also, the aim is to show how 
institutional theorists went beyond the traditional axis suggested, or made explicit, 
by Abrams. This occurred because these theorists regarded the traditional criteria 
(i.e., universe, artist, audience, work) as insufficient to account for all artistic 
phenomena, and more specifically, to account for the phenomenon of Ready-Made 
art that appears in the first half of the 20
th
 century. 
 
Thus, during the 20
th
 century, before institutional theories were first formulated by 
Danto and Dickie, other combinations or actualizations of the definitions 
summarized by Abrams were presented, such as those of Collingwood, Langer, 
Greenberg and others. Dickie in fact classifies Collingwood‟s and Langer‟s theories 
either in terms of expressionism (Collingwood) or mimeticism (Langer). He 
clarifies this latter controversial classification by claiming that contra the apparent 
expressionist character of Langer‟s theory, she is defending the idea that works of 
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art always arise in the attempt to provide a (mimetic) representation of human 
feelings (Introduction1997: 58 – 62).  
 
Carroll‟s introductory book on aesthetics (Carroll, 1999b) also helps to classify, in 
terms of Abrams scheme, the aesthetic theories of Bullough, Vivas, Stolnitz, 
Aldrich and Beardsley, which also play an important role in the current debate 
concerning definitions of art. Carroll distinguishes between two types of theories of 
the aesthetic experience: the content-oriented and the affect-oriented theories. The 
content-oriented theorist, Carroll suggests, supports the idea that „an aesthetic 
experience is an experience of the aesthetic properties of a work‟ (Carroll, 1999b: 
168), while the affect-oriented theorist instead argues that „an aesthetic experience 
is the disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any object 
whatsoever for its own sake‟ (Carroll, 1999b: 172).  
 
In this case, the direction of influence (or arrow) that goes, in Abrams‟s scheme, 
between the work and the subjects of the aesthetic experience (audience), thus also 
becomes an important way to distinguish between the different theories. Carroll‟s 
idea suggests that it is possible to argue then that the content-oriented theory 
explains the phenomenon of the aesthetic experience of artworks from the direction 
work-to-audience (work  audience). The affect-oriented theory, instead, explains 
the phenomenon of the aesthetic experience of artworks from the direction 
audience-to-work (audience  work).  
 
As a result, on the one hand, theories of the aesthetic experience such as 
Bullough‟s, Aldrich‟s, Vivas‟s or Stolnitz‟s, that claim that a type of aesthetic 
perception is required to deal with the aesthetic objects, would be supporting the 
„audience  work‟ (affect-oriented) direction of the theory. Beardsley‟s theory of 
Metacriticism, on the other hand, would be supporting a „work  audience‟ 
(content-oriented) direction of the theory. This is because, as Dickie insists, 
Beardsley‟s theory of the aesthetic experience is in no way dependent upon the idea 
of a special type of aesthetic perception required for the proper appreciation of 
artworks. Instead, it is based upon the idea that the internal properties of the works 
are those that provoke the so-called aesthetic experience (see Chapter 6 where I 
quote Dickie‟s reflections on Beardsley‟s theory). So following Abrams, Beardsley 
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would support a sort of objectivist content-oriented theory of the aesthetic 
experience. 
 
To complete this classification based on Abrams, and still following Carroll‟s 
distinction between content-oriented and affect-oriented theories, it is possible to 
distinguish between the formalist theories of Clive Bell and Greenberg: Bell 
stresses that the aesthetic experience of the audience is produced by the significant 
form of the work, and his theory thus takes the direction „work  audience‟ 
(content-oriented theory). Greenberg‟s theory – although at first sight it seems to 
claim something along the lines of Bell‟s (i.e., in the sense that he considers the 
aesthetic experience of the audience to be provoked by the formal aspects of the 
work) – nevertheless differs from Bell‟s and approaches Beardsley‟s, in its 
insistence on characterizing explicitly the intrinsic properties of artworks, which 
results in making them more central than the fact of the phenomena of aesthetic 
experience.  
 
Thus, Greenberg argues that the formal aspects that provoke the aesthetic 
experience are, in the case of painting, a representation consistent with the two-
dimensionality of the surface, the limits of the frame and the properties of the 
pigment. In more general terms, he believes that the formal aspects of any works of 
art ought to arise from the different works being consistent with the conditions and 
limits of their respective mediums and materials used (e.g., three-dimensionality in 
the case of sculpture, two-dimensionality in the case of painting).  Greenberg‟s 
theory, then, even if it is as content-oriented as Bell‟s, is nevertheless more of an 
„objectivist‟ type than Bell‟s (although, as with Beardsley‟s, I am not claiming he is 
an „objectivist‟ in toto).  
 
However, the neo-Wittgensteinians, like Morris Weitz, sought to counter all the 
previous (and future) attempts to define art by claiming that the current diversity in 
art made the search for common necessary and sufficient conditions impossible. 
The only possible way, Weitz argued, to explain what a work of art is, would be by 
means of suggesting family resemblances between different types of works of art.  
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The institutional theories appeared, on the one hand, as a critical response to the 
neo-Wittgensteinian claim. These institutional theories, however, were also 
formulated as an attempt to contest certain other theories they regarded as altogether 
misleading in the attempt to understand the nature of the artistic process. Thus: 
 
- Danto, in his Transfiguration of the Commonplace (see Chapter 3), 
addressed part of his criticism against mimetic theories, and in less explicit 
manner, against formalist theories of art. His main concern, however, was to 
correct the misunderstandings of his theory that takes him to be claiming 
something along the lines of Dickie‟s type of institutional theory. Also, in 
many of his papers about the end of art (see Chapter 4), he critically 
responded, this time explicitly, to Greenberg‟s extremely formalist 
conception of art. 
 
- Dickie‟s institutional theory was formulated as a consequence of his critical 
response to the theories of Bullough, Stolnitz, Vivas and Aldrich which 
attempted to explain the phenomena of art and the aesthetic properties of 
artworks, as resulting from a particular process of aesthetic perception. In 
fact Dickie, not only criticized these theories but also acknowledged, in the 
reformulations of his early attempts to define art (see Chapter 5), his debt to 
Beardsley‟s theory. This is because Beardsley‟s theory posited a 
Metacritical theory of art that lacked any reference to the aesthetic 
perception requirement defended by the above mentioned authors 
(Bullough, Stolnitz, etc.). 
  
The institutional theorists, sought a new type of definition of art that, contra the 
opinions of Weitz and Kennick, could account for all instances of art. To do this, 
the institutional theorists argued that a definition of art was possible if certain ideas 
were left behind, such as the search (1) for common internal properties in works of 
art (in the objectivist fashion), and (2) the attempt to identify art only in terms of 
traditional and simple relations such as those between the artist and the work 
(expressionism), the work and nature (mimeticism) or the work and the audience 
(pragmatism).  As a result, Danto and Dickie defended two different normative 
aspects in art that underlined the idea of its institutional character: 
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- Danto suggested that a relational aspect of art, so far ignored in aesthetics, 
ought to be taken into account: namely, the normative role of 
(institutionalized) artistic theories used for the production and understanding 
of artworks.  
 
- Dickie revised Beardsley‟s theory of Metacriticism to defend the idea that, 
in order to examine the objects of criticism properly, it is first necessary to 
have a previous acquaintance with the institutionalized (relational) 
conventions that make possible the existence of the different art objects. 
Later on, Dickie would combine this approach with Danto‟s ideas about the 
artworld, to propose the first version of his institutional definition of art.  
 
Much later, in the nineties, Davies developed his own institutional theory, based 
mainly on Dickie‟s earlier institutional definition of art. However, elements from 
Danto‟s theories and even from Diffey‟s short paper (Diffey, 1969) can be found in 
his own version of the institutional theory of art, in particular his use of the 
„argument of indiscernibles‟ from Danto and of the notion of „authority‟ from 
Diffey. 
 
After these theories were presented, it became apparent that the institutional 
theories stressed, in one form or another, a new element beyond those traditionally 
endorsed (i.e., work, audience, universe and artist): the institutionalized norms and 
conventions that make possible the practice of artmaking and art appreciation and 
criticism. These later theorists would argue that anything could be an artwork (not 
just mimetic, expressionist or aesthetically pleasing works) provided it followed a 
number of institutionalized norms or conventions: theories of art, rules of display, 
the conventional behavior of the audience, and so on. I will use the term „norms‟ to 
refer, in a more synthetic manner, to the normative background that, in becoming 
institutionalized – as art theories, social conventions or types of actions – becomes 
the precondition for the introduction of new instances of art. Thus, following these 
ideas, there is a fifth element to explain what art is. As a result, we can now slightly 
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modify the way Abrams represents the focus of attention of the different theories 
concerned with the nature of art, as follows: 
 
         Universe     Norms (i.e., normative institutionalized background – theories, conventions,…)   
                \             /                   
                    Work 
                /             \ 
          Artist          Audience 
 
The different institutional theories that stress the role of the normative background 
in art, however, can be conceived as supporting also the relevance of any of the 
other four elements presented by Abrams. This is a consequence of Abrams‟s 
suggestion that any criterion can be combined with any other, so as to produce 
substantial differences between the contending theories of art. Thus, for example, 
Danto‟s definition of art (see Chapter 3) stresses the normative role of art theories in 
producing art together with ideas reminiscent of the expressionist theories of art. 
This is because he argues that artists always attempt to express something by means 
of their artworks (i.e., Danto claims in this version of the institutional theory, that 
artworks are always about something). 
 
 
1.3 Rationale of the methodology used 
 
After the institutional theory had been much discussed and criticized, it lost part of 
its original charm and only a few theorists continued to defend it in one form or 
another. The perspective afforded to us by the passing of time, however, also 
provides us with a larger number of papers, summaries and critiques of these 
different institutional theories, allowing us to have a more detached and informed 
approach to them.  
 
Stephen Davies has recently attempted to provide a summary of these theories in his 
book Definitions of Art, because he asserts that „when much of the debate is 
confined to comparatively short pieces in scholarly journals, as is the case with this 
topic, I believe there is some value in the attempt to present an overview‟ (Davies, 
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1991: x).
2
  Given his attempt to pioneer a synthesis of this debate, Definitions of Art 
is currently used as a textbook on institutional definitions of art. Although it is true 
that other books have also attempted to summarise the debate about definitions of 
art such as Hagberg in his Art as Language, Dickie in his Introduction to Aesthetics 
or even Tilghman in his book But is it Art?, nevertheless the title of Davies‟s book 
is so compelling and clear about its topic, (i.e., Definitions of Art) and it is so 
focused upon the claims of institutional theorists, that his work is taken as an 
essential introductory textbook to the debate. 
 
However, as I will argue in this thesis, Davies‟s pioneer attempt at compiling, 
summarizing and examining the institutional theories of art in a systematic manner, 
long after their novelty had faded away, raises a problem: perhaps as a consequence 
of its being a pioneer work on this topic, it provides only a partial and confusing 
account of these theories. This is because in rushing to present his own institutional 
definition of art, he first provides only a very general and oversimplified 
explanation of Dickie‟s and Danto‟s theories. This is followed by a dissection of 
their different ideas thematically (i.e., separately by topics), prior to giving a careful 
and thorough account of Danto‟s and Dickie‟s theories in their own philosophical 
context (i.e., in relation to Danto‟s and Dickie‟s overall ideas). Thus, even though 
Davies attempts to make careful conceptual distinctions and clarifications in the 
different chapters on the ideas of these two philosophers – as well as those of 
Beardsley, Diffey, Levinson, and Carroll, amongst others –, he nevertheless lumps 
together, without making the required distinctions, reflections and ideas coming 
from very different periods and works of these same authors.   
 
In this thesis, I will attempt to avoid Davies‟s misinterpretations of Danto and 
Dickie which result from an unsuitable methodology. I will take instead a more 
contextual approach, organizing the chapters by authors (Danto, Dickie, Davies) 
and each author by his different theoretical periods (Danto1, Danto2, Danto3, 
Dickie1, Dickie2 and early and later claims of Davies). Davies‟s early and later 
                                                 
2
 I am, of course, sympathetic with this claim, given that this idea is also part of the rationale of this 
research. 
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theories, however, will be developed only in a single chapter, because there is still 
an insufficient amount of secondary material to justify further treatment. While I 
acknowledge that dividing an author‟s work by periods is also something of an 
artificial distinction, I consider this to be a much better methodology to follow than 
the one used by Davies. I will thus divide the chapters in this way, before 
proceeding with the critical assessment and comparison of Danto‟s and Dickie‟s 
claims. 
 
Yet, even if this study is critical of Davies‟s attempt to summarize the institutional 
theories of art and of his attempt to give his own definition in the way he does, I 
nevertheless invite any researcher interested in this topic to read, together with this 
work, also Davies‟s Definitions of Art. This is not only for the heuristic usefulness 
of contrasting both types of interpretations of the different institutional theories of 
Danto and Dickie. It is also an acknowledgement that Davies‟s book contains 
interesting distinctions and useful clarifications that I will be unable to introduce in 
the chapters to come, given the compressed nature of the thesis I am about to 
present. 
 
As a result of the particular methodology I have taken to conduct this work, each 
chapter of the present work will be structured as follows:  
 
1) Presentation: I will provide a general introduction of the author‟s theory 
during this period. This will be followed by a brief contextualization of the 
different works (papers and books) that ought to be taken into consideration 
in order to understand the ideas developed by this author during this 
particular period. I will do this in order to make clearer the relation that 
these works bear with each other within this period and within the overall 
philosophical literature by this author.  
 
2) Exposition: I will then proceed with a thorough examination of the theories 
of this author during this particular period. I will organize the exposition of 
the author‟s thesis with some subsections dealing more specifically with the 
major topics of the works of this period. In these subsections I will focus on 
those works I regard as most relevant for understanding each of these 
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periods. In doing this, however, I do not mean to imply that other works 
within these periods are not worth reading. 
  
3) Criticism: I will finally divide this section under headings A, B,… to deal 
with those aspects of the theory that I reckon are most vulnerable to 
criticism. These critical subsections, will attempt, not only to point out the 
flaws of these theories, but also to provide the reader with a better awareness 
of what the author sometimes  seems to be attempting to claim and yet fails 
to defend or put forward appropriately.  
 
 
1.4 Objective of the thesis: main point and subpoints 
 
The main point of this thesis is to provide a critical overview of the institutional 
theories of art that substantially differs from the received views of Danto’s and 
Dickie’s theories. I claim that these received views (in plural) are today best 
exemplified by the summary of these theories presented in Davies‟s Definitions of 
Art. Other theorists, however, especially Carroll and Sclafani, seem to provide an 
account of Danto and Dickie more in accordance with the one given here. However, 
Davies‟s title of his work is so compelling and its content is so focused upon the 
debate about definitions of art, that even Carroll, in his recent introductory book on 
aesthetics (Carroll, 1999b), follows Davies in his attempt to explain the debate 
about definitions of art in terms of a divide between functionalists and 
proceduralists. I oppose this attempt here because in my view it leads to a 
significant misinterpretation of Danto‟s and Dickie‟s theories (see Chapter 7). 
 
The received views of Danto‟s and Dickie‟s theories (and also of Davies‟s), that I 
am going to introduce in each chapter, defend all or some of the following ideas:  
 
1) Danto‟s 1964 notion of the „artworld‟ is understood in terms similar to 
Dickie‟s notion of the „artworld‟ presented later in 1969. 
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2) Danto‟s theory of Transfiguration of the Commonplace (henceforth 
Transfiguration) supports the idea that an artwork (a) is always about 
something and (b) incarnates its meaning.  
 
3) Danto‟s theory of the end of art:  
 
A) Is a logical consequence of his definition of art in Transfiguration.  
 
B) Reveals the similarities between his ideas and Hegel‟s, concerning the 
nature and development of art until a final stage of a philosophical self-
understanding of art. 
 
4) Dickie‟s theory derives basically from Danto‟s paper „The Artworld‟, 
because:  
 
A) Dickie uses this same concept of „artworld‟ from Danto‟s 1964 paper in 
his 1969 paper where he first attempted to define art and he makes 
mention of it also in his successive definitions of art. 
 
B) He shares, in his 1969 paper, the idea that artworks, in order to exist, 
require a special relational „atmosphere‟ as Danto proposes in his 1964 
paper.  
 
5) Dickie‟s overall claims are best understood in terms of the final 
reformulation of his earlier definition of art in Art and the Aesthetic 
(henceforth referred to as „DK1c‟).  
 
6) Davies‟s summary of the current debate about definitions of art in terms of a 
divide between functionalism versus proceduralism is useful for clarifying 
what the different contending institutional and non-institutional theories are 
claiming. 
 
Contrary to these claims, I will oppose, chapter by chapter, these received views of 
the different institutional definitions of art by arguing, respectively, that:   
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1) Danto doesn’t conceive the artworld as an institution à-la-Dickie. Danto 
has argued in several places that his theory is not an institutional theory 
understood in terms similar to Dickie‟s. However, even if Danto‟s point has 
been more or less acknowledged, nevertheless Danto‟s notion of „artworld‟ 
is often referred to in terms similar to Dickie‟s notion (for example by 
Davies, Tilghman, Dickie or others such as Young). Contrary to this, Danto, 
in „The Artworld‟ (hereinafter identified with his D1 period), understands 
this notion in terms of the world-of-artworks. In Transfiguration the notion 
of „artworld‟ is also generally acknowledged in these terms, although it is 
true (as I will show in Chapter 3 – especially Section 3.6-C) that there are a 
few brief references to this notion closer to Dickie‟s, that may, nevertheless, 
induce the readers on the idea that Danto had always understood this notion 
in these terms. I will argue that this is not the case at all and that interpreters 
should at least (A) distinguish between Danto‟s references to the notion of 
„artworld‟ in his early 1964 paper „The Artworld‟ and in his later work 
Transfiguration and (B) distinguish in Transfiguration, between those 
references to the notion of „artworld‟ that use the term in ways similar to his 
early 1964 paper (most of the time), and those very few occasions where it 
is understood in terms closer to Dickie. 
 
2) In Transfiguration, Danto doesn’t claim that all artworks (a) are always 
about something and (b) incarnate their meaning. This is a critical 
response to Danto‟s later 1997 claim – and also to those that, like Goehr, 
Kelly and Margolis, seem to have taken Danto‟s claim at face value (Goehr, 
2007; Kelly, 2007; Margolis, 2010) – that in Transfiguration (1981) he 
defines art in those terms. A thorough examination of Transfiguration shows 
that he doesn‟t define art in this way. He provides a much more complex 
definition of art, which will be summarized in the chapter dedicated to this 
book (see Chapter 3 – in particular in Section 3.5). The definition I will 
provide, in a way, shares similar conclusions, though not identical, with 
Carroll‟s and Rollins‟s about what Danto‟s implicit definition of art in 
Transfiguration actually seems to be (Carroll, 1993; Rollins‟s definition can 
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be found in: Murray, 2003). In fact I will show that Danto‟s claim that 
artworks (a) are about something and (b) incarnate their meaning, 
correspond to a definition of his late period I will call henceforth D3, rather 
than his period that lasts until Transfiguration (hereafter this period will be 
named D2). As a result, it is possible to argue that Danto provides two 
different types of definitions: his D2 implicit definition in Transfiguration 
summarized in different ways by myself, Carroll and Rollins, and his D3 
explicit definition of art. As I will argue, the latter is an oversimplification 
and radical alteration of his early D2 terminology, based on his new 
conception about language and cognition and, above all, on his 
interpretation of Hegel. This is because he uses notions similar to Hegel‟s, in 
order to strengthen his D3 ideas and language also and essentially based on 
his interpretation of Hegel and on his rejection of the philosophy of 
language he had endorsed earlier in D2. In doing so, however Danto, and 
those who follow him on this, provide a false and biased account of his own 
ideas about the nature of art in his 1981 book. As a result, I will argue that 
anyone interested in understanding Danto‟s D2 and D3 theories should 
acknowledge the different versions of his definition of art and the reasons 
that led him to present them in such a varied manner.  
 
3) Danto’s theory of the end of art (A) is not at all a logical consequence of 
his definition of art in Transfiguration. Additionally, (B) is different 
from that of Hegel. Having demonstrated that Danto later modifies his 
1981 implicit definition of art in order to make it appear closer to his 
Hegelian ideas, it is possible to observe better (A) how his definition is not a 
logical consequence of his previous D2 theory. In D3 he fully endorses a 
whole new set of ideas about language and perception, and philosophical 
theories such as Hegel‟s theory of art, and when retrospectively revising his 
earlier theories, he presents them as if he also fully held them in D2. 
Presumably he does this in an attempt to obscure the discontinuities between 
his D2 and his D3 theories. This reveals that Danto‟s theory of art is not 
only interesting for its reflections about the history of art, but also for its 
different ideas about language and perception as well as about the definition 
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of art itself. This aspect has remained unacknowledged by Danto‟s 
interpreters with the possible exception of Carroll (Carroll, 1997). Thus, for 
example, Davies fails to see the importance that Danto‟s theory of the end of 
art has for his definition of art. Rollins and Goehr explain Danto‟s D2 and 
D3 ideas as if ab initio they formed part of the same unitary theory. Also 
other authors such as Margolis, Bacharach, etc. consider Danto‟s late D3 
period only in terms of how it contributes to re-introduce Hegel‟s idea of the 
end of art (Margolis, 1997, Bacharach, 2002), rather than for its introduction 
of a radical modification of his 1981 definition of art and for his new ideas 
about language and perception. Additionally, (B) I will criticize Solomon 
and Higgins and, in this different aspect, also Carroll, because they believe 
that Danto‟s theory of the end of art (Solomon & Higgins) and his new 1997 
definition (Carroll) are similar to Hegel‟s. Contra this opinion, I will argue 
that Danto provides a biased misinterpretation of Hegel‟s theory and 
definition so to better justify the idea that art reaches a final process of self-
understanding. 
 
4) Dickie’s theory does not derive essentially from Danto’s ‘The 
Artworld’. This results in part from showing in (1), what, Tilghman, Young 
or Davies amongst others, failed to see (i.e., that Danto‟s and Dickie‟s 
notions of „artworld‟ are different).  It is also a result of demonstrating that 
the basic and most important claims of Dickie‟s early institutional definition 
of art began to be configured before Danto‟s 1964 papers, with his 
arguments against the theories of aesthetic perception (Bullough, Vivas, 
etc.) that can be found in most of his early (pre-1964) papers. More 
specifically, in his 1962 paper „Is Psychology Relevant to Aesthetics?‟ 
Dickie already provides the first serious sketch of an early institutional 
explanation of art (see Chapter 5 – especially Section 5.3). As a result, I now 
think it is more useful, after developing this new perspective on Dickie‟s 
theories, to examine Dickie before Danto‟s theory is taken into 
consideration, in case both theories are examined together. This is because 
Dickie‟s seems now to be the precedent, rather than Danto. However, in 
case only Dickie is to be considered, then I would rather recommend 
examining Dickie‟s theory on its own without any reference to Danto. This 
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is because presenting Dickie in relation to Danto‟s theory can run the risk of 
misinterpreting Dickie‟s theories by emphasizing excessively his sharing 
certain ideas with him (e.g., the term „artworld‟, the relational condition of 
artworks, etc.). 
 
5) Dickie’s theory cannot be explained only in terms of the final 
reformulation of his early definition of art in Art and the Aesthetic (i.e., 
DK1c). This is because in his later attempt to define art (i.e., in The Art 
Circle), he rejects most of his earlier „strong‟ claims and, in particular, the 
claim that works of art are the product of an action of „status conferral‟. 
Now he asserts that artworks have to be „made‟ and thus explicitly claims 
that not everything, contrary to what his early definition seemed to imply, 
can be a work of art. Thus, assuming that the best way to understand 
Dickie‟s theory is by examining the later version of his early definition of 
art (DK1c), as for example Davies, Danto or Carroll do, is to make the error 
of absolutely ignoring the important turn that Dickie‟s institutional theory 
takes after his later reformulation in The Art Circle (see Chapter 6). 
 
 
6) Davies’s summary of the debate on definitions of art in terms of a 
debate between functionalism and proceduralism is not only confusing, 
but also leads to important misinterpretations of Danto’s and Dickie’s 
claims: This point is a criticism of those who endorse in one way or another 
Davies‟s distinction between functional and procedural definitions of art, 
such as Scholz, Graves, Österman, Matravers, Corse, Stock or Brand 
amongst others, as well as other relevant figures in this debate such as 
Dickie, Carroll or Levinson seem to endorse (although it is true that they do 
this with certain provisos or objections). This is because a thorough analysis 
of Danto‟s Transfiguration reveals, contra Davies (and also against those 
who endorse Davies‟s ideas), that Danto supports a definition of art with 
both functionalist and proceduralist elements. Also, Davies understands 
functionalisms basically in terms of aesthetic functionalism and leaves aside 
many other types of functionalism. As a result, he fails to provide a full 
exposition of the current debate about definitions of art, because there are 
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other types of functionalisms (e.g., cognitive or semantic functionalisms) 
that he never takes into account, so that he concludes that the only 
alternative to aesthetic functionalism is proceduralism. Additionally, if 
Davies‟s way of understanding the current debate about definitions of art is 
followed, then (A) Dickie‟s later definition of art, in The Art Circle, cannot 
be considered, contra Davies‟s criteria, as institutionalist. This is because 
Davies understands institutionalists as supporting the idea of works of art as 
the products of an act of „status conferral‟, while, as stated above in (5), 
Dickie no longer supports this idea in his later definition, in The Art Circle. 
(B) It leads to the obscuring, rather than the clarification, of what 
proceduralists and institutionalists are actually claiming. The problem here 
is that Davies doesn‟t provide any justification of why we are required to 
substitute the notion of „institutional theories of art‟ for that of „procedural 
theories of art‟. As a result of this and of his way of understanding 
institutionalists in terms of their supporting this idea of „status conferral‟, it 
leaves unclear whether Dickie‟s later theory is a proceduralist theory but not 
an institutionalist one, or if it is both at the same time or if he (probably) had 
simply misunderstood Dickie‟s later DK2 theory presented in The Art 
Circle, in terms of its DK1c version (see Chapter 7 on Davies‟s theories).  
 
This concludes the preliminaries. I will now begin my detailed examination of 
Danto‟s and Dickie‟s theories. 
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2. DANTO’S EARLY THEORY OF ART: ‘THE ARTWORLD’ 
 
Danto‟s „The Artworld‟ (1964) is already the locus classicus of the debates in 
contemporary aesthetics concerning definitions of art. It was central in shifting the 
criteria for defining artworks from internal, manifest properties to relational non-
manifest ones. Danto‟s particular reflections, mainly developed around the idea of 
how to distinguish between pairs of similar objects (an artwork and a non-artistic 
object or two different yet indiscernible artworks), have been central in analytic 
aesthetics since the 60‟s in re-orienting the focus of attention on the relational 
aspects of works of art. 
 
Given the attention that Danto‟s early paper „The Artworld‟ received in analytic 
aesthetics, and the debates it promoted concerning the institutional or non-
institutional nature of artworks, in this chapter I will briefly summarise and clarify 
Danto‟s principal ideas presented in that paper. In order to proceed with this 
examination, I will first take into consideration Danto‟s account of the role of 
theories that he claims are central to understanding adequately what art is. I will 
then proceed to examine Danto‟s conception of the notion of „artworld‟, a notion 
that was coined in this paper and later used also by Dickie in his attempt to provide 
his own institutional definitions of art (see Chapter 5). In the second part of this 
section I will briefly present some of the problems in Danto‟s early paper before I 
proceed to examine, in extenso, in Chapter 3, mainly Danto‟s work The 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace, where he develops further his previous ideas 
of „The Artworld‟. 
 
 
2.1 Danto on the role of theories in art 
 
Danto points out, at the beginning of „The Artworld‟, that the philosophical 
discussion concerning definitions, ever since Socrates, has always presupposed a 
prior knowledge of the concept being examined and of the instances of such a 
concept. This is relevant because it establishes, in the case we are dealing with, a 
limit to definitions of art: Danto claims that definitions of X are not intended to 
identify X‟s but to understand why they are X‟s. He also argues against Kennick‟s 
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idea that definitions of art are useless. Kennick argues that anyone with good 
language skills would be able to identify artworks in a warehouse full of artworks 
and non-artworks.  Danto rejects this on the grounds that many modern and 
contemporary artworks may be indistinguishable from everyday objects. Thus he 
argues that linguistic competence is no longer enough to identify instances of art, 
and that knowledge of artistic theories will also be required to identify artworks: 
 
It is of course, indispensable in Socratic discussions that all participants be masters of 
the concept up for analysis, since the aim is to match a real defining expression to a 
term in active use, and the test for adequacy presumably consists in showing that the 
former analyzes and applies to all and only those things of which the latter is true […] 
a theory of art, regarded here as a real definition of „Art‟, is accordingly not to be of 
great use in helping men to recognize instances of its application. Their antecedent 
ability to do this is precisely what the adequacy of the theory is to be tested against 
[…]. But telling artworks from other things is not so simple a matter, even for native 
speakers, and these days one might not be aware he was on artistic terrain without an 
artistic theory to tell him so (Danto, 1995 [1964]: 202 – 203).   
 
In „The Artworld‟, in order to understand better the ontological condition of 
artworks, Danto compares art with science. He argues that often in science new 
facts can be explained by means of older theories together with new auxiliary 
hypotheses, without the need of making any conceptual revolution. However, he 
also claims that often such facts can only be accepted after promoting important 
theoretical changes within such a discipline. That is to say, Danto argues that often 
new facts can only be explained in science once the previous theory is rejected and 
a new one is introduced (Danto, 1995 [1964]: 203).  
 
Danto argues that something similar occurred in art. The imitation theory of art 
(IT), he explains, was initially very useful to explain most types of art satisfactorily, 
and whenever the work of particular artists didn‟t fit this theory, they could be 
accused of ineptitude or madness. At some point, however, the IT theory and the 
auxiliary hypotheses that were used to explain all artistic facts became – in a way 
similar to what occurred in certain periods of the history of science – no longer 
useful to explain all instances of art. Danto argues that this became especially acute 
with post-impressionism. Hence, to accept these new types of entities as artworks, it 
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was necessary to introduce a new theory different from the IT, capable of 
explaining why these objects were actual instances of the concept of art. He calls 
this new theory the „reality theory of art‟ (or RT). Thus he argues: 
 
Suppose then, tests reveal that these hypotheses fail to hold, that the theory, now 
beyond repair must be replaced. And a new theory is worked out, capturing what it can 
of the old theory‟s competence, together with the heretofore recalcitrant facts. One 
might, thinking along these lines, represent certain episodes in the history of art as not 
dissimilar to certain episodes in the history of science, where a conceptual revolution 
is being effected and where refusal to countenance certain facts […] is due also to the 
fact that a well established, or at least, widely credited theory is being threatened in 
such a way that all coherence goes. Some such episode transpired with the advent of 
post-impressionist paintings. In terms of the prevailing artistic theory (IT), it was 
impossible to accept these as art unless inept art […]. So to get them accepted as art 
[…] required not so much a revolution in taste as a theoretical revision of rather 
considerable proportions (Danto, 1995 [1964]: 203). 
 
Actually, Danto is perfectly aware of his oversimplification of the historical 
development of art in terms of one theory (i.e., IT) as being replaced by another one 
(RT): „[to] be sure, I distort by speaking of a theory: historically there were several, 
all, interestingly enough, more or less defined in terms of the IT […] and I shall 
speak as though there were one replacing theory, partially compensating for 
historical falsity by choosing one that was actually enunciated‟ (Danto, 1995 
[1964]: 204).  
 
In fact, in reflecting on the replacement of the IT in response to the new 
phenomenon of post-impressionist artworks, Danto wants to explain that while 
previous artists expected more or less to imitate real forms, later artists left such an 
aim aside to create new real forms independently of whether their artworks 
resembled other real entities or not. He also claims that the RT is still valid for the 
current art. As he says: „[by] means of this theory (RT), artworks re-entered the 
thick of things from which Socratic theory (IT) had sought to evict them: if no more 
real than what carpenters wrought, they were at least no less real […]. It is in terms 
of RT that we must understand the artworks around us today‟ (Danto, 1995 [1964]: 
204).  
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Thus, by means of this RT, an artist may introduce a bed as an artwork, as Claes 
Oldenburg or Robert Rauschenberg did, the difference being only that these beds 
may have some paintstreaks as part of the work or may have a different shape from 
normal ones (e.g., a rhomboid shape). Such new instances of art, nevertheless, may 
pose a problem to particular individuals incapable, with reason, of distinguishing 
artworks from non-artworks. Namely, there could be somebody, Danto calls him 
Testadura, incapable of understanding that a particular exhibited object is to be seen 
as a work of art rather than simply as the real object he sees in front of him.  
 
To be able to make such types of distinction, Danto says, Testadura or anyone else 
has to master what he names as „the is of artistic identification‟. He can do this by 
means of acquiring the knowledge of a certain theory or theories that allow the 
identification of artworks. Thus by means of „the is of artistic identification‟, 
somebody may be able to identify some artistic objects constituted in part by real 
objects (e.g., a bed) or alternatively of certain artworks physically indiscernible, yet 
different, from other artworks: 
 
Testadura […] protests that all he sees [in a particular pair of indiscernible frescoes 
previously considered by Danto] is paint: a white painted oblong with a black line 
painted across it […]. We cannot help him until he has mastered the is of artistic 
identification and so constitutes it a work of art. If he cannot achieve this, he will 
never look upon artworks: he will be like a child who sees sticks as sticks […]. To see 
something as art requires something the eye cannot decry – an atmosphere of artistic 
theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld (Danto, 1995 [1964]: 208 – 209). 
 
Thus Danto stresses that what distinguishes an artwork from a similar object, such 
as Claes Oldenburg‟s bed from a non-artistic bed, or an artwork A from an 
indiscernible artwork B, is something that „the eye cannot decry‟: a certain 
„atmosphere‟ of theory that surrounds the real physical object as part of the artwork. 
Hence, following Danto, somebody like Testadura might be capable of discovering 
that the object he has in front of him is an artwork once he is given a number of 
reasons by means of a theory that justifies it as such.  
 
In fact, he says in the beginning of „The Artworld‟ that „one use of theories, in 
addition to helping us discriminate art from the rest, consists in making art possible‟ 
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(Danto, 1995 [1964]: 203). In claiming this, Danto stresses the idea that theories are 
the condition of possibility for the creation and understanding of artworks. This 
suggests that his enquiry fits better with the Kantian aim of searching for the 
conditions of possibility of an object of enquiry (i.e., in this case, art) rather than 
with his claim that it resembles scientific procedures, in which also the submitting 
of hypothesis and the role of experimentation become central. Actually, Danto 
states a few years later that „[my] own essay of 1964, which was an immediate 
philosophical response to Brillo Box, was explicitly titled “The Art World”, but it 
was less concerned with the question of what made Brillo Box a work of art than 
with the somewhat Kantian question of how it was possible for it to be one‟ (Danto, 
1992: 37).  
 
Now, Danto attempted to explain what the artworld is by arguing that „to see 
something as art requires something the eye cannot decry – an atmosphere of 
artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld‟ (Danto, 1995 [1964]: 
209). However it is not very clear in this statement, what he means by „artworld‟. 
To understand it better, it is necessary to examine the notion in more detail. 
 
 
2.2 Danto’s notion of ‘artworld’ 
 
Towards the end of this essay Danto states: 
 
What in the end makes the difference between a Brillo box and a work of art 
consisting of a Brillo Box is a certain theory of art. It is the theory that takes it up into 
the world of art, and keeps it from collapsing into the real object which it is (in a sense 
of is other than that of artistic identification). Of course, without the theory, one is 
unlikely to see it as art, and in order to see it as part of the artworld, one must have 
mastered a good deal of artistic theory as well as a considerable amount of the history 
of recent New York painting […]. The world has to be ready for certain things, the 
artworld no less than the real one. It is the role of artistic theories, these days as 
always, to make the artworld, and art, possible (Danto, 1995 [1964]: 210).  
 
This paragraph, suggests, contrary to Tilghman‟s idea, that Danto distinguishes 
between the notion of „artworld‟ and the „theories of art‟ (see: Tilghman, 1984: 47). 
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It is a particular theory of art that makes possible artworks and takes them up into 
the art world (or „world of art‟ as he alternatively says). Hence, the art world is 
basically to be understood as the world of artworks that are organised by means of 
the historical succession in which they have been created with the help of theories. 
Following Beardsley‟s suggestion, Danto understands the artworld in terms of a 
class of objects (i.e., paintings or more generically speaking, artworks) rather than 
as a class of people (Beardsley, 1976: 203). If such an understanding of the 
„artworld‟ as the-world-of-artworks is correct, this differs radically from Davies‟s 
understanding of the notion of „artworld‟ in Danto‟s earlier paper:  
  
The notion of the Artworld was presented by Danto in 1964 […]. To recognize and 
understand a work of art as such one must be able to locate it within a historical and 
social context. That context or atmosphere, is generated by the changing practices and 
conventions of art, the heritage of works, the intentions of artists, the writings of 
critics, and so forth. Taken together, these constitute an Artworld (Davies, 1991: 81; 
italics mine). 
 
In fact contra Davies, Danto never mentions that, in „The Artworld‟, he understands 
the social context (i.e., a set of persons) or the changing practices and conventions 
as forming part of the definition of the artworld. Danto does mention the new 
artistic styles based on abstract or pop art theories, amongst others, and he also talks 
about certain figures, such as Cezanne, Van Gogh or Lichtenstein, introducing new 
objects into the artworld. Davies‟s claim  that „conventions‟, „practices‟ and the 
„social context‟ constitute the „artworld‟ in Danto‟s 1964 paper, however, is a 
misreading of Danto‟s early theorisation. It is legitimate to claim that Danto‟s „The 
Artworld‟ implies the existence of intersubjective relations, practices and 
conventions that influence the artworld – i.e., the world of artworks. But this is 
clearly different from what Davies treats as Danto‟s early formulation.  
 
However, Davies‟s misinterpretation of the notion of the „artworld‟ is useful for 
him, because ultimately it allows him to claim that Danto‟s theory prefigures 
Dickie‟s institutional theory, which also uses the notion of „artworld‟ and which 
stresses the role of conventions, practices and social contexts. Davies‟s 
interpretation of Danto‟s „The Artworld‟, however, is wrong in crediting Danto with 
such a „pre-Dickiean‟ conception of the artworld when it asserts that Danto 
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„prepared the ground for an institutional account [of Dickie‟s type] of the definition 
of art‟ (Davies, 1991: 81). This overlooks the fact that Dickie‟s institutional 
conception of art began to take shape before Danto presented his early paper „The 
Artworld‟ (see Chapter 5 on Dickie, Section 5.3). 
 
In fact, it seems to be the case that Tilghman and Davies (as well as many others) 
conflate Danto‟s different notions of the „artworld‟ developed in different periods 
after 1964 (as can be observed, for example, in The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace – see Chapter 3, especially Section 3.6-C). Furthermore, in the case 
of the early Dickie and Davies, they also seem to confuse Danto‟s notion of 
artworld with their own. They also seem to conflate Danto‟s theory with other later 
institutionalist theories, in which conventions and groups of people such as artists, 
art critics and the publics of art become central (see, for example: Diffey, 1969).  
 
This, however, is perhaps in part also due to Danto‟s vagueness in explaining what 
the „artworld‟ is. Also it may have been due to some other reflections contained in 
„The Artworld‟ that are similar in appearance to the later institutional ones, such as 
when he says that „a stockroom is not an art gallery, and we cannot readily separate 
the Brillo cartons from the gallery they are in, any more than we can separate the 
Rauschenberg bed from the paint upon it. Outside the gallery, they are pasteboard 
cartons‟ (Danto, 1995 [1964]: 210). 
 
Yet this reflection, rather than necessarily pointing towards the idea that Danto is 
here supporting an understanding of the artworld à-la-Dickie, as Dickie himself 
might have thought  when first reading Danto, may be considered to be claiming 
something else. It seems rather to indicate that the relational condition of artworks 
may make some of them, due to their structural form, dependent upon particular 
sites, as in site-specific art, land art or public art. In other words, some artworks, in 
Danto‟s opinion, such as the Brillo Box cartons made by Andy Warhol, can be 
valued as the artworks that they are, only when located within the framework of a 
particular institutional or institutionalised site. But this idea doesn‟t lead necessarily 
to the conclusion that all art, to exist, must thus be intrinsically linked to these types 
of institutional sites.  Note, additionally, that Danto doesn‟t mention here the notion 
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of „artworld‟, which reinforces the idea that Danto is not supporting in this passage 
a notion of „artworld‟ similar to Dickie‟s. 
 
Also, in the last part of „The Artworld‟, after reflecting on the conditions of 
possibility for artworks to exist and be appreciated, Danto goes on to consider how 
new styles might affect the critical appreciation of past and later art. To do so, he 
introduces the method of the „style matrix‟ and discusses how this matrix might 
change as a result of how connoisseurs and other social actors might favour one 
style or another. These ideas are presented in such a way as can wrongly lead us to 
understand the artworld as a sort of social institution and as a set of institutional 
individuals rather than as a class of objects. As Danto says: „Fashion, as it happens, 
favors certain rows of the style matrix: museums, connoisseurs, and others are 
makeweights in the Artworld‟ (Danto, 1995 [1964]: 212). However, a more 
detailed examination of Danto‟s claim shows that he thinks that these persons act as 
makeweights: he believes that they have an influence upon the configuration of the 
world of artworks, not that the art world is constituted by them, as Dickie and 
Davies sometimes seem to think.  
 
Even if Danto‟s notion of „artworld‟ is thus different from Dickie‟s later usage of 
this notion, nevertheless it is true that it is still possible to claim that both support an 
institutional theory of art: Danto‟s „The Artworld‟ indicates that some artistic styles 
and theories vital for artmaking and art appreciation might become institutionalised 
guidelines or norms for artmaking. This can happen once these theories are 
favoured by some institutionally recognised social actors, such as art critics, 
connoisseurs or by certain kinds of social institutions related to art, such as 
museums or art galleries acting as makeweights (not as artworld members). 
Additionally, some years later Danto remarks that if his theory were in fact 
institutional, it would be because the art world itself has already become 
institutionalised (Danto, 1992: 38) – an idea that Danto may have already held in 
1964, although he didn‟t explicitly claim this in „The Artworld‟. 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
2.3 Some problems with Danto’s earlier theory 
 
A) Ambiguity about artistic theories in art in ‘The Artworld’ 
 
Danto says at the beginning of „The Artworld‟ that: „telling artworks from other 
things is not so simple a matter, even for native speakers, and these days one might 
not be aware he was on artistic terrain without an artistic theory to tell him so‟ 
(Danto, 1995 [1964]: 203). Later on he says: „[to] see something as art requires 
something the eye cannot decry – an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of 
the history of art: an artworld‟ (Danto, 1995 [1964]: 209). 
 
These claims point towards the idea that artworks depend upon artistic theories to 
exist and to be identified and understood as artworks. Danto presents different types 
of theories (presumably corresponding to the „atmosphere of artistic theory‟ he 
mentions – Danto, 1995 [1964]: 209) to identify and understand the different 
artworks. For example: 
 
1) He talks about the pair of theories that allowed mimetic art and non-mimetic 
art after post-impressionism (i.e., IT and RT).  
 
2) He takes recourse to scientific theories in order to explain the differences 
between two indiscernible artworks, referring to Newton‟s First and Third 
Laws.  
 
3) He talks about the implausibility of Neolithic cave-painters producing art, 
unless there were Neolithic aestheticians. So presumably, he believes that 
theories of the type considered in aesthetics, are also relevant in making 
artworks.  
 
4) As an introduction to his reflections on the „style matrix‟ he tells the reader 
that he is going to talk more about the role of theories in art, and then goes 
on talking about the different artistic styles in art. So presumably he also 
believes artistic styles (i.e., fauvism, abstract expressionism, etc.) to be 
different theories which make artworks possible.  
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The problem here is that Danto insists explicitly on the idea that artistic theories are 
necessary to make art, and then he lumps together scientific theories, aesthetic 
theories, styles and so on by implying that all of them can make up the theoretical 
atmosphere that surrounds artworks and that „the eye cannot descry‟. These, then, 
are presumably to be understood as the „artistic theories‟ he refers to as the 
necessary precondition for artmaking and for the identification of artworks – that is, 
so as to allow a proper understanding of these objects as works of art.  
 
However, if by „artistic theories‟ Danto means any theory that makes possible the 
creation and understanding of artworks, then this would be deeply problematic: in 
such a view, almost any theory used to produce artworks should count as an artistic 
theory, merely by virtue of the fact that artists use them in their making. Thus 
certain psychoanalytical theories, such as Freud‟s, which inspired Surrealists to 
make artworks ought to be regarded as artistic; the scientific theories of vision used 
by Impressionists ought to be treated as artistic for this same reason. This seems 
deeply implausible and it rather points towards the idea that Danto was too careless, 
in his early 1964 paper, in trying to specify what kinds of theories are necessary for 
making art.  
 
Another problematic aspect of the notion of „artistic theories‟ in Danto‟s early paper 
is his assertion that one might not be aware of being in an artistic terrain unless one 
is provided with some theories or explanations that allow him to realise this.  
 
The problem here is that Danto claims that artistic theories are required to 
distinguish between artworks and non-artworks, yet the examples he presents are 
cases in which the only thing that could be observed is either a physical object 
similar to another non-artistic object, or an artwork physically indiscernible from a 
different one. The problem with Danto‟s Gedankenexperiment of pairs of 
indistinguishable objects, is that it actually shows that theories per se cannot be 
used to distinguish between an artwork and its non-artistic indiscernible counterpart 
or between two indiscernible, yet distinct artworks, precisely because they are 
physically indistinguishable – i.e., there is no distinctive physical mark telling us 
which one is the artwork and which isn‟t (or which one is the artwork A and which 
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one the artwork B). Thus, when an artwork is put next to its similar non-artistic 
counterpart, it is first necessary to know already which one is the artwork and which 
one is not. Otherwise it might be possible to talk about the theory that makes a 
particular object an artwork, and yet be unable to tell which one is the artwork and 
which isn‟t, or even, to use the theory to explain the artwork while mistakenly 
pointing at its non-artistic identical counterpart which is next to it 
3
 (or, which is 
wrongly placed in an exhibit instead of the artwork). So in this case the theory is not 
useful in identifying artworks from their identical counterparts but only in allowing 
us to understand why an already identified artwork is an artwork, and one 
previously identified object is not. 
 
Thus, in this case, theories, whatever they might constitute for Danto (e.g., styles? 
different types of knowledge?, etc.) might be necessary to make artworks and to 
understand them. However, contrary to what he claims in „The Artworld‟, they are 
useless in identifying particular instances of art when, following his 
Gedankenexperiment, they are considered together with their indiscernible 
counterparts. 
 
Further, if in order to create artworks it is necessary to master a certain theory, then 
Danto‟s observation that it would „never have occurred to the painters of Lascaux 
that they were producing art on those walls. Not unless there were Neolithic 
aestheticians‟ (Danto, 1995 [1964]: 210) is irrelevant in clarifying whether the 
painters of Lascaux were making art. This is because, following his ideas about the 
role of theories in artmaking, these painters were unlikely to have absorbed any 
aesthetic theory or to have consciously thought that they were making artworks, but 
they may well have mastered a number of theories concerning the techniques (the 
use of chalk or coal) and styles (more or less realistic) required to make these 
paintings. 
 
                                                 
3
 Actually Danto, in his paper „Answer‟, imagines a similar situation in which two critics could 
disagree because one of them would be explaining an artwork A and wrongly be pointing at another 
indiscernible artwork B while  the other one would be talking about B and pointing at its 
indiscernible counterpart A („Answer‟: 82). 
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Of course, Danto could answer that, in the first place, mastering a particular theory 
about how to paint (such as how to use chalk or coal for cavepainting) is not exactly 
the same as mastering artistic theories required to make art. In the second place, he 
could argue that the Lascaux painters were not producing art because, even though 
they might have mastered the rudimentary theories needed for painting, he also 
claims that „it never had occurred to the painters of Lascaux that they were 
producing art‟. In „The Artworld‟, however, he doesn‟t insist on the idea that an 
artist, in order to make art, ought to be aware of anything (for example of an artistic 
theory). Nor does he provide any criteria for distinguishing between non-artistic 
theories and artistic theories used for artmaking. So in this case it remains unclear if 
the example he provides, about the Neolithic aestheticians, is a proof that they were 
not producing art. Contrary to Danto‟s apparent intentions, it may have been the 
case that it „never have occurred to the painters of Lascaux that they were producing 
art‟ and yet they might have produced it accidentally: this is because being aware of 
making art, and being aware of using artistic theories, is not a condition for making 
it, at least not in Danto‟s „The Artworld‟ (see Chapter 3 for Danto‟s later change of 
opinion in this respect in Transfiguration).  
 
However, Danto could respond that knowledge of the history of art is nevertheless 
essential for making artworks (Danto, 1995 [1964]: 209). In this case, then, Danto 
could defend the idea that artworks are made only by those having sufficient 
knowledge of art in the broader sense. But in that case, it could be still possible to 
argue that maybe the Lascaux painters had some knowledge about other works 
made by their predecessors, and thus mastered a type of (rudimentary) art history, 
without consciously knowing they were also making art. 
 
 
B) The is of artistic identification: distinguishing artworks from non-
artworks 
 
An idea related to the role of artistic theories in art is that of „the is of artistic 
identification‟. The problem with this theory is not only that it is very difficult to 
understand (I agree here with Davies‟s criticism of Danto – See: Davies, 1991: 
162). The problem also is that Danto, in distinguishing „the is of artistic 
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identification‟ from „the is of existence or identification‟ and „the is of identity or 
predication‟ confuses different claims concerning artworks.  
 
Thus Danto stresses the idea that, with the emergence of the Reality Theory (RT), 
artworks „re-entered the thick of things‟ from which the Imitation Theory (IT) had 
attempted to remove them. In arguing this, he seems to favour the idea that both 
„the is of identity or predication‟ and „the is of existence or identification‟ might 
apply as well to artworks qua members of this „thick of things‟ he mentions (as in 
„there is a table‟, „there is a painting‟, „this strange object is a radio‟, „this is a 
sculpture made with a bed‟ etc.). This is because Danto argues that the RT, 
repositions artworks in the realm of things from which they had been segregated in 
the past. 
 
However, Danto later goes on to claim that even though artworks might look like 
non-artistic objects (e.g., like a bed) they nevertheless are not these former objects 
but artworks. Thus, the RT notwithstanding, Danto opposes „real‟ objects to 
artworks without clarifying what artworks are. Are they illusions? Are they 
something more than real (i.e., owing to their being constituted by something real 
plus an „atmosphere‟ of theories of art)?  
 
Thus, he argues that artworks such as Oldenburg‟s bed are complex objects 
constituted in part, following his terminology, by „real‟ objects (Danto, 1995 
[1964]: 206). Because they are surrounded by an atmosphere of art theory, he 
argues, they contrast now with these real objects and are elevated to the world of 
artworks. This is thus an invitation for us to consider the idea that artworks are more 
than, or above, what he names as „real objects‟ yet still „real‟ in the sense of really 
existing.  
 
But then, when Danto goes on to reflect how objects resembling „real‟ ones can be 
identified as works of art, he introduces the idea of „the is of artistic identification‟ 
and compares this type of identification with how children can imaginatively 
identify themselves with geometrical figures (Danto, 1995 [1964]: 206) or how they 
also imaginatively identify sticks as something other than sticks (Danto, 1995 
[1964]: 208), for example as horses.  
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So in this case it seems that for Danto, „the is of artistic identification‟ invites us to 
consider the idea that artworks are not „real‟ but some sort of playful illusion or 
imaginary product provoked by the imagination of the artist and the publics of art 
(the playful imagination of children, Danto argues, would be an analogy here). This, 
however, goes against his previous analogy between art and science. It also goes 
against the idea that artworks are now to be considered in terms of the Reality 
Theory thus re-entering „the thick of things from which Socratic theory (IT) sought 
to evict them‟ (Danto, 1995 [1964]: 204). As a result, we are left to question 
whether Danto has dropped the analogies between scientific facts and artworks and 
between artworks and „real‟ objects, because now he seems to stress the idea that 
artworks are not facts in the full sense of the term, but products of the imagination, 
pure and simple. 
 
Furthermore let us concede that the theory about „the is of artistic identification‟ can 
account for artworks such as those he presents here – i.e., Claes Oldenburg‟s bed 
and Warhol‟s Brillo Boxes. Nevertheless it is not at all clear that „the is of artistic 
identification‟ would be necessary in order to also see as artworks, the less 
controversial cases of Leonardo‟s paintings, Mozart‟s piano sonatas or 
Shakespeare‟s works (Hagberg argues something similar when criticising Danto‟s 
generalisation of his theory as applicable to all types of artworks; see: Hagberg, 
2002: 499 – 500). It seems rather that these cases, and probably also all artworks, 
are identified as artworks just by means of „the is of identity or predication‟ and „the 
is of existence or identification‟, without the need of postulating any fantastic or 
imaginative way (akin to the playful imagination of children) to „see‟ things as if 
they were artworks. 
 
Besides this, Danto invites us to understand „the is of artistic identification‟, in 
order to identify artworks. But now, if we examine in more detail his reflections 
concerning „the is of artistic identification‟, we find that most of the examples he 
introduces to support his theory, are those concerning the elements of an artwork – 
i.e., not the artwork in toto. Thus, he introduces the examples of „that one is Lear‟ 
and „that white dab is Icarus‟. He also gives the examples of two indiscernible 
frescoes entitled Newton’s First Law and Newton’s Third Law in which each of the 
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constituting elements of these two abstract paintings ought to be interpreted as 
exemplifying these two theories respectively.  
 
In providing these few examples, he is rather focusing upon the idea that some 
material properties or elements of an object ought to be interpreted imaginatively as 
if they were other things, by means of using artistic and non-artistic theories: Thus 
an artistic theory is used to see the properties of Rauschenberg‟s work, scientific 
theories are used to identify the elements within the works based on Newton‟s First 
and Third Laws, or a mythological theory is used in the case of identifying a white 
dab in the work with the main character of the myth of the fall of Icarus.  
 
The problem here is that „the is of artistic identification‟ is not so much used to 
distinguish artworks from non-artworks (and thus to identify artworks), but to 
identify the elements or parts of these things we already know to be artworks. Thus, 
by using the different theories (mythical, scientific, etc.) it is possible to identify the 
elements present in these works previously acknowledged as artworks. In other 
words, we might be unable to identify a particular dab in a painting as Icarus unless 
we know the myth and recognise the portrait of Icarus. Yet, we might already know 
that we are in front of an artwork before using „the is of artistic identification‟ to 
identify the white dab as Icarus. Likewise, in the example of the pair of 
indiscernible frescoes, we might not see the painted line as the exemplification of 
Newton‟s First or Third Law unless we know what these laws are about, and 
imagine then (through „the is of artistic identification‟, akin to the playful 
imagination of children, as Danto suggests), that these lines exemplify Newton‟s 
First and Third Law. But again, in doing so, we might be already aware we are 
looking at some artistic frescoes.  
 
As a result, Danto‟s theory about „the is of artistic identification‟ confuses more 
than clarifies because it introduces and conflates several ideas that he never explains 
further: Is „the is of artistic identification‟ used to identify artworks or to identify 
imaginatively the elements in artworks? Are artworks unreal because they are akin 
to the horses imagined by children when playing with sticks? Furthermore, is he 
correct in establishing an analogy between the children‟s playful use of imagination 
and the understanding and identification of artworks and their properties? etc.  
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Besides, Danto also distinguishes between „the is of artistic identification‟, „the is of 
identity or predication‟ and „the is of existence or identification‟ without ever taking 
into consideration what we could call „soft‟ cases of art – in opposition to what 
Davies calls „hard‟ cases, when talking about Duchamp‟s Fountain or Warhol‟s 
Brillo Boxes (Davies, 1990; 1991 – see also Chapter 7).  
 
In these „soft‟ cases, maybe „the is of artistic identification‟ is useless because we 
might be already able to identify these artworks by other means such as, for 
example, by means of „the is of identity or predication‟ or „the is of existence or 
identification‟. In other words, it seems we can identify Kabalevsky‟s Cello 
Concerto no. 1 in G minor Opus 49, or Leonardo‟s painting „The Last Supper‟, as 
instances of art, without any need of using a type of „is‟ (of artistic identification) 
which for Danto is required to engage us to playfully imagine these works as if they 
were artworks – as he suggests, in a way similar to when a child playfully imagines 
a stick to be a horse or a geometrical figure to represent himself; or alternatively, as 
he also suggests, in a way similar to when we imagine a white dab to be a portrait of 
Icarus or to when we imagine an horizontal line drawn in a pair of frescoes, to be an 
exemplification of Newton‟s First and Third Law. 
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3. DANTO’S THEORY OF THE TRANSFIGURATION OF THE 
COMMONPLACE 
 
After „The Artworld‟, Danto reformulated his own theory about art. The main 
theory of this second period (I will call it D2 to distinguish it from his earlier 
reflections in „The Artworld‟, hereafter called D1) is to be found in his book The 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace (from now on Transfiguration). Note first that 
Transfiguration is a synthesis of several ideas that were developed in his 1974 
paper, also entitled „The Transfiguration of the Commonplace‟, („Transfiguration‟, 
as distinct from his book Transfiguration – in italics) and of other previous and later 
papers such as „Artworks and Real Things‟(1973) and „An Answer or Two for 
Sparshott‟ („Answer‟ – 1976). In this section I will mainly focus on analysing his 
book Transfiguration, because it is a synthesis of the main corpus of ideas 
developed after D1 (and before he formulated his theory of the end of art – see 
Chapter 4). However, where necessary for the purpose of clarification, I will 
comment on some of the ideas contained in the other early and later works. 
 
In part, Danto attempted in Transfiguration to clarify and improve upon some of his 
earlier ideas. He attempted as well to respond to some misinterpretations of „The 
Artworld‟ (1964) which thought of that paper as supporting an institutional theory 
similar to the theory that Dickie would later present in 1969. As a result, he not only 
introduced substantial modifications to his previous D1 theory but, in doing so, 
altered as well the notion of „artworld‟ itself.  
 
 
3.1 Towards the Transfiguration of the Commonplace 
 
As previously mentioned, Danto‟s aim in „The Artworld‟ was to understand in a 
Kantian fashion the conditions of possibility for art-making and art identification, 
rather than to explain, in definitional terms, what art is. In Transfiguration, 
however, he is more interested in defining what art is, and thus in discovering the 
necessary and sufficient features that constitute each and every instance of art. For 
this reason, to distinguish the different aims of „The Artworld‟ and Transfiguration, 
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it is necessary to distinguish between Danto‟s ideas about the search for the 
conditions (of possibility) for the making and identification of art (in both „The 
Artworld‟ and Transfiguration) and the search for the defining features of artworks 
(in Transfiguration but not in „The Artworld‟).4  
 
In „The Artworld‟, Danto introduced the idea of artworks that are indistinguishable 
from „real‟ objects. As I argued earlier, he explored this possibility in order to 
explain not only how artworks could be possible, but also to explain how it could be 
possible to distinguish artworks, partially constituted by „real‟ objects, from „real‟ 
objects themselves or from other distinct but indiscernible artworks. In this case, the 
criterion for understanding that something is an artwork, he argued in „The 
Artworld‟, is the use of a certain „artistic theory‟ as well as certain knowledge of the 
history of art. However, I pointed out earlier the ambiguity of the notion of „artistic 
theory‟, as well as that concerning „the is of artistic identification‟, in Danto‟s early 
paper.  
 
In Transfiguration, Danto attempts to correct this ambiguity, by distinguishing 
between the artistic theory used to explain a determinate set of artworks, for 
example the theory used to support and understand art movements such as 
Impressionism, Abstract Expressionist Art or Pop Art, and the types of theories 
used to respectively make and understand individual artworks. To do so he first 
introduces the idea of the „aboutness‟ of the artwork, by suggesting that individual 
artworks are always made with the purpose of being about something, having a 
meaning, or content or a subject.
5
 Such „aboutness‟ following Danto, could be 
achieved by means of particular extra-artistic theories (e.g., an artwork may be 
about Newton‟s theories). He also introduces the notion of „interpretation‟, that 
                                                 
4
 Even though sometimes in „The Artworld‟ he seems to endorse the RT (reality theory) as 
appropriate to define current art. 
5
 Henceforth, to make the reading easier, I will most of the times, refer to the artwork being about 
something, having a meaning, or a content or a subject, in terms of the „aboutness‟ of the artwork (he 
also uses this notion is in some passages – see for example in: Transfiguration: 3, 52, 69, 81, 85). I 
will, however, discuss Danto‟s attempt to present all these notions (being about something, having a 
meaning or a content or a subject) as if they were synonyms in Section 3.6-A. 
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refers to the theoretical understanding of what particular artworks are meant to be 
about.  
 
To explain what art is, Danto poses at the beginning of Transfiguration the case of a 
number of artworks and non-artworks with their surfaces completely painted red, 
and reflects on the possibility that each of these artworks would be indiscernible 
from one another, as well as from the other non-artistic objects. Yet, he argues, each 
of these objects would have a different set of properties, either because of their 
particular „aboutness‟ (an idea that wasn‟t considered in „The Artworld‟), or 
because of their complete lack of „aboutness‟, which would prevent their being 
artworks.  
 
In fact, this particular set of red indiscernibles was first introduced by Danto in his 
1976 paper „Answer‟ in order to clarify some questions formulated by Sparshott, 
concerning Danto‟s paper „Transfiguration‟ (1974). In „Transfiguration‟, Danto first 
argued that even if a canvas were empty, nevertheless if such a canvas were an 
artwork, it would be the sort of thing entitled to have a title, while non-artistic 
things are not entitled to have a title. In stressing the role of titles in artworks as he 
had already done in „Answer‟, he aims to show that the emptiness of 
representational content in artworks doesn‟t necessarily lead to the emptiness of 
explanatory content.  
 
Actually Danto had already proposed by 1973 (in „Artworks and Real Things‟) that 
by means of their artworks, artists are attempting to make statements about things 
and that this is so because, he claims, art is a language of sorts. In this sense, he 
argues later in his reply to Sparshott that „only with reference to the statements [that 
the different artists are making by means of their respective artworks] can we say 
what the work is about, if it is about anything at all‟ („Answer‟: 81). So in his 1976 
reply, he seems to imply that artworks are the right sorts of thing to be about 
something although not all artworks are necessarily about something (i.e., some 
may not be about anything at all).
6
 In Transfiguration (1981), he finally claims that 
                                                 
6
 Although some paragraphs later he also tries to show that even empty artworks that attempt to 
demonstrate that not all art is about something „in meaning to refute that theory [that all artworks are 
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all artworks are representational in the sense of being semantic vehicles of 
representation as words are (Transfiguration: 79 – 82), and as a result they are 
about something – as he most of the times says – or have content or a subject or a 
meaning (Transfiguration: 139). 
 
 
3.2 Danto’s theory of Transfiguration (I): artistic theories, ‘aboutness’, 
history and intention. 
 
Now, in Transfiguration, Danto examines other theories or definitions of art in 
order to formulate his own. One of the theories he examines thoroughly is the 
mimetic theory of art that he had presented as IT (imitation theory) and only 
superficially examined in „The Artworld‟. By examining the idea of mimetic 
representations and mimetic theories of art, he attempts to clarify some of the 
differences between artworks and their indiscernible non-artistic counterparts that 
no mimetic theory can account for. He also attempts to show the differences 
between mimetic theories of art and his own theoretical approach. This is because 
both theories strongly rely on the idea of reflecting about artworks that aim at 
faithful representations of „real‟ objects or events.  
 
But in critically examining the mimetic theory of art in order to propose his own 
approach, based upon the problem of indiscernibles, Danto ends up supporting 
another pre-existing theory of art. As Dickie and Carroll point out, Danto‟s 
emphasis on the „aboutness‟ of artworks in Transfiguration leads him to endorse a 
theory of art that, in Dickie‟s opinion, is reminiscent of the expressionist theories of 
Langer (Dickie, 1993: 76) and in Carroll‟s opinion, of Tolstoy  (Carroll, 1993: 87). 
In fact, in Transfiguration Danto at times openly plays with the idea of his own 
theory being close to expressionist theories of art (Transfiguration: 165 – 208). 
Later on, he fully endorses this idea when responding to Dickie and Carroll (Danto, 
1993: 204 – 206). The problem with this, however, as both Dickie and Carroll point 
                                                                                                                                        
about something], it proves to be about the theory it rejects‟ („Answer‟: 81). Nevertheless this 
doesn‟t lead him to assert that hence all artworks are always about something (at least not in 
„Answer‟). 
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out, is that expressionist theories of art, in one form or another, were already 
rejected as appropriate theories to explain all instances of art and their unifying 
function. However, Danto doesn‟t think of this as a problem for his theory, 
(although he acknowledges some of the criticisms made against expressionist 
theories of art – see: Transfiguration: 6), and he develops this idea in several places, 
particularly in chapter 7 of Transfiguration, to explain why an expressionist theory 
of art, such as his, is fundamentally correct. 
 
Danto‟s aim in Transfiguration is not only to examine and reject the mimetic 
theories of art, aesthetic theories of the Beardsley type or as Deveraux points out, 
formalist theories of art of Bell‟s type (Deveraux, 1984). He also attempts to reject 
the institutional theory of art à-la-Dickie. This is because, as explained in Chapter 2, 
some interpreters of Dickie‟s theories (as well as Danto himself), conceive of 
Dickie‟s theory as being inspired by „The Artworld‟ (Davies, 1991: 81; see also: 
Transfiguration: viii).
7
  
 
Thus, in Transfiguration, Danto attempts to undermine such a conception by 
arguing that the institutional theory, and by this he means Dickie‟s theory, is unable 
to explain satisfactorily what art is (Transfiguration: 31 – 32). He argues that:  
 
1) Institutional theories (i.e., of Dickie‟s type) cannot explain why a 
particular object is elevated as an artwork. 
 
2) Such an approach cannot account for the different features between 
artworks and their indiscernible non-artistic counterparts. 
 
3) Even if being an „artwork‟ is an honorific title, as institutionalists 
seem to claim, the honorific predicates, he argues, must always be 
                                                 
7
 Even Dickie himself in his early attempt to define art considers this, although he later on rejects 
such an idea by acknowledging the central influence of Beardsley in his theories (see Chapter 5, 
Section 5.3). 
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supported by certain criteria. That is to say, honorific predicates must 
always be earned. 
 
4) Institutionalists cannot account in their theories for the defeating of 
the conditions of something being an artwork. In other words, he 
argues that even if they may be able to explain why something is an 
artwork, because of the institutional framework in which the artwork 
is presented, they nevertheless cannot explain why other identical 
objects (e.g., other objects located in musems together with actual 
artworks) are not artworks at all. 
 
In fact, Danto argues that, unlike himself, institutional theorists of art of Dickie‟s 
type, stress the role of context for reasons analogous to those of earlier 
Wittgensteinian theorists of human action, in their rejection of any theoretical 
explanation that would lend support to any sort of mentalism of the dualist type. To 
avoid any intentionalist explanation of art, when distinguishing between two 
indiscernible actions (my raising my arm and my arm going up) and between 
indiscernible artworks, these theoreticians stress the notion of the normative context 
in which the action occurs or in which the object is created and exhibited. As Danto 
says: 
 
Now in the field of action theory, it has proved instructive to ask, in the manner of 
Wittgenstein, what it is that is left over when, from the fact that you raise your arm, 
you substract the fact that your arm goes up […]. An early Wittgensteinian solution 
was this: an action is a bodily movement that is covered by a rule […] in the parallel 
theory of art […] a material object (or artifact) is said to be an artwork when so 
regarded from the institutional framework of the artworld […]. Decriers of the Internal 
World, conflationists of mentalism with dualism, the Wittgensteinians fled to the 
externalities of institutional life rather than admit the compromising internalities of 
mental life (Transfiguration: 4 – 6). 
 
Yet, Danto is well aware that Aristotle‟s theory of mimesis also justifies some of 
these normative-contextual ideas later supported by institutional theorists of art: 
Aristotle‟s mimetic theory, as opposed to Plato‟s, stressed the idea that an imitation 
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per se is not what gives pleasure to its public. He argued that in fact it is the 
knowledge that such an event or object is an imitation, that ultimately gives us 
pleasure. Actually, Danto endorses Aristotle‟s claim that an artwork cannot be 
successful if it cannot be distinguished from deceptive illusion or from reality and 
that the pleasure we have in watching a tragedy is due to the knowledge that what 
we are watching is not a real event but the product of an artistic praxis – for 
example, the staged killing of Oedipus‟ father. For this reason Danto, following 
Aristotle and to a certain extent institutional theorists too, accepts that what makes 
possible the arousal of pleasure in art is the knowledge that such artistic practices 
are a result of a normative context that puts such types of objects of experience at an 
ontological distance from real life (Transfiguration: 23 – 24).  
 
Danto, however, also asserts that even if the implicit knowledge of the normative 
context in which artworks are created and exhibited is relevant, this is not enough to 
explain what art is. In order to demonstrate this, he introduces other sets of 
indiscernibles which clarify the ontological differences between artworks and their 
non-artistic counterparts that no institutional theory can account for.  
 
Thus Danto argues that in fact there are irreducible differences between the features 
of a non-artistic object, such as one resembling Rembrandt‟s The Polish Rider, and 
the actual artwork The Polish Rider. These differences, he argues, are the reason for 
placing them in two different ontological categories; it is not just a matter of the 
institutional consequences of such a classification, as certain institutionalists would 
argue. In this respect Davies‟s argument is a result of completely misinterpreting 
Danto‟s theory (see: Davies, 1991: 82). Danto believes that it is necessary to take 
into account, against Wittgensteinian theorists of action and against institutional 
theorists, that artworks are always the product of an intention by the artist seeking 
to produce a work with a particular „aboutness‟. In contrast, he argues, their non-
artistic counterparts are not about anything. This is because there is no artistic 
intention behind non-artistic objects or events, willing to give them a particular 
„aboutness‟; such is the case of the splattered surface that resembles The Polish 
Rider (Transfiguration: 48).  
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To clarify the notion of the „aboutness‟ of artworks and the intentionality of the 
artist, Danto offers several other sets of indiscernibles: one is Borges‟s example of 
Menard‟s version of Don Quixote, indiscernible but different from that of 
Cervantes;  the other is the pair of indiscernible neckties respectively painted in 
blue by Picasso and a child.  
 
In dealing with Borges‟s proposal about the two indiscernible versions of Don 
Quixote, Danto attempts to show that the „aboutness‟ of the artwork is necessarily 
shaped by the historical and cultural context in which the work is created. The 
works by Cervantes and Menard are intrinsically different because:  
 
Borges tells us that the Quixote of Menard is infinitely more subtle than that of 
Cervantes, while that of Cervantes is immeasurably more coarse than its counterpart 
even though every word contained in the Menard version can be found in Cervantes‟ 
and in the corresponding position. Cervantes “opposes the fiction of Chivalry the 
tawdry provincial reality of his country”. Menard on the other hand (on the other 
hand!) selects for its reality “the land of Carmen during the century of Lepanto and 
Lope de Vega”. These are of course descriptions of the same place and time, but the 
mode of referring to them belongs to different times (Transfiguration: 35). 
 
In the case of the two different neckties, Danto insists that Picasso‟s intention in 
painting the necktie, as an artistic act, is based upon his deep knowledge of the 
history of art (and thus of theories of art throughout history). The child, on the other 
hand, would lack this kind of internalised deep knowledge; thus his act of painting 
the necktie blue would be a response to his own personal intentions, rather than an 
intentional response to produce a statement related to the historical development of 
art up until then by creating an artwork (Transfiguration: 39 – 51). The child‟s 
necktie wouldn‟t be an artwork at all because it would lack any kind of artistic 
statement; it would be a mere non-artistic necktie painted in blue and for this reason 
it wouldn‟t be about anything at all. Picasso‟s necktie, Danto argues in both 
„Artworks and Real Things‟ and Transfiguration, would be an artwork because it 
would contain a kind of statement about art and the history of art, and hence it 
would be about something. 
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3.3  Danto’s theory of Transfiguration (II): the analogy between art and 
language 
 
In stressing the notion of the „aboutness‟ of artworks in Transfiguration, Danto 
establishes as well an analogy between art and language – particularly in the chapter 
„Philosophy and Art‟. This analogy wasn‟t taken into consideration at all in „The 
Artworld‟ and was first introduced in his paper „Artworks and Real Things‟ (Danto, 
1973: 561). He argues later, in Transfiguration, that artworks have a similar 
function to words, in representing and producing statements about the world from a 
certain ontological distance. To defend this thesis about artworks as vehicles of 
meaning analogous to words, he refers to Wittgenstein‟s theory of language in the 
Tractatus. 
 
Furthermore, besides establishing an analogy between art and language, particularly 
in terms of his own interpretation of the Tractatus,
8
 Danto also argues that, in fact, 
Wittgenstein‟s ideas contained in this work exemplify perfectly the origins of 
philosophical thinking since ancient Greece: he argues that philosophical thought 
began when a distinction between reality and appearance (or representation) was 
established, in order to distinguish between true descriptive claims about reality and 
false or misleading ones. To defend this thesis, he also refers to, and develops 
further, Nietzsche‟s ideas in The Birth of Tragedy (Transfiguration: 18 – 29; 76 – 
77).
9
  
 
Danto argues that both philosophy and (mimetic) art arose with the establishment of 
a distinction between reality and appearance (or representation). Once this division 
was established, he argues, it became possible to do philosophy and to understand 
                                                 
8
 Actually Danto seems to be supporting a standard interpretation about the early Wittgenstein‟s 
theory. To see some responses to the standard interpretations, see Cora Diamond‟s and James 
Conant‟s works (Diamond, 2000; Conant, 2000. Both in: Crary & Read, 2000). Other opposing 
positions to this standard interpretation can be found in this same volume. See also Section 3.6-A of 
this Thesis for some criticisms of Danto when holding this line of interpretation of the Tractatus. 
9
 In fact Danto had, in his 1974 paper „Transfiguration‟, already used Nietzsche‟s theory to support 
his own claims, about the distance between art and reality (see: „Transfiguration‟: 146). 
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words and linguistic statements of fact as attempting to describe correctly the real 
world. In a similar fashion, Danto argues, artworks, as semantic vehicles of 
representation, would also differ from „real‟ objects. This is, he argues, because 
artworks would either make statements about these „real‟ objects (i.e., they would 
be about something) or because they would mirror them qua indiscernible objects 
representing or appearing as if they were the „real‟ ones. Thus Danto says: 
 
My thought is that philosophy begins to arise only when the society within which it 
arises achieves a concept of reality […] that can happen only when a contrast is 
available between reality and something else – appearance, illusion, representation, art 
– which sets reality off in a total way and puts it at a distance. For me, in many ways 
the paradigm of a philosophical theory is what we find in the Tractatus where a 
contrast is drawn between the world, on the one side, and its mirror image in discourse 
on the other […]. What I want to propose on the basis of these immensely schematic 
and vulnerable remarks, is that works of art are of the right sort to be bracketed with 
words, even though they have counterparts that are mere real things, in the respect that 
the former are about something (or the question of what they are about may 
legitimately arise). Artworks as a class contrast with real things in just the same way in 
which words do, even if they are in “every other sense” real (Transfiguration: 78 – 
82). 
 
Now, this analogy that Danto establishes in D2 between language and art, helps 
solve in part, the question that arose in the previous Chapter, about how to 
distinguish artworks from mere „real‟ things: artworks are now to be considered as 
semantic vehicles of representation that, like words, refer to „real‟ things.  
 
 
3.4 Danto’s theory of Transfiguration (III): rhetoric, metaphor and 
transfiguration. 
 
To further clarify the semantic condition of artworks, Danto reflects upon the use of 
rhetoric, as a linguistic form of expressing facts, fashioned in such a way as to 
persuade the audience. With this he attempts to show that artworks are the products 
of some sorts of rhetorical devices (i.e., style and manner), used to point the 
audience towards the correct interpretation expressed by the artwork in question. In 
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developing this view of rhetoric, he also introduces the idea that artworks are 
similar to metaphors, qua rhetorical tropes of sorts.  
 
Thus Danto proposes that artworks and their non-artistic indiscernible counterparts 
with the same extensional properties cannot be exchanged, because, he argues, 
artworks have an ontological condition analogous to metaphors: Danto argues that 
metaphors cannot be replaced by synonymous words because this would modify the 
whole of the originally intended phrase (e.g., „my dreams are dark fields‟ may not 
have the same meaning as „my dreams are black meadows‟). Analogously, artworks 
cannot be exchanged, and this is because, Danto argues, what is relevant in art is not 
only the content of the artwork but also the singular form by which this content is 
represented or takes place. Thus Danto says:  
 
[If] the structure of artworks is, or is very close to the structure of metaphors, then no 
paraphrase or summary of an artwork can engage the participatory mind in at all the 
ways that it can […] the structure of the metaphor has to do with some features of the 
representation other than content. It is this that would explain why the difference 
between artworks and mere representations is not a simple matter of differences of 
content […] metaphors have an intensional structure, it being one of the marks of such 
structures that they resist substitutions of equivalent expressions […]. From my 
perspective it will have sufficed to have shown that metaphors embody some of the 
structures I have supposed artworks to have: they do not merely represent subjects but 
properties of the mode of representation itself must be a constituent in understanding 
them (Transfiguration: 173 – 189). 
 
It follows, then, that in an exhibit about Warhol, exchanging Warhol‟s Brillo Boxes 
for the Brillo Boxes entitled Not Andy Warhol made by the appropriationist artist 
Mike Bidlo would alter the whole idea of the exhibit. The exhibit would not now 
refer only to Warhol‟s works but rather (or in addition) to the works of artists that 
Warhol inspired.  
  
Thus, Danto‟s reflections lead him also to examine the relations between form and 
content in art. On the one hand, the „aboutness‟ of artworks seems to point to the 
idea that it is the representational and the semantic content that plays a major role in 
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art, and that the form is irrelevant in distinguishing between artworks and their 
artistic and non-artistic counterparts. Also the idea of indiscernibility in art seems to 
reproduce the mimetic project of turning invisible (or, as Danto says, transparent) 
the medium of the indiscernible object (Transfiguration: 151). On the other hand, 
he also introduces some examples of artworks, such as Menard‟s and Cervantes‟ 
Don Quixote and The Polish Rider, as actual instances of artworks possessing the 
same content than their indiscernible counterparts, yet ontologically distinct to 
them. Additionally, the fact that some artistic predicates (e.g., „is a powerful 
drawings of flowers‟) may apply to artworks but not to their non-artistic denoted 
objects (i.e., the mentioned flowers might not be particularly powerful in any sense 
– Transfiguration: 157) seems to point to the idea that the represented object qua 
content of the artwork alone cannot per se establish the difference but that the form 
or medium or representation also seems to play a central role: 
 
If illusion is to occur, the viewer cannot be conscious of any property that really 
belongs to the medium […] and this requirement is perfectly symbolised by the pane 
of glass which is presumed transparent […]. But imitation evidently did not entail 
illusion in Aristotle‟s scheme. In Plato it evidently did […]. Taken as a theory of art, 
what the imitation theory [as understood by Plato] amounts to is a reduction of the 
artwork to its content, everything else being supposedly invisible […]. My aim is to 
show that this is part of the reason the imitation theory cannot serve to differentiate 
artworks from the pertinent class of representations which are just like them in the 
sense of having the same content. As I have shown, content alone cannot do the trick 
(Transfiguration: 151).  
 
The latter ideas support Danto‟s conclusion, inspired by Aristotle‟s, that the 
medium of the represented object also plays a major role in artistic representations 
(Danto, 1981: 151 – 160). This, Danto argues, makes it possible to see the object as 
an artwork and ultimately to see the world through the artist‟s eyes by means of the 
formal projection of the artist‟s own style onto the physical medium of the artwork. 
As a result, the artist provides the denoted object with a certain style or coloration, 
as Danto says, following Frege‟s notion of Farbung (Transfiguration: 163).  
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For Danto, the content of the artwork is intrinsically configured by the relation 
between the object denoted and the properties of the form or medium of 
representation. In fact, he argues, a work acquires an objectively interpretable 
meaning, intended by the artist, who is historically and culturally located and who is 
using a number of artistic theories. This meaning, he claims, is embedded in the 
formal properties of the artwork by means of the artist‟s own style. As a 
consequence, he thinks that such a work is transfigured into an artwork possessing 
now, not just the properties of the represented content, but also the properties of the 
medium of presentation as well as a semantic content or „aboutness‟, given by the 
artist, to be appropriately interpreted by the audience. Thus Danto stresses the idea, 
already hinted in „Answer‟, that every artwork allows one and only one possible 
interpretation of the statement that the artist intends to provide to his artwork (see: 
„Answer‟:  81). As he asserts in Transfiguration: „An object o is then an artwork 
only under an interpretation I, where I is a sort of function that transfigures o into a 
work [of art]: I(o)=W. Then even if O is a perceptual constant, variations in I 
constitute different works‟ (Transfiguration: 125).  
 
Later on, Danto reflects again on the process of transfiguration and its relation with 
the form of presentation of the artwork, as well as with its analogical relation to 
metaphors. He does this when discussing the example of Lichtenstein‟s painting, 
based on Loran‟s diagram of Cezanne‟s portrait of his wife: 
 
In the one case [Loran‟s diagram of Madamme Cezanne] the diagram maps the eye‟s 
trajectory, more or less. In the other [i.e., Lichtenstein‟s artwork], as we saw, the 
intention is wholly different. We may interpret it as a metaphor in this sense: it is as it 
were the Portrait of Madame Cezanne as a diagram […] to see that portrait as a 
diagram is to see that artist as seeing the world as a schematized structure. In order for 
the viewer to collaborate in the transfiguration, he must of course know the portrait, 
know the diagram of Loran and accept certain connotations of the concept of the 
diagram, and then he must infuse that portrait with those connotations. So the artwork 
is constituted as a transfigurative representation rather than a representation tout court, 
and I think this is true of artworks […]. To understand the artwork is to grasp the 
metaphor that is, I think, always there (Transfiguration: 172).  
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3.5 Danto’s theory of Transfiguration (IV): defining art 
 
In brief, Danto, in Transfiguration, argues that an artwork: 
 
1) Is a semantic vehicle of representation: Danto argues that an artwork is 
always representational in the semantic sense of the term (like words are par 
excellence) and as a result, always is about something, or has a particular 
meaning, expressive content or a subject. 
 
2) Is the product of the artist‟s intentions: Danto is against those supporting an 
anti-mentalist explanation of art, such as, he thinks, Dickie does. Thus he is 
able to support the idea that intentionality is essential in creating works of 
art.  
 
3) Is to be interpreted correctly by the publics: an artwork has a univocally 
correct interpretation owing to its being an expressive-semantic vehicle of 
representation with a particular meaning intended by the artist.  
 
4) Is intrinsically related to the historical and cultural context in which it is 
created: to interpret correctly an artwork, one must understand the context in 
which the artwork is created.  
 
5) Is dependent upon an artistic theory or theories: artistic theories allow us to 
interpret an artwork‟s „aboutness‟ correctly. 
 
6)  Is created in relation to an internalised knowledge of the history of art: a 
specific knowledge about the history of art is necessary to make artworks. 
This is the reason why Danto believes that children cannot succeed in 
making art. 
 
7) Is characterized by the relations between its physical medium and its 
semantic content (its „aboutness‟): an artwork cannot be substituted by its 
indiscernible counterpart because it is valued for the interplay of its 
extensional and intensional properties. 
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However, even if these ideas seem to be implicitly endorsed by Danto, he doesn‟t 
explicitly summarise this definition in Transfiguration. In fact, Carroll and Rollins 
have also attempted to summarise what Carroll refers to as Danto‟s „implicit 
definition‟ in Transfiguration.10 Further, Carroll argues that, as far as he is aware, 
Danto doesn‟t provide any explicit summary of his definition of Transfiguration 
until much later, with the publication of his book After the End of Art (Carroll, 
1997: 386). In this later book, Danto claims that his theory of Transfiguration 
asserts that „[to] be a work of art is to be (i) about something and (ii) to embody its 
meaning‟ (After: 195).  
 
Carroll is, however, surprised that Danto‟s explicit definition doesn‟t include any 
other conditions that he believed to be central to the theory of Transfiguration. Thus 
he is astonished not to find in Danto‟s new definition, any reference to the 
importance of theories in art, which he felt it was necessary (as I also do) to 
mention in order to reconstruct Danto‟s 1981 „implicit‟ definition.  
 
In order to understand why Danto summarises his D2 definition as he does, in what 
I call his D3 period (basically the period that begins in 1984 and that is focused 
around the idea of the end of art – for a detailed account of Danto‟s theories in this 
period see Chapter 4), it is necessary to understand that Danto‟s D3 period is largely 
inspired by (his interpretation of) Hegel‟s theories. It is, therefore, not surprising 
                                                 
10
 Carroll‟s implicit definition of Transfiguration runs as follows: „Something X is a work of art if 
and only if: (a) X has a subject (i.e., X is about something), (b) about which X projects some attitude 
or point-of-view (this may also be described as a matter of X having a style), (c) by means of 
rhetorical ellipsis (generally, metaphorical ellipsis), (d) which ellipsis, in turn, engages audience 
participation in filling-in what is missing (an operation which can also be called interpretation), (e) 
where the works in question and the interpretations thereof require an art-historical context (which 
context is generally specified as a background of historically situated theory)‟ (Carroll, 1993: 80). 
Rollins also presents Danto‟s implicit definition of art in the following terms: „[1] Art is always 
about something. [2] It also expresses the attitude or point of view of the artist with respect to 
whatever is about. [3] It does this by means of metaphor [4] Metaphorical representation and 
expression always depend on a historical context [5] The contents of artistic representation and 
expression are largely constituted by interpretation‟ (in the section on Danto in: Murray, 2003: 90). 
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that Danto‟s summary of his D2 definition, presented in D3, is strikingly similar to 
Hegel‟s (see for example: Danto, 1997: 194 – 195). This is because it appears that 
Danto‟s explicit definition is an oversimplified version of the ideas found in 
Transfiguration, which is presented now as similar to Hegel‟s ideas in order to 
strengthen his D3 claims about the end of art (based also on Hegel).  
 
Thus, after a careful examination, it is possible to observe that Danto‟s later explicit 
version of his earlier implicit definition is actually a biased version designed to 
conceal the discontinuities between the ideas he held in D2 and D3. If this is 
correct, Danto‟s late period based around the theory of the end of art is not only 
important for its philosophical significance and for the debates it provoked, but also 
for understanding why he reformulates the implicit definition of Transfiguration. 
Thus, Carroll‟s and Rollins‟s summaries (and mine presented above) allow us to 
challenge Danto‟s later account – although Danto does later accept that there might 
be more conditions than just the two that he explicitly recalled (for example, as he 
argues in his paper „Art and Meaning‟ – Danto, 2000: 132; also in The Madonna of 
the Future) 
 
Yet, Carroll, is not completely correct in claiming that it is in After the End of Art 
that Danto first explicitly summarises his definition of art in a way (suspiciously) 
similar to Hegel – and different from his account in Transfiguration: other attempts 
can be found in some of his post-Transfiguration papers, that led him to (re-) 
formulate his 1981 definition as he finally does in 1997. It is important to trace the 
evolution of Danto‟s later claims regarding his 1981 work, in order to avoid, when 
examining Danto‟s definition and theory of Transfiguration, his post-1981 
„coloration‟ of these claims. Once this clarification is done, it will be possible to 
return to Danto‟s theory of Transfiguration and proceed towards the criticisms of 
this theory.  
 
In his 1989 introduction to his book Encounters and Reflections – Art in the 
Historical Present (which is a compilation of some of his works as an art critic), 
Danto had already quoted Hegel‟s ideas in which he later bases his own definition 
of art. It seems, however, that he did this here, mainly in order to reflect about the 
role of art criticism that, for him (Danto), is concerned with understanding the 
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meaning of the artworks he examines. Thus he says that criticism should take into 
account Hegel‟s claim that „beautiful art‟ is „the idea given sensuous embodiment‟ 
and this idea, Danto argues, is what the critic has to find (Danto, 1990 [1986]: 8). 
Danto‟s early attempts to present his own definition of art following a formula 
similar to that of Hegel‟s, however, seem to occur, at least more explicitly, in his 
1991 paper „Description and the Phenomenology of Perception‟.   
 
In this 1991 paper Danto returns to some of the issues he had already addressed at a 
conference in 1983 (later summarised in his paper „Language, Art, Culture, Text‟ – 
reprinted in: Danto, 1986). He does this by reflecting on the differences between 
pure optical perception which does not require any cultural knowledge whatsoever 
– the type of perception that he imagines is typical of animals – and a more 
sophisticated type of perception whereby interpretation is connected to certain 
forms of cultural knowledge and linguistic acquisition.
11
 Danto argues that artworks 
exemplify this latter type of perception and he thinks that they validate the idea, 
based on Wittgenstein‟s Philosophical Investigations (henceforth PI), that there is 
not a complete detachment between language on the one side and the experience of 
the world on the other but that „experience is indelibly linguistic‟ (Danto, 1991: 
204). Danto presents also the ideas from post-Wittgensteinian theories of science, 
such as Kuhn‟s or Hanson‟s, that insist that in science observations are theory-laden 
and that there is no „innocent eye‟ but rather that „language penetrates perception‟ 
(Danto, 1991: 205).  
 
Danto, following this discussion, argues that artworks are not pure perceptual signs 
(that in his opinion, even animals can understand) but rather symbols, which require 
linguistic and cultural mediation in order to interpret them (Danto, 1991: 211) and 
thus he says that „[my] sense is that the experience of art descriptions really does 
penetrate perception, but this is because perception itself is given the structure of 
thought‟ (Danto, 1991: 214; italics mine). To support this, he presents an artwork 
from Guercino, which not only requires for its understanding, a linguistic and 
                                                 
11
 For yet more references, Danto later on presents a somewhat more refined account about the 
relations between language and representation in his papers from the symposium on „the historicity 
of the eye‟ (in: Danto, 2001; 2001b).  
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cultural background, but also knowledge about the history of art (Danto, 1991: 213 
– 214). In reflecting on Guercino‟s work, he connects the ideas critical to the notion 
of „the innocent eye‟, he has previously summarised, and Hegel‟s theory of art, 
which is presented almost as if it were a clear antecedent of his own theory of 
indiscernibles. Thus he says in relation to this painting:  
 
[The] significations language enables us to grasp are abstract beyond the animal‟s 
means: the bird [in Guercino‟s work] for the Holy Spirit, for example. To see the bird 
and to know that it means (signifies) the Holy Spirit may not be phenomenologicaly 
distinct from seeing the bird tout court. What further takes place may not take place at 
the level of perception but at the level of interpretations and connotation. The entirety 
of what Hegel calls Symbolic Art is in external relationship to its meaning: we don‟t 
see the meaning through the symbol but connect it with the symbol. But there may be 
a more internal connection than this, as Hegel acknowledges in his category of 
Classical, and especially of Romantic Art, where what we see is determined by what 
we don‟t (Danto, 1991: 211). 
 
It is after examining the connection between his endorsement of Wittgenstein‟s and 
post-Wittgensteinian‟s ideas on perception and description and his reflecting on 
Hegel‟s theories of art, that Danto presents up to three (proto-?)explicit definitions 
(in relation to his 1997 explicit definition that, he says, is a summary of his ideas in 
Transfiguration), now following a formula inspired by Hegel‟s sort of rationalistic 
pantheism (I give a more detailed account of Hegel‟s theory in Chapter 4, especially 
in Section 4.4-B): First he says, a few lines after the ideas of the previous quoted 
passage where he mentions Hegel‟s theories, that „art attains here [in the example of 
Guercino‟s work] the level of thought, and the artwork is a thought given a kind of 
sensuous embodiment‟ (Danto, 1991: 211; italics mine). He then says something 
similar by talking about the „embodiment in a sensuous idiom to a thought‟ (Danto, 
1991: 212). Finally he says:  
 
With artistic perception we enter the domain of the Spirit, as Hegel said, and the 
visible is transformed into something of another order, as the Word is when made 
flesh. The enfleshement of the word: I find that a stirring formulation of the 
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relationship between the visual and the non-visual exemplified in art and, in my view, 
in every exemplar of art (Danto, 1991: 214; italics mine).
 12
 
  
So now we can understand better why Carroll was so surprised at Danto‟s 
oversimplified definition of art in After the End of Art, without being able to explain 
why this definition differed so much from his implicit definition in Transfiguration. 
Danto is presenting a different definition of art in 1997 (or in 1991, in the case of 
this other paper I have examined), because he has moved from one group of 
theories, to another: his D2 theory is inspired essentially by his interpretation of 
Wittgenstein‟s theory of language in the Tractatus (see: Transfiguration: 78 – 83)13, 
leading Danto to establish an analogy in his philosophy of art, thus presenting a 
dualist distinction between artworks (qua semantic vehicles of representation) and 
„real‟ things;14 and his transition from D2 to D3 is effected by moving towards 
Hegel – who stressed the inter-relatedness of the Idea (or Spirit) and the world – 
and towards those theories he thinks claim things similar to Hegel, such as 
Wittgenstein‟s PI, post-Wittgensteinian theories of science, and internalist theorists 
of cognition such as Goodman. This latter set of theories, precisely, puts into 
question the idea about the separation between language and perception (of raw 
facts), that Danto had earlier on fully endorsed to develop his previous D2 works 
based on the Tractatus. 
 
As a result of his stressing the idea that language penetrates perception, Danto now 
stresses (after Transfiguration), that the „aboutness‟ of artworks is attached or 
rather, following Hegel, „embodied‟ or „incarnated‟ in the „real‟ thing used as 
                                                 
12
 In fact, these attempts to define art explicitly, in 1991, are very similar to another definition he is 
going to propose in a much recent paper, where he says that works of art are „embodied meanings‟ 
(Danto, 2009 [2007]: 112).  
13
 It is true that Danto in Transfiguration sometimes talks about the theory of the later Wittgenstein. 
He does this, however, in order to fill some gaps of his own theory while leaving untouched his 
dualist conception about language based on the Tractatus. So in a way he sees the theory of the later 
Wittgenstein in the light of the theory of the Tractatus.  
14
 Although he is also inspired by Nietzsche‟s dualism characteristic of his earlier work, The Birth of 
Tragedy. Also, Sclafani argues that Danto‟s ideas in „The Artworld‟ and in „Artworks and Real 
Things‟ are based on Kuhn‟s ideas, when stressing the theory-laden aspect of artworks – an aspect 
that is also stressed in Transfiguration (Sclafani, 1973). 
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medium. That is, Danto highlights now in D3 this idea in detriment of his earlier D2 
idea that was so central in Transfiguration (and that was inspired by the dualism of 
the Tractatus), that artworks, qua semantic vehicles of representation refer, in a 
detached (i.e., dualist) manner to „real‟ things, by means of their „aboutness‟. 
Furthermore, Danto even argues in D3, clearly following the idea that language 
penetrates perception, that „with great art the meaning penetrates the work, so that 
to perceive is to understand‟ (Danto, 1990 [1986]: 239; italics mine).  
 
The problem here is that Danto in supporting as central in D3 this conception of 
language, he not only „colours‟ his theory of Transfiguration (inspired by  the 
theory of the Tractatus) in the light of the philosophy of language of the PI and the 
post-Wittgensteinians. In supporting now the idea that „to perceive [great art] is to 
understand [it]‟ (Danto, 1990 [1986]: 239) or as he says in 1991, that „the 
experience of art descriptions really does penetrate [the] perception [of artworks]‟ 
(Danto, 1991: 214), he also gets his D1 and D2 ideas, concerning the problem of 
indiscernibility, into serious trouble. This is because, following the theory of 
language of the PI and the post-Wittgensteinians, he now argues that (paraphrasing 
him), to perceive an artwork is ipso facto to understand it as such. As a result, to be 
coherent with his D3 conception about language and perception, Danto would have 
now to acknowledge that the problem of indiscernibility would never arise, or not at 
least for a connoisseur or an art critic whose previous knowledge about art would 
allow him to identify immediately which one is the artwork and which is not.
15
   
 
Thus, in D3 Danto has moved from one paradigm about language and perception, to 
another; he has effected a sort of „conceptual revolution‟, when presenting his D2 
theory from the standpoint of D3. He does this by substituting retrospectively the 
language and concepts of the theories of Hegel (and the anti-dualist theories of 
language – that reject the idea of a separation between language and perception or 
experience – of the PI, the post-Wittgensteinian theories of science, and the 
internalist theories of cognition), for the language and conceptual scheme used in 
his previous clearly dualist account of language and the world, based essentially 
                                                 
15
 In fact it seems that as a result, he would be now implicitly taking a position closer to that of 
Goodman that he had rejected in his 1981 book (see: Transfiguration: 42). 
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upon his interpretation of the Tractatus (and of Nietzsche‟s The Birth of Tragedy). 
As a result, it falsely appears as if there were continuity, if not a logical necessity, in 
the transition between his ideas in D2, that I have presented so far, and his ideas in 
D3, that I am going to examine more thoroughly in the next Chapter.  
 
Possibly resulting from Danto‟s retrospective „coloration‟ of his previous ideas, 
Goehr, Kelly and Margolis make reference to Danto‟s 1997 definition without any 
hint of suspicion regarding Danto‟s distortion of his earlier 1981 claims (see: 
Goehr, 2007: 57; Kelly, 2007: 152 – 153; Margolis, 2010: 218). In addition, 
Rollins‟s (and again Goehr‟s) account of Danto‟s implicit definition of 
Transfiguration (Rollins‟s account can be found in: Murray, 2003: 90 – 95), fails to 
distinguish between Danto‟s D2 and D3 theories when explaining Danto‟s 
conception of history. This is because Rollins and Goehr follow the idea that 
Danto‟s latter D3 ideas follow logically from his ideas in D2. I deny that this is the 
case.   
 
 
3.6  Some problems with Danto’s theory in Transfiguration  
 
A) Art and language: ‘aboutness’, representations and real things 
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Danto‟s theory of art presented in his D2 
period differs from that presented in D1 (i.e., in „The Artworld‟), in the sense that 
he now introduces and stresses the analogy between art and language. He even 
argues that artworks have a semantic condition and are de facto vehicles of meaning 
as words are. Such reflections are the basis for his attempt to provide a definition of 
art in D2, in terms of the constitutional features of artworks. 
 
In the first place, however, there is a problem with the idea that Danto so much 
stresses, that all artworks have a meaning or are about something. This objection 
has already been insistently put forward by other philosophers of art who have 
argued that clearly this is not the case for all artworks (as for example in: Dickie, 
1997: 80; also in: Beardsley, 1976: 203). In fact, although Danto stresses the 
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semantic condition of art, nevertheless at some points he seems to hint at the idea 
that not all instances of art are about something, though he persistently ignores this.  
 
For example, he seems to hint that, in terms of the historical canon of art, not all 
artworks in the past necessarily had a meaning, or „aboutness‟. This could well 
support Carroll‟s attempt to show that Danto‟s definition of art doesn‟t refer to all 
art but only to a historically located type of art, particularly the „art in the age of 
theory‟ (Carroll, 1993: 90). The following fragment of Transfiguration is thus 
illuminating in relation to his suggestion that perhaps not all art, is included in his 
definition, and particularly Egyptian and Mesopotamian art: 
 
Though there was art in Egypt and Mesopotamia and elsewhere, it is not clear that it 
was seen as what we today would call art – representations in the semantic rather than 
in the magical sense of the term. But neither really was there philosophy in Egypt and 
Mesopotamia, only science. It is my view that art, as art, as something that contrasts 
with reality, arose together with philosophy, and that part of the question of why art is 
something with which philosophy must be concerned may be matched by the question 
of why philosophy did not historically appear in every culture, but only in some, and 
pre-eminently in Greece and India (Transfiguration: 77 – 78).  
 
The problem with this paragraph – with the thesis that art as we know it today arose 
only with philosophy and hence only in Greece and India – is that it undermines his 
own reflection that there actually was Egyptian and Mesopotamian art. Thus, while 
Danto seems to afford them the status of art, he denies that they can be included in 
what we understand today to be really art (i.e., representations in the semantic sense 
of the term). Hence we can see that Danto is stipulating an ad hoc classification of 
what actually ought to be „art as art‟ for us (i.e., semantic). This is because he 
assumes that art arose with philosophy, in its attempt to become a semantic vehicle 
of representation that would contrast with (and reveal) reality. But this is precisely 
what he ought to prove after taking into consideration all instances of art (including 
instances of Egyptian and Mesopotamian art), not the other way round.  
 
Danto‟s ideas concerning Egyptian and Mesopotamian art as not-really-art-as-
understood-today, thus undermine his implicit attempt to provide a descriptive 
definition of art instead of a stipulative one. This also shows that Danto has a very 
67 
 
narrow conception of art, one that cannot explain all instances of art but only those 
about which it is plausible to claim that they are about something or that they have a 
meaning. 
 
Danto argues that artworks are semantic vehicles of representation similar to words 
or propositions and even similar to images, gestures, maps or diagrams amongst 
others (Transfiguration: 79 – 80); thus in a way he acknowledges the potential 
objection to his theory, that not only artworks have meaning or are about 
something. However, by proposing an analogy between artworks and other 
semantic vehicles of representation (e.g., words and propositions), he attempts to 
demonstrate that there is an essential dualist contrast between language (or 
representational vehicles of sorts – such as artworks, maps, diagrams, etc.) and the 
world. He does this by resting his theory upon his controversial interpretation of 
Wittgenstein‟s Tractatus. Thus, his philosophy of art relies analogously upon taking 
for granted a dualism understood in terms of a clear distinction between artworks 
and real things. 
 
Now, independently of the usefulness of Danto‟s Gedankenexperiment of 
distinguishing between pairs of indiscernible things, his dualist distinction between 
artworks and real things has several important weaknesses:  
 
1) It contrasts artworks to „real‟ things in order to clarify what the former are. 
But, to begin with, the problem here is that it remains unclear what a „real‟ 
thing is for Danto. The answer is not so obvious, because Danto argues that 
artworks (as well as maps, diagrams, etc.) are something altogether different 
from real things. Although presumably, resulting from his reflections about 
meaning and representation, he would argue that his attempt is to show that 
a „real‟ thing is the counterpart of what a semantic vehicle of representation 
would be: in this case it is possible to contrast representational vehicles 
(such as words, maps, diagrams, artworks, etc.) to the „real‟ things they 
represent or make reference to. Yet, even if Danto‟s conception about 
meaning and representation, allows him to apply in art a logical distinction 
analogous to that between sign, meaning and reference (i.e., for Danto 
respectively, the artwork, its „aboutness‟ and the indiscernible counterpart to 
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which it refers), nevertheless these ideas about language become entangled 
in a confusing manner with Danto‟s fundamental (dualist) distinction 
between artworks and real things. As a result, it becomes unclear, for 
example, if an artwork A that serves as a reference to another one B (e.g., 
the case of one of Warhol‟s Brillo Boxes serving as a reference for its 
indiscernible counterpart Not Andy Warhol’s, made by the appropriationist 
artist Mike Bidlo – or the example he gives about Cervantes‟s Don Quixote 
which is indiscernible from that of Menard‟s, written later on; 
Transfiguration: 33 – 36), is now to be understood only as an artwork (qua 
semantic vehicle of representation that A also is) or as a real thing (resulting 
from A being the reference of B – i.e., because B seems to be about, or at 
least make reference to, A)  or as both. Although the latter would seem to be 
the most appropriate, Danto leaves unexplained how we should understand 
these intermediate cases, presumably because they don‟t fit in terms of the 
strict dualist distinctions he presents in Transfiguration.  
 
2) Danto assumes that artworks are always representational vehicles of 
meaning. In fact, he claims explicitly, in Transfiguration, that he 
understands these semantic vehicles of representation in terms of the 
picture-theory of the Tractatus. So he assumes, following this conception of 
language, that on the one hand there are „things‟ or raw atomic facts; and on 
the other hand that there are propositions (or semantic vehicles of 
representation) about things/facts. But this conception of language 
controversially seems to imply that there are a-linguistically mediated things 
that can be put in a one-to-one isomorphic relation with propositions (or 
semantic vehicles of representation) qua linguistic counterparts: The 
problem here, as Hagberg also argues, is that Danto builds his theory upon a 
traditional view of language, that Wittgenstein himself later criticises (see 
specially: Hagberg, 1998: 137 – 146; see also: Tilghman: 114 – 116). Danto 
is led by his interpretation of the Tractatus to the assertion that there are on 
the one hand purely perceptible „real‟ things (or raw facts) and on the other 
hand semantic vehicles of representation such as artworks, maps, words, 
diagrams, etc.,  that always have an „aboutness‟. Thus he seems to imply 
that non-artworks (or at least those things that are not semantic vehicles of 
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representation) do not carry any meaning whatsoever with them and thus are 
sensu strictu pure objects of perception, that is, pure pre-linguistic raw 
phenomena – i.e., Danto interprets Wittgenstein as claiming that only 
semantic vehicles of representation would have meaning. However, the later 
Wittgenstein explicitly argued not only against the Augustinian conception 
of language as naming. He also argued explicitly against the very idea that it 
is possible to ever step outside language and separate perception from 
description, as if, following Danto‟s terminology, it would be possible to 
distinguish between „real (a-linguistic) things‟ on the one hand and language 
(or semantic vehicles of representation) attempting to give or explain the 
meaning of these a-linguistically mediated things, on the other.  
 
3) To better support his own dualist position, Danto at times substitutes his 
references to Wittgenstein for Nietzsche‟s early theory in The Birth of 
Tragedy to justify his ideas about representation and appearance. However, 
Danto doesn‟t seem to acknowledge – or, for that matter, to care at all about 
– the fact that Nietzsche later repudiated the dualism of his earlier work. 
This is because later, Nietzsche considered that any dualism was a complete 
mistake and that it ultimately relied on a Platonic/Socratic mode of 
philosophy that, he argued, was at odds with the material-sensual reality he 
so much celebrated. Danto, however, never acknowledges Nietzsche‟s 
change of position; he just uses Nietzsche‟s earlier work, omitting his later 
self-critical views, because Nietzsche‟s earlier metaphysical speculations fit 
his own controversial speculations about the historical origins of civilization 
and, more specifically, about the essential contrast between appearances (or 
representations) and „real‟ things. If Danto seriously wanted to rest his 
theory on Nietzsche he needed to take also into consideration Nietzsche‟s 
later repudiation of any type of philosophical dualism. This, however, is 
unlikely to be accepted by Danto, because his own D2 theory rests upon a 
fundamental dualism based on the distinction between artworks (and other 
semantic vehicles of representation) and „real‟ things. 
 
4) Furthermore, if Danto still insists on the validity of this dualist distinction 
between appearances (or representations) and things, inspired by 
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Nietzsche‟s earlier work,  then this radically clashes with the view he 
derives from the Tractatus: Danto understands the Tractatus not in terms of 
how it contrasts appearances (as illusions) with the reality behind these 
illusory things (as the ideas he based on Nietzsche‟s early work seems to 
be), but in how it contrasts (true) propositions about facts with the facts 
themselves. That is, Danto ignores the fundamental differences between 
Nietzsche‟s early view about representation, that still substantially relied in 
Schopenhauer‟s notion of the Veil of Maya, and those of Wittgenstein‟s 
Tractatus, in which propositions play a role radically opposite to 
Schopenhauer‟s Veil (or to Nietzsche‟s Apollonian reality). 
 
Moreover, Danto‟s interpretation of the Tractatus substantially follows the type 
of „standard‟ interpretation currently rejected by Diamond and Conant, among 
others, for being an old-fashioned misreading of Wittgenstein‟s work. Thus 
Danto‟s reading of the Tractatus is opposed to those who challenge this view 
because claiming that Wittgenstein‟s aims were not to provide a metaphysical 
account of language. They instead, argue that Wittgenstein‟s attempt in the 
Tractatus was actually to dismantle or „explode‟ from within any metaphysical 
claims about language (as some claim seems to be implied in 6.54 of the 
Tractatus). More particularly, they suggest that he was criticising the very idea 
that is it possible to provide an external metaphysical account of the relations 
between language and the world and that it is possible to provide an external or 
objective explanation of the representational nature of language (for an account 
of non-standard interpretations, see for example: Diamond, 2000; Conant, 2000; 
more in: Crary & Read, 2000).  
 
Additionally, Danto, in order to demonstrate that artworks are semantic vehicles of 
representation, is always very partial in selecting one word or another to 
demonstrate further this idea. The problem here is that whenever he finds it suitable, 
instead of claiming that all artworks are about something or have a meaning (as he 
asserts most of the time) he alternatively argues that artworks have „expressive 
content‟ or a „subject‟. In doing so, he seems to support the idea that „being about 
something‟, „having a meaning‟, or an „expressive content‟ or „a subject‟ are 
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synonymous notions. However, when they are examined in more detail it becomes 
clear that this is not always the case. 
 
Thus something, for example a painting might have a particular „expressive content‟ 
and not have a meaning (e.g., an abstract painting from Jackson Pollock may have a 
particular expressive content – resulting from the expression of Pollock‟s emotions 
– but may not have a meaning whatsoever), or a book may have a subject (e.g., war) 
yet the meaning of the work might be quite another (e.g., the breaking and recovery 
of a friendship). Alternatively, there might be a work consisting on a set of 
displayed paintings (where the surface of each painting is covered in a different 
colour), in which the subject might be „multicoloured surfaces‟; yet the collective 
work might be about something entirely different – e.g., about the idea that anyone 
can make art because each of the canvas was painted by someone picked up 
randomly – as in a recent work exhibited in the Hamburger Bahnhoff Museum for 
Contemporary Art in Berlin.  
 
Furthermore, at the end of „Answer‟, and also in Transfiguration, Danto attempts to 
demonstrate that even artworks that are apparently empty of any content 
whatsoever, might not really be so. He does this by reflecting on the statement that 
an artist, Shiko Munakata, gave about his – apparently – empty artwork („Answer‟: 
82; Transfiguration: 52 – 53). Presumably Danto‟s attempt is to show that all 
artworks, in one way or another, have a distinctive meaning. However, he wants to 
convince us that he is talking about the meaning of this artwork, when actually he is 
referring to a statement the artist gives about his artwork when explaining it to the 
public. But one may question whether such a statement and the meaning of the 
work are one and the same; whether what the artist says about his work must be 
correct; and whether what the artist says about the meaning of his work exhausts 
that work‟s meaning.  
 
In fact, Danto seems to acknowledge at some point that there might be different 
ways in which artworks can be semantic vehicles of representation. He asserts: „I 
offer the speculation that the phenomenon of confusable counterparts belonging to 
distinct ontological orders arises only when at least one of the confusable things 
bears a representational property: where at least one of the counterparts is about 
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something, or has a content, or a subject, or a meaning‟ (Transfiguration: 139). 
Thus, resulting from these reflections, Danto could argue that actually his attempt is 
to show that each of these different ways in which an artwork can be a semantic 
vehicle of representation can disjunctively cover all the different instances of art. 
 
Yet, even if we could concede this to Danto (provided he could defend that all 
artworks have either one, many or all of this set of disjunctive features – being 
about something, having a meaning, a subject, content and/or an artistic statement) 
there is still the problem that, as I have shown earlier, by 1997 he argues that in 
Transfiguration he actually wanted to defend the idea that all artworks (a) are about 
something and (b) incarnate their meaning  (After: 195 – See also Section 3.5). This 
idea, however, might imply different things (although they are not completely 
incompatible from each other, so he might have held some or all of them at the 
same time or at different stages). It might imply: (A) that actually Danto in 1981 
considered the notion of being about something, as synonymous to the notions of 
having a meaning, a subject, an expressive content or being the product of an 
artistic statement. As a result he would now believe more useful to simply define art 
as his 1997 explicit (and much shorter) definition goes.
16
 (B) That Danto no longer 
believes by 1997 that all artworks need to have a subject or an expressive content or 
an artistic statement, although they still need to be about something or have a 
meaning. Or (C) that Danto presents in 1997 an oversimplified version of his 1981 
definition (avoiding the set of disjunctive terms he presents in Transfiguration) in 
order to present it as closer to Hegel‟s claims (see Chapter 4, especially Section 4.3 
for Danto‟s suggestions about the similarity between his own ideas and Hegel‟s; see 
also Section 4.4-B for a critical examination Danto‟s suggestion).  
 
In fact, it seems that Danto‟s 1981 definition of art is linked to his usage of 
indiscernible objects. When two artworks, or an artwork and its non-artistic 
counterpart, appear to be indiscernible, some non-physical property seems to be 
required in order to distinguish one from another as well as their respective features. 
                                                 
16
 Or following his latest formulation, it would even be possible to define art without the notion of 
„being about something‟, as he now claims that artworks are „embodied meanings‟ (Danto, 2009 
[2007]). 
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Danto seems to argue that owing to this, what may apply to indiscernible artworks 
applies also to all instances of art and thus that all artworks are about something, or 
have a meaning or a content or a subject or produce a distinctive artistic statement. 
But it is very controversial to argue that all artworks, including for example the 
Minimalist sculptures (that attempted to be purely physical works lacking any 
meaning whatsoever) of Carl Andre or Donald Judd, or in music, (non-„narrative‟) 
plays such as Brahms Violin Concerto in D major Opus 77, or Tchaikovsky‟s Piano 
Concerto no. 1 in B-flat minor are representational in Danto‟s sense of the term – in 
the sense of being about something, or having a meaning, or a subject or a semantic 
content.  
 
It is true, however, that Danto could argue that these (and any other) artworks have 
always „aboutness‟ because, as he also argued with the work of Munakata, 
ultimately they are about what each artist claims about them. However, I have 
already argued that it is not that clear that an artist‟s statement does exhaust the 
meaning of his work, or even that it reveals it. Alternatively, Danto could argue that 
these works (and any other), in not being about anything, are about „nothing‟ (as he 
argues in: Danto, 2000: 133). Yet while this seems to be a plausible response to 
works such as the Suprematist painting of Malevich Black Square, it seems utterly 
wrong to argue that Judd‟s work or Brahms‟s, for example, are about „nothing‟ (or 
about „nothingness‟). Another alternative for Danto would be to argue that these 
works in pretending not to denote anything external to them, they would be close to 
the works of Kandinsky or of other abstract painters that, instead of denoting 
something external, denote the internal or „subjective‟ feelings of the artists that 
made them (as in: Danto, 2000: 132). However, saying that these (and any other) 
works are „subjective‟ because they are, non-denotative in appearance, is nothing 
more than just saying that other works are „objective‟ without specifying in what 
sense they are thus: Danto should still have to explain (and justify), about what 
subjective feelings would each of these artworks be, and how would it be possible 
for these artworks to appropriately express these feelings. In addition, as I have 
hinted it above, he would have to be more precise also in justifying that the 
statements that artists make about their artworks, exhaust (and reveal) the artwork‟s 
„aboutness‟. Otherwise, we could counterclaim to Danto by paraphrasing him in 
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that without some specificity on his part, the game of attempting to provide 
„aboutness‟ to every artwork gets pretty tiresome (see: Danto, 2000: 133).17 
 
In fact, as I have shown earlier in this Section, Danto acknowledges that some types 
of art are not art in the semantic sense of the term (such as, following him, is the 
case of Egyptian and Mesopotamian art), so this may show that in fact his definition 
of art, rather than being a definition for all art, is a definition applicable only to the 
new category of „indiscernible artworks‟ of the type presented in D1 and D2. If this 
is so, then his definition should be reformulated as a definition of „indiscernible 
artworks‟ rather than as a definition of regular „artworks‟.  
 
 
B) The notion of ‘transfiguration’  
 
Perhaps one of the most attractive ideas in D2, as well as one of the most difficult to 
understand, is Danto‟s notion of „transfiguration‟. In fact Danto takes the title The 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace from a novel, Muriel Spark‟s The Prime of 
Miss Jean Brody, in which she mentions a fictitious book bearing this title. In fact, 
Danto first introduces the notion of „transfiguration‟ almost in passing in „The 
Artworld‟ (Danto, 1995 [1964]: 209) 18  and later again in his paper 
„Transfiguration‟. But it is not until his book by that same title that he uses it 
systematically to explain what art is.  
 
The attractiveness of this idea perhaps comes from the fact that it is introduced from 
religion and transferred into the sphere of aesthetics, thus providing a certain 
metaphysical cachet to this discipline. Danto‟s use of this concept is also attractive 
in the sense that it implies that what is transfigured is a commonplace object turned 
now into an artwork. So to a certain extent it invokes ideas about the discipline of 
                                                 
17
 There is however another alternative that Danto considers: that some artworks would be making 
statements about art. In fact this explanation becomes central in his D3 theory (focused around the 
theory of the end of art), as he insists in this period that artworks, until Warhol, had been trying to 
formulate the question „what is art?‟ in its proper form (for a more detailed account of this period, 
see Chapter 4). 
18
 Also when he refers to the title of a painting  (Danto, 1995 [1964]: 203) 
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art as practised in the 20
th
 century, very much concerned with the connections 
between art and life.  
 
Yet, Danto first introduced this notion in his previous papers without developing it 
and he used it again in his book Transfiguration where he attempts to define art. 
This seems to indicate that his use of this notion comes simply from his attraction to 
its the powerful connotations, to make his definition of art more metaphysically 
attractive rather than to make the explanation of art more philosophically 
comprehensible.  
 
Of course, Danto could argue that in fact this conceptual obscurity is precisely what 
was intended; following certain Wittgensteinian ideas, he may want to point out that 
some parts of the process of art-making cannot be explained but can only be shown. 
In fact, in his paper „Artworks and Real Things‟ he explicitly says that he will be 
using a type of language not common in (analytical) aesthetics, supposedly for 
heuristic reasons. So this might also be implicitly claimed in Transfiguration, when 
he uses the notion of „transfiguration of the commonplace‟ supposedly to enlighten 
his readers by (paraphrasing Wittgenstein), showing concepts and procedures not 
clearly explained or defined. However, my claim here is that his use of this obscure 
notion ends up by overturning his attempt to provide an analytically clear 
understanding of art. In doing so, he finally renders useless many of his other 
analytically clear, although not always correct, reflections borrowed from the 
philosophy of language, to clarify his definition of art.  
 
In the second place, the idea of transfiguration of the commonplace as it is posed, it 
refers to a transfiguration of a commonplace object which is now indiscernible, yet 
different from its non-transfigured counterpart. In considering this he seems to refer 
to a purely semantic transformation of objects. This is because the artistic object is 
physically indiscernible from the common object it was before becoming an 
artwork by means of the process of transfiguration. So it presupposes that such a 
commonplace object undergoes no physical change whatsoever when being 
transfigured into its indiscernible artistic counterpart. This seems to be implied by 
Danto in most of the cases he mentions the notion of „transfiguration‟ where he 
suggests that seeing an object transfigured is similar to imagine (or to see) 
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something as something else without occurring any physical or external 
modification whatsoever in the object (Transfiguration: 56, 99, 107, 111, 126, 130, 
172, 173, 208).
19
  
  
But if this is what Danto attempts to do, the only plausible cases of transfigured 
(i.e., semantically transfigured) commonplace objects, indiscernible from their non-
transfigured counterparts, he mentions in D2 are Duchamp‟s In Advance of Broken 
Arm (a snow shovel) the urinal entitled Fountain, and, perhaps, some of the fictive 
objects presented by J. as art, that nevertheless it remains unclear whether always 
succeed in being transfigured as art;
20
 and in fact, if we examine Duchamp‟s urinal 
more thoroughly, we observe that, although Duchamp‟s work still could be seen as 
a commonplace object semantically transfigured into an artwork, nevertheless it 
should be pointed out that Duchamp actually did make some relevant and 
uncommon physical modifications (i.e., uncommon for commonplace objects) to 
this artwork: he signed it with the pseudonym R. Mutt and placed it in an atypical 
position to be contemplated as a type of sculpture.
21
  
 
In fact, it should be stressed that Danto‟s paradigmatic case in Transfiguration (i.e., 
Warhol‟s Brillo Box), is not at all a case of commonplace object semantically 
transfigured into an artwork: Warhol‟s Brillo Boxes cannot be referred to as really 
                                                 
19
 Actually, in some of these cases Danto uses the notion of „transfiguration‟ as analogous to that of 
„the is of artistic identification‟ that was first presented in „The Artworld‟ and that, as I have already 
pointed out in Chapter 2, was really problematic (see especially: Transfiguration: 126, 130, 172 – 
See also Chapter 2, Section 2.3-B). 
20
 This is because Danto often presents J as a sort of institutionalist à-la-Dickie, because J believes he 
can make art just by fiat (see particularly: Transfiguration: 3, 7, 13). Thus presumably Danto would 
have to claim, to be coherent with his criticisms of Dickie‟s theory (Transfiguration: 31 – 32), that J 
often fails in his attempts of making art because declaring something art, he argues, is not enough to 
transfigure something into an artwork. It is also true, however, that later Danto acknowledges that 
maybe, at least in the case of „Red Square‟, J succeeds in making an artwork because the work is 
surrounded by a sort of theoretical atmosphere related to art (Transfiguration: 51). It remains 
unclear, however, if Danto considers that the same applies to the rest of J‟s works.  
21
 Or in my opinion as a hybrid type of sculpture-performance, given the relevance of the ironic 
Dadaist gesture performed by Duchamp. 
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semantically transfigured commonplace objects because they were from the very 
beginning painted sculptures made by Warhol, rather than by the manufacturer or 
the original designer of the brillo boxes (James Harvey). In other words, Warhol‟s 
Brillo Boxes are not commonplace objects (e.g., brillo boxes from the supermarket) 
transfigured into artworks but were from the very beginning artworks (Brillo 
Boxes) made by Warhol representing a type of commonplace object (brillo boxes) 
designed by someone else (Harvey). Something similar occurs with the imaginary 
case presented by Danto, in which something identical to a can-opener is created as 
an artwork, by an artist who ignores the existence of its functional and non-artistic 
indiscernible counterpart  (Transfiguration: 29 – 30). This object, like Warhol‟s 
Brillo Box, wouldn‟t be a case of a functional commonplace object (i.e., a 
commonplace can-opener) transfigured by the artist into an artwork but rather, an 
artwork created by an artist and only similar in appearance to a functional can-
opener.  
 
Furthermore, it is also relevant to point out that the rest of the objects Danto 
introduces – the randomly splattered painting with the shape of Rembrandt‟s The 
Polish Rider, the blue painted necklace and so on – are all either artistic objects 
only similar in appearance to quite rare (i.e., non-commonplace) ones, or were 
commonplace objects in the past but so physically modified that it makes little sense 
to speak about a kind of transfiguration of a commonplace object.  
 
If by „transfiguration‟ Danto means, however, not only a semantic change, as he 
seems to imply in most of the cases he uses this notion (as I have shown above), but 
also the possibility of a physical change, then the above criticism might be 
irrelevant (although he only presents one example of a clear physical 
„transfiguration‟, in which he talks about Picasso‟s modification of a number of 
objects to transform them into artworks, or into parts of artworks – see: 
Transfiguration: 46). The problem, however, is that Danto never explains or 
clarifies explicitly what he means by „transfiguration‟. Further, if the 
„transfiguration‟ of the object involves a physical change, there wouldn‟t be any 
reason to call such a change „transfigurative‟. It would suffice to refer to this change 
in a clearer way („a modification of the commonplace‟ for example) although, in 
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this case, the metaphysical cachet of the phrase would dissolve completely, a 
sacrifice that Danto might be not willing to make. 
 
Finally using the idea of „transfiguration‟ in combination with that of „metaphor‟ (as 
in: Transfiguration: 172), only makes things more complicated. This is because in 
doing so, he is now relating two obscure concepts rather than using just one, to 
clarify what art is. In this sense, even if Carroll is quite successful in his attempt to 
explain Danto‟s theory, he never takes into consideration (nor does Danto himself), 
when endorsing the analogy between artworks and metaphors, that „metaphor‟ is 
one of the most problematic rhetorical tropes in linguistics and in philosophy, 
periodically pondered and never conclusively defined. Rollins‟s account of Danto‟s 
definition (in: Murray, 2003: 90 – 95) has the same problem as Carroll‟s, although I 
don‟t consider his explanation as good as Carroll‟s is. Thus, Danto‟s introducing in 
combination the notions of transfiguration and metaphor to define art yields the 
very problematic result of attempting to clarify an obscure concept (art) with two 
even more obscure concepts, respectively coming from religion (transfiguration) 
and from the poetic praxis (metaphor). 
 
 
C) Variations upon the artworld 
 
In Danto‟s early paper „The Artworld‟, the notion of the concept of „artworld‟, was 
understood as the world of artworks. However, Danto‟s usage of the notion of 
artworld together with some of his reflections on art institutions, sites and 
connoisseurs, led other theorists to see him as an institutional theorist akin to 
Dickie. These and other misunderstandings, as was explained earlier, led him to 
reject clearly in D2 such an understanding of his theory. However, the re-
elaboration of his theory, not only adds some new relevant ideas about art but also, 
as a consequence, modifies some other notions – particularly his concept of the 
artworld.  
 
Hence it is possible to observe in Transfiguration that some meanings of the term 
„artworld‟ vary importantly from those in his early paper „The Artworld‟. Actually 
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it is possible to classify Danto‟s notion of „artworld‟ in Transfiguration in five 
different ways: 
 
1) There are those explicit references to the notion of „artworld‟, compatible 
with (or at least not necessarily different from) those in „The Artworld‟ (see: 
Transfiguration: 7, 45, 46, 125, 126, 135, 193, 208). This is specially clear 
in the following passages when he says that „[there] was room in the space 
of the artworld by then and in the internal corpus of Picasso [for his 
presenting a painting necktie as an artwork] which did so much to define the 
space of the artworld‟ (Transfiguration: 46) or when he says that „it is 
essential to our study that we understand the nature of an art theory, which is 
so powerful a thing as to detach objects from the real world and make them 
part of a different world, an art world, a world of interpreted things‟ 
(Transfiguration: 135). The other passages pointed out above, can be also 
understood as referring to the artworld in this sense. 
 
2) There are those implicit references to the artworld in which (without 
mentioning the term itself), Danto is clearly referring to this concept as 
developed in „The Artworld‟: e.g., when he talks about „the confederation of 
enfranchised artworks‟ (Transfiguration: 40). He also seems to talk about 
the artworld in terms of the logical succession of artworks in the history of 
art when he says that „not everything is possible at every time, as Heinrich 
Wölflin has written, meaning that certain artworks simply could not be 
inserted as artworks into certain periods of art history‟ (Transfiguration: 44). 
He also talks about „the realm of art‟ (Transfiguration: 126). 
 
3) As Danto was attempting in D2 to reject the interpretations of his theory as 
an  institutional theory à-la-Dickie, there are also those critical references to 
the notion of „artworld‟ as, he believes, is understood by institutionalists like 
Dickie (Transfiguration: 5, 32, 91, 144). 
 
4) Further, in Transfiguration he also refers to the artworld in terms of the 
„language‟ of the artworld, and in doing so, he also points towards the 
existence of a community of users of this „artworld‟. For instance, he says 
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„The artworld of the period would have excluded from the expressive 
vocabulary of its contemporaries the deliberate exploitation of archaic 
forms, in contrast with the situation today‟ (Transfiguration: 45; italics 
mine). He also says that: 
 
A comparable list [of words such as „powerful‟, „swift‟ „fluid‟, etc.] could be culled 
from the columns of any art magazine, any volume of art criticism […]. These words 
are the currency of the artworld […]. It seems clear that the members of the language 
community one may refer to as the artworld not merely tend to share the values these 
words express, but would seldom disagree among themselves as to whether a given 
term applies to a given work […]. The rules for applying these terms within the 
artworld must be pretty well understood in practice. (Transfiguration: 155 – 156; 
italics mine). 
22
 
 
5) Danto‟s reflections grouped in (4) lead him to talk, later in Transfiguration, 
more explicitly about the artworld in terms clearly different from those he 
uses in „The Artworld‟. That is to say, in this case he is not talking about the 
artworld as constituted by a class of artworks, as Beardsley argued in his 
discussion of „The Artworld‟ (Beardsley, 1976: 203), but in this particular 
case, as constituted by a class of people. It is possible to observe this when 
Danto says: „what I call “style” must have been less what Giotto saw than 
the way he saw it, and invisible for that reason. It must have been a way of 
seeing shared by a sufficiently large group of citizens of the artworld of his 
time, or they could not have praised Giotto in terms of the sort Vasari 
employs‟ (Transfiguration: 163; italics mine).  
 
It is in fact unclear, as a consequence of these few comments in (4) and (5), whether 
Danto‟s original intention in Transfiguration was actually to understand the 
artworld just in terms of (1) and (2) or also in the terms comprehended by (4) and 
(5) (i.e., in terms of its language and its people). This is, however, very problematic 
if Danto wants to distance himself from the institutional theories of art understood 
in Dickie‟s terms, because it is possible to observe in (4) and (5) certain elements 
similar to Dickie‟s (e.g., understood in terms of the artworld publics, artists and its 
                                                 
22
 Danto further develops this idea along similar lines in the following pages (Transfiguration: 157 – 
158). 
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members in general). In fact, Danto elsewhere recognises that at times he might 
have spoken about the artworld in these terms and that this might be „an 
institutional theory of sorts‟. Nevertheless he also argues that this is far from 
supporting what institutional theories such as Dickie‟s, actually do support (Danto, 
1993: 204). 
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4. DANTO’S THEORY OF THE END OF ART 
 
After Transfiguration (1981), Danto presents his theory of the end of art, based on 
Hegel. It is also after this 1981 work, when he progressively develops an explicit 
definition of art that was implicit in Transfiguration (see Chapter 3, Section 3.5). As 
a result, not only is Danto‟s explicit definition of art presented in accordance with 
the new anti-dualist conception of language – i.e., that doesn‟t detach language 
from perception (or experience) – that he endorses after Transfiguration, but also in 
accordance with his D3 theories of the end of art, which themselves rely upon his 
own definition of art. In doing so, Danto is attempting to reinforce the claims of D2, 
concerning what art is, with his D3 claims about the end of art. 
 
The major thesis of this new period, thus concerns the idea of the „end of art‟, and is 
characterised by three distinctive features: first, it implicitly endorses Danto‟s 
previous ideas (from D1 and D2) about art although now from the perspective of his 
new ideas about language and about Hegel‟s philosophy. Second, it is progressively 
developed and modified in a series of papers rather than in a single book. Finally, 
after first proposing this theory in 1984, Danto also began working as an art critic, 
thus supporting his various philosophical versions of the end of art with new ideas 
acquired as an art critic. He did this by contrasting his own theory with the theories 
of art historians and art critics, such as Vasari, Panofsky or Greenberg that he hadn‟t 
take into consideration earlier (contra Carroll, I argue that Greenberg is irrelevant 
for his previous D1 and D2 theories and becomes important only in the last stage of 
his D3 period – See: Carroll, 1997: 388). Possibly, owing to his experience as an art 
critic after 1984, Danto also takes into account, in more detail during this period, 
several art movements, artworld practices and contemporary artists. 
 
The primary paper where he first develops the thesis of this period is „The End of              
Art‟ (hereafter „End‟ – first published in 1984), but it is possible to trace the                          
origins of this thesis to his paper „The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art‟ 
(„Disenfranchisement‟ – both this paper and „End‟ were reprinted later in the same 
1986 volume, wrongly leading some interpreters to assume that these two papers 
were first presented that year. See for example: Davies‟s and Novitz‟s section on 
Danto in: Davies, Higgins et al., 2009: 227). It is also worth pointing out that the 
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ideas contained in „End‟ were later reformulated in the papers collected in his book 
After the End of Art (After). Further relevant reflections on the end of art can be 
found in other papers, among them „Approaching the End of Art‟ („Approaching‟), 
„Art, Evolution and the Consciousness of History‟ („Consciousness‟ – also included 
in the 1986 volume with „Disenfranchisement‟ and „End‟. This paper is the only one 
of them that was first published this same year), „Learning to Live with Pluralism‟, 
„Narratives of the End of Art‟, and „Art and Meaning‟ (reprinted in The Madonna of 
the Future). There are also a few other remarks about the end of art in his book The 
Abuse of Beauty.  
 
In fact, as I have already argued, it is possible to establish connections between 
Danto‟s Transfiguration and his thesis about the end of art. We should nevertheless 
be aware that, even though it is also possible to trace some of these ideas to Danto‟s 
Transfiguration, this doesn‟t mean that the thesis about the End of Art is a logical 
consequence of the ideas contained in Transfiguration as some authors, such as 
Carroll, Goehr or Rollins seem to think (Carroll, 1993; Goehr, 2007; see also 
Rollins‟s section on Danto in: Murray, 2003).  
 
Finally, it should also be pointed out, as Solomon and Higgins also stress (Solomon 
& Higgins, 1993: 109), that because „End‟ was first published in a book entitled The 
Death of Art, Danto‟s thesis has been often misunderstood: that thesis, contrary to 
appearances, and as he stresses in After (After: 4), is neither a pessimistic theory 
about the current condition of the artworld, nor a theory about the death of 
artmaking, as some interpreters have often wrongly claimed (see, for example: 
Young, 1997). 
 
 
4.1 Danto’s early ideas about the end of art: 
 
From the time when Danto first submitted, in „The Artworld‟ (D1), his own theory 
about the conditions necessary for art to exist, he continually stressed the centrality 
of history and the historical context for understanding artworks and what art is. As 
Carroll says, Danto‟s philosophy of art is characterised by his stressing the role of 
history when reflecting about art, against, in his opinion, the opposite tendency 
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within the analytic tradition (Carroll, 1999 [1997]: 30 – 31). Thus, in D2 and 
particularly in Transfiguration, the historical context also plays a central role, in this 
case, in determining the „aboutness‟ of the artwork, intentionally created and 
dependent upon the historically and culturally located artist. In the thesis concerning 
the end of art, the role of history plays an even more central role. This is because it 
appears not only as the determining factor for the „aboutness‟ of particular artworks 
but also as teleologically determining the current pluralism in the art produced after 
the end of art.  
 
Danto believes that once the history of art reaches its end, an era of artistic 
pluralism arises, concerned with non self-referential issues in art. As a result, he 
argues, artists are not only free to make whatever kind of art they wish, but free as 
well to address their art to purely functional human purposes and social needs.  
 
In fact, in „Disenfranchisement‟ Danto already attempts to understand the historical 
relations between art and philosophy in a way that establishes the rationale for the 
theory of the end of art: there he considers art as a practice apart from philosophy 
but which nevertheless has often been intermingled with philosophical issues and 
problems in a manner very unsatisfactory for both disciplines. This relation, Danto 
argues, has often led to the disenfranchisement of art, in the sense of its 
ephemeralisation by philosophers. Against this situation, he argues that both art and 
philosophy, ought to take different paths from each other in order to de-
ephemeralise and reenfranchise art.  
 
Later, in „End‟, he argues that philosophy and art have finally taken different paths 
and thus artists are now free to present whatever they want as art. Given this 
apparent connection between „Disenfranchisement‟ and „End‟, I support Forsey‟s 
position, that to understand Danto‟s thesis about the end of art properly, it is 
important to understand his perspective, in „Disenfranchisement‟, on the history of 
the relationship between art and philosophy (Forsey, 2001). 
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Hence, in „Disenfranchisement‟ Danto attempts to explain why:                
 
1) Historically, philosophers have considered it important to address 
themselves to art.  
 
2) Philosophers have attempted to explain art as being either cognitively 
useless (Plato) or – which, in Danto‟s opinion, amounts euphemistically to 
the same thing – as being at a certain distance from everyday practical 
experience (Kant), from empirical phenomenal reality (Schopenhauer), or 
from philosophical-conceptual thinking (Hegel).  
 
3) The disenfranchisement perpetrated by philosophy on art should be replaced 
with a new re-enfranchisement, in which artists are no longer constrained 
and ephemeralised by philosophers or obliged to deal with philosophical 
issues.  
 
Interestingly, in „Disenfranchisement‟ Danto suggests that the disenfranchisement 
of art and its aggressive ephemeralisation by the philosophical tradition is a reaction 
against the power of art itself. He argues that art, by virtue of its rhetorical structure 
(see Chapter 3) has the power to „modify the minds and then the actions of men and 
women by co-opting their feelings‟ („Disenfranchisement‟: 21). This, he asserts, is 
one of the main reasons why philosophy has so often attempted to segregate les 
beaux arts from the reality corresponding to les arts pratiques: because of sensing 
the political danger that lies in art. As Danto says: 
 
Indeed, it has at times struck me that the conventional division between the fine and 
the practical arts – between les beaux arts and les arts pratiques – serves, in the name 
of a kind of exaltation, to segregate les beaux arts from life in a manner curiously 
parallel to the way in which calling woman the fair sex is an institutional way of 
putting woman at an aesthetic distance – on a kind of moral pedestal which extrudes 
her from a world it is hoped she has no longer any business in. The power to classify is 
the power to dominate, and these parallel aestheticizations must be regarded as 
essentially political responses to what were sensed as dark dangers in both […]. 
Aesthetics is an eighteenth century invention, but it is exactly as political, and for the 
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same causes, as Plato‟s was of setting artists at a distance for which aesthetic distance 
is a refined metaphor („Disenfranchisement‟: 12). 
 
In his paper „End‟, rather than attempting to explain art in political terms as he had 
in „Disenfranchisement‟, Danto explains art in terms of a historical process of self-
understanding (i.e., of art). Even so, „End‟ also endorses the idea submitted for 
consideration in „Disenfranchisement‟, that art has been historically disenfranchised 
because it has been seen as a type of philosophy in an alienated form. Once the end 
of the self-understanding of art is reached, art becomes free from philosophy and 
thus finally can deal with issues other than philosophical self-reflection.  
 
The ideas offered in „End‟, however, were greeted with a considerable number of 
objections. The claim that art had reached its end was in itself contentious (see for 
example: Margolis, 1999 [1997]
23
). Additionally the fact that Danto referred his 
theory to that of Hegel, was also problematic, because, as Solomon and Higgins  
point out such a theory has often been misunderstood by the English speaking world 
(see: Solomon & Higgins, 1993: 109).  
 
To justify his theory of the end of art, in „End‟, Danto argues that the history of art 
was first structured in terms of the progressive effort to improve the mimetic 
representations of reality. Once the new technological advance of cinema appeared, 
however, such teleology became obsolete. Because of this, artists, above all in 
painting and sculpture, began to redefine the aims of their work. Danto argues that 
this is one of the reasons why the Expressionist movement appeared: as an 
alternative to the aim of promoting mimetic representations in art. The problem 
with the Expressionist theories, however, Danto argues, is that they don‟t allow for 
any idea of progress because any form of expressing one‟s feelings is as good as 
another. To the contrary, Danto asserts not only that is there progress in art, but also 
that art has reached its end. To explain how it is possible to account for the 
historical evolution of art (i.e., of art history in terms of progress), and for the idea 
that the end of art has actually occurred, he refers to Hegel‟s theory, which had 
already addressed these issues. As Danto remarks: 
                                                 
23
 From a conference he presented in 1990. 
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[Given] the way progress itself was conceived, about 1905 [with the discovery of 
cinematography] it appeared that painters and sculptors could only justify their 
activities by redefining art in ways which had to be shocking […]. It became 
increasingly clear [with Post-Impressionist paintings] that a new theory  was urgently 
required, that the artists were not failing to yield up perceptual equivalences but were 
after something not to be understood in those terms […] painters were not so much 
representing as expressing […]. But even more interesting from our perspective is the 
fact that [with Expressionist theories of art] the history of art acquires a totally 
different structure. It does so because there is no longer any reason to think of art as 
having a progressive history: there simply is not the possibility of a developmental 
sequence with the concept of expression […] one style follows another as in an 
archipelago […] if we are to think of art as having an end, we need a conception of art 
history which is linear […]. Now Hegel‟s theory meets all these demands („End‟: 100 
– 107). 
 
Hegel‟s theory, Danto believes, can account for both the idea that there is historical 
progress in art and for the idea that art has reached its end. This is because Hegel 
has a philosophy of history in which humanity, understood in terms of the Idea or 
Spirit (Geist) of human Consciousness, develops historically – and, in doing so, 
develops history itself – towards its own cognitive self-understanding. For Danto, 
Hegel‟s theory of the Geist has the form of a Bildungsroman in which this main 
character progresses towards a final stage of self-recognition („End‟: 110). Danto 
believes that if Hegel could argue this plausibly, then it is also legitimate to argue in 
analogous terms, that the Spirit of Art History has reached the climax of self-
understanding with 20
th
 century art. 
 
Danto argues in „End‟, that since the beginning of the 20th century, a variety of 
different artistic movements have attempted to answer the question of what art is in 
terms of their own artworks and theories. So, he argues, artists promoted a 
philosophical enquiry about the nature of art, turning art into a kind of philosophy 
in an alienated form. However, precisely because art is an alienated form of 
philosophy, it is incapable of properly doing the job of philosophy. Thus, he argues 
in „End‟ that art is liberated from that effort once the task is handed to philosophy, 
which is capable of properly defining art in conceptual terms. In fact, Danto argues, 
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art ends when it is known what art is and means, and this knowledge can only be 
attained by philosophers of art: 
 
What is Art? The question became urgent in the twentieth century, when the received 
model collapsed […] each movement raised the question afresh, offering itself as a 
possible final answer […]. It is this way of looking at things which suggests another 
model of art history altogether, a model narratively exemplified by the Bildungsroman, 
the novel of self-education which climaxes in the self‟s recognition of the self […]. 
The great philosophical work which has this form is Hegel‟s astonishing 
Phenomenology of the Spirit […]. It is possible to read Hegel as claiming that art‟s 
philosophical history consists in its being absorbed ultimately into its own philosophy 
[…]. The historical stage of art is done with when it is known what art is and means. 
The artists have made the way open for philosophy, and the moment has arrived at 
which the task must be transferred finally into the hands of philosophers („End‟: 109 – 
111). 
 
In fact, this idea supports Forsey‟s claim that the theory of the end of art confirms 
Danto‟s previous theory of „Disenfranchisement‟. This is because, she asserts, 
Danto‟s attempt in „End‟ is the most aggressive disenfranchising programme ever 
undertaken against art. This is due, amongst other things, to the fact that in „End‟ 
Danto argues that artists are incapable of doing the job of philosophy and thus that 
it is the task of philosophers, rather than of artists, to finally explain what art is 
(Forsey, 2001: 407).  
 
Now, implicit in „End‟ is the idea that, if art has reached its end, it is because 
philosophy already knows „what art is and means‟. Curiously, Danto never says in 
this paper what art is and means. So in „End‟, he might be implicitly endorsing the 
idea that what art „is and means‟ is what has been already argued in 
Transfiguration. Carroll also suggests something similar when arguing that Danto‟s 
philosophy of art history depends upon his philosophy of art developed earlier 
(Carroll, 1993: 97). If this is so, then the end of art has to be understood as reaching 
its climax with the appearance of Warhol‟s Brillo Boxes, because it was Danto‟s 
achievement to provide, in Transfiguration, a definition of art based on such a type 
of indiscernible objects.  
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4.2  Danto’s revision of the end of art in ‘Art, Evolution and the Consciousness 
of History’: 
 
In part, presumably to respond to criticisms of his thesis about the end of art, and of 
his use of Hegel to support his theory, Danto further modified his thinking before 
presenting what we could regard as the later synthesis of his ideas in his 1997 book 
After the End of Art (After). Thus Danto provides, for example, in his paper „Art, 
Evolution and the Consciousness of History‟ („Consciousness‟), a somewhat refined 
account of the theory of the end of art. Carroll, however, seems to put together the 
theories of „End‟ and „Consciousness‟ without making any distinction between 
them (Carroll, 1999 [1997]). This is probably because both papers were reprinted in 
the same volume (Danto, 1986). Unlike Carroll, I intend to explain separately the 
reformulations of the end of art that Danto introduced in this later paper.  It is also 
relevant to point out that Danto‟s claims in his paper „Approaching the End of Art‟ 
(1985), are transitional between his ideas in „End‟ (1984) and in „Consciousness‟ 
(1986); yet, most of the views of this transitional paper are better organised in 
„Consciousness‟. For this reason I will mainly examine this latter paper as an 
example of Danto‟s ideas before he published After.  
 
In „Consciousness‟, Danto distinguishes his account of the development of the 
history of art from his account of the relevant developments in the philosophy of the 
history of art (i.e., the theoretical reflections concerning the configuration of the 
history of art). He also distinguishes, in this paper, between two periods in the 
history of art, in a slightly modified manner from those presented in „End‟: here he 
has a first period that supported the idea that art was teleologically oriented towards 
achieving better mimetic representations (as in „End‟); and a second period, not 
considered in his 1984 paper, but already introduced in „Approaching‟, 
corresponding to the appearance of modernity (or modern style), in which artists 
attempted to reach a definition of art by making artworks that reflected upon the 
concept of art. Thus he no longer speaks generically of 20
th
 century art as he did in 
„End‟, but of Modern art.  
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Danto argues that this later period of Modern art, characterised by the advent of 
self-reflection, ends when the aim of defining art is handed over to philosophers. 
However, in this paper, as well as in „Approaching‟ – unlike in „End‟ –, he is 
unclear as to whether the final definition of art has been already submitted or not. 
The only observation he offers is that „[art] has brought us to a stage of thought 
essentially outside history, where at last we can contemplate the possibility of a 
universal definition of art and vindicate therewith the philosophical aspiration of the 
ages, a definition, which will not be threatened by historical overthrow‟ 
(„Consciousness‟: 233).  
 
Additionally, he argues that there are two main theories that may be useful to 
explain the historical development of art:  
 
1) There is Vasari‟s view about the history of art. Vasari stressed in his 1550 
book about the lives of different artists, the idea that the history of art was a 
progressive effort of improving mimetic representation. In contrast to the 
discussion in „End‟, Danto holds here that such a conception of the history 
of art became problematised with the post-impressionist rejection of optical 
illusion and of the use of perspective in their paintings („Consciousness‟: 
232), rather than with the appearance of cinematography, as he still holds in 
„Approaching‟. 
 
2) When this occurred, Danto claims, a theory different from the idea of 
mimetic progression became possible: namely Panofsky‟s theory of 
perspective as a symbolic form (1924), which is an „iconological‟ theory 
(that is, „a way in which a culture represents its inner life to its members‟ – 
Carroll, 1999 [1997]: 34). Danto first introduces Panofsky‟s theory in 
„Approaching‟ and he argues, in „Consciousness‟, that this theory became 
possible when post-impressionism showed how the mimetic programme in 
art was seen just as a particular way of organising the world of the 
Renaissance but irrelevant in modern art.  
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Panofsky‟s iconological theory, Danto argues, is explicative of many practices and 
historical facts. He argues that Vasari‟s and even Panofsky‟s own theories might be 
themselves symbolic forms of different conceptions of history typical of their 
respective historical periods („Consciousness‟: 229); nevertheless he also argues 
that Panofsky‟s theory cannot account for a progressive conception of history 
(„Consciousness‟: 230), because for Panofsky, any symbolic form is as good as any 
other and from this standpoint, there would be no evolution from one form to the 
next. Danto insists, however, that the history of art is progressive because it 
evidences a movement from art to philosophy, which for him means a movement of 
the history of art towards the cognitive self-understanding of what art is 
(„Consciousness‟: 232). So, Danto argues, Panofsky‟s theory is useless because it 
cannot explain the historical progress in art. 
 
It is for this reason that even though Danto is very sympathetic to Panofsky‟s theory 
(see for example, later in: After: 129), nevertheless he believes that the only theory 
that can appropriately synthesise both the correct (for Danto) intuitions of Vasari 
and Panofsky, is Hegel‟s. Presumably this is because Hegel‟s theory is clearly 
teleological, as Vasari‟s is, and it seems to be understood by Danto as providing a 
pseudo-Panofskian conception of the „symbolic forms‟ by means of the theory 
about the different objectifications of the Zeitgeist – in different cultures and 
historical periods – in its teleological process towards self-understanding. Actually 
in „Approaching‟, Danto seems to think of Hegel‟s theory, in relation to Panofsky‟s, 
more or less along these lines („Approaching‟: 215).  
 
Another idea that Danto develops in „Consciousness‟ is the one already introduced 
in „End‟, about the progressive dissolution of the barriers in post-historical art. He 
now argues that once the end of art has been reached, there are further dissolutions 
besides the one between the different art disciplines, such as between art criticism 
and art, artist and art dealer, art dealer and art critic as well as between gallery and 
street („Consciousness‟: 233). This is relevant because it invites us to take into 
account other further dissolutions within the art praxis that he is going to take into 
consideration later on – such as between High Art and Craftmanship (After: 114; 
136) and High Art and Commercial Art (Danto, 2000: 135) – thus significantly 
extending the instances of „art‟ that he had offered in Transfiguration.  
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4.3 Danto’s later revisions in After the End of Art  
  
As mentioned earlier, in the papers collected in his book After, Danto elaborates 
what appears as the latest and most elaborate synthesis of ideas concerning the end 
of art. Since After, he has further reflected about the end of art (as for example in 
The Abuse of Beauty), although it is in After that he explains this idea most 
extensively as he understands it by 1997.  
 
Perhaps the changes he effected in After were the result of his becoming aware that 
in his previous papers  he was endorsing a number of ideas that didn‟t fit very well 
with his earlier theory in Transfiguration. For example, in „End‟ he appears to have 
implicitly accepted the mimetic theories in art because they had helped move the 
history of art further towards the process of self-understanding in the 20
th
 century 
(or until the appearance of Modern Art); while in Transfiguration he had rejected 
the idea that mimetic theories had any theoretical validity whatsoever. Further, 
while he supported the expressionist character of his D2 definition of art he now 
attacks expressionist theories in D3 because he claims that they cannot account for a 
teleological development of history.  
 
Alternatively, perhaps Danto‟s modifications in After, are to address problems 
internal to the theory about the end of art which are criticised by other theorists 
(such as Margolis or Carroll amongst others – Carroll, 1993; Margolis, 1999 [1997]; 
see also in: Haapala, Levinson & Rantala, 1999 [1997]).  
 
In any case, in After Danto reflects explicitly, on his modifications to the theory he 
had earlier submitted in „End‟ and slightly modified later in „Consciousness‟. In 
effect, Danto says: 
 
I had in the course of ten years of reflection arrived at a very different view of what 
the end of art meant than I had when that concept first possessed me. I had come to 
understand this doubtless incendiary expression to mean, in effect, the end of the 
master narratives of art – not just of the traditional narrative of representing visual 
appearance, which Ernst Gombrich had taken as the theme of his Mellon Lectures, nor 
of the succeeding narrative of modernism, which had all but ended, but the end of 
master narratives altogether (After: xv). 
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Thus, Danto now argues that after the end of art, there will be no more master 
narratives of the historical development of art understood in terms of a progressive 
teleological evolution. To demonstrate this, Danto not only examines modern art 
and modern art theory as practiced in the 20
th
 century more thoroughly – that is, in 
terms respectively of the art of the period of Manifestos, and of the theory of 
modern art as understood by Greenberg. He also reintroduces some ideas presented 
in D2 and more specifically in Transfiguration, to stress the idea that post-historical 
art, in contrast to what had come before, is characterised by artistic pluralism. 
 
In After, Danto argues that the history of art can be divided into two different 
consecutive narratives. In the first place again, there is Vasari‟s narrative, central to 
which is the idea that artists strive for increasingly better mimetic representations of 
reality. After post-impressionism, this narrative becomes obsolete and a new 
narrative emerges: the „era of ideology‟ appears, in which each artistic style, as a 
disguised philosophical practice, attempts to provide a type of stipulative definition 
of what art is (After: 30). This, Danto says, was often done either in terms of 
manifestos, or in terms of art criticism and essays in art magazines like October and 
Art Forum, as types of disguised-covert manifestos (After: 26 – 30).  
 
To be more precise, he argues that it is Greenberg‟s theory of modern art that best 
represents the second great alternative narrative of the whole history of art: 
Greenberg attempted to demonstrate, with his own theory of modern art, that the 
earlier mimetic credo, derived from Vasari, that valorised realistic representation, 
was actually concealing the true nature of art (After: 73). This true nature of art, he 
claims, was finally revealed with modern art and more particularly with abstract 
expressionism. Thus, Danto argues, Greenberg‟s narrative did not in fact constitute 
a break with Vasari‟s narrative, as he seems to suggest in „Consciousness‟ in his 
discussion of modern art. On the contrary, Greenberg attempted to establish a 
continuity with Vasari‟s teleological narrative, once it was revealed that the true 
goal of art was not to improve mimetic representation but to reveal its own 
underlying nature (After: 76). Thus, the real underlying aspiration of the whole 
history of art, Greenberg argued, was to progressively reveal the conditions of 
possibility of the different art disciplines, understood in terms of providing absolute 
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priority to their respective materials and media (e.g., flatness and the properties of 
the pigment, in the case of painting) (After: 72).  
 
Greenberg‟s materialist aesthetics, however, arise from his (Greenberg‟s) 
misreading of Kant‟s Kritik der Urteilskraft as if it was a sort of Kritik der Reinen 
Vernunft although addressed essentially to the experience and production of art 
(After: 67 – 69; See also: Capdevila, 2004).  As a result of this interpretation, 
Greenberg misunderstood Kant‟s later Kritik as a sort of normative Kritik der 
Reinen Kunst (i.e., Critique of Pure Art), and thereby attempted to demonstrate that, 
with the appearance of modern art:  
 
1) Artistic practices had to be consistent on the one hand with the theoretical 
practice of philosophical modernity, understood in terms of a critical self-
examination of the spheres of enquiry.  
 
2) Modern art had to be consistent with Kant‟s philosophical transcendental 
criticism, understood in terms of revealing the conditions of possibility and 
the limits of the objects of enquiry.  
 
3) This meant, in effect, that art had to entail the search for the purest formal 
elements that would represent the conditions of possibility and limits of each 
artistic discipline.  
 
However, Danto argues, Greenberg‟s formulation was in fact typical of the age of 
manifestos, in that it favoured a particular artistic style as true art and excluded 
others by stressing the relevance of purity, a position typical of the era of ideology 
(After: 70). This sort of ideological narrative-making typical of the era of ideology, 
Danto argues, ended once the question about the nature of art was answered – 
allowing for the validity of all styles in art. Thus Danto says in „Master Narratives 
and Critical Principles‟, one of the papers collected in After: 
 
The age of Manifestos, as I see it, came to an end when philosophy was separated 
from style because the true form of the question “What is art?” emerged [...]. Once it 
was determined that a philosophical definition of art entails no stylistic imperative 
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whatever, so that anything can be a work of art, we enter what I am terming the post-
historical period. Thus sketched, the master narrative of the history of art [...] is that 
there is an era of imitation, followed by an era of ideology, followed by our post-
historical era in which, with qualification, anything goes [...]. Art today is produced in 
an art world unstructured by any master narratives at all (After: 46 – 48).  
 
The true form of the question „what is art?‟ that, Danto argues, made possible the 
end of art, is: „what makes the difference between a work of art and something not a 
work of art when there is no interesting perceptual difference between them?‟ 
(After: 35). In this sense, then, Danto recovers the original idea from 
Transfiguration, that the essence of art, that drove the history of art and that was 
finally revealed by him, is one in which perceptual criteria plays no role. Moreover, 
the proper answer to this question is, for Danto, strikingly similar to Hegel‟s:24 
 
[Like] all definitions, mine (which was probably only partial) was entirely essentialist 
[…]. The only figure in the history of aesthetics I found to have grasped the 
complexities of the concept of art […] was Hegel […]. In the marvellous passage 
where Hegel sets out his ideas on the end of art, he writes “What is now aroused in us 
by works of art is not just immediate enjoyment but our judgment also, since we 
subject to our intellectual consideration (i) the content of art, and (ii) the work of art‟s 
means of presentation, and the appropriateness and inappropriateness of both to one 
another”. At the conclusion of chapter five [(After: 98)], I suggested that we need little 
more than (i) and (ii) to map the anatomy of criticism […] The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace, in its effort to lay down a definition, hence chart the essence of art, did 
little better than come up with conditions (i) and (ii) as necessary for something having 
the status of art. To be a work of art is to be (i) about something and (ii) to embody its 
meaning (After: 194 – 195). 
 
Danto claims that his definition, as summarised above, was inspired by Warhol‟s 
Brillo Boxes (After: 35), which demonstrated that no perceptual criterion can be 
applied to distinguish an artwork from its indiscernible non-artistic counterpart. Yet, 
as I pointed out in the previous chapter (in Section 3.5), Danto‟s explicit definition 
summarised in After does not correspond to what he argued in Transfiguration, but 
                                                 
24
 Other interesting reflections from Danto concerning the similarities between his and Hegel‟s 
theory can be found in Three Decades after the End of Art (in: After: 21 – 39; more particularly in: 
After: 30 – 31). 
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is rather a retrospective oversimplification of his D2 theory, written in somewhat 
Hegelian language. In doing so, he „coloured‟ his previous D2 theory by embracing 
Hegel‟s theory in D3, and embracing anti-dualist theories of language (that do not 
detach language from perception) that apparently, for Danto, are similar to Hegel‟s 
sort of rationalistic pantheism. This decision to follow Hegel, he asserts in the 
above passage, is because „the only figure in the history of aesthetics I found to 
have grasped the complexities of the concept of art […] was Hegel‟ (After: 194). 
Thus, the admiration for Hegel leads him to claim that he was arguing something 
similar to him in Transfiguration, when actually this is not strictly true. In fact, he 
modifies his theory retrospectively to make the reader believe he was, like Hegel, 
grasping „the complexities of the concept of art‟ from the very beginning. 
 
Furthermore, besides modifying his earlier implicit 1981 definition, it is relevant to 
point out here, that Danto also modifies his earlier claim that the demonstration that 
no perceptual criterion can be used to distinguish between artworks and non-
artworks, was discovered by Warhol: he now argues that this was also discovered 
by almost all artistic movements between the 1960s and 1970s (i.e., Minimalism, 
Arte Povera, Post-Minimalism, Fluxus, Conceptualism, etc.) (After: 113; Danto, 
2006 [2003]: xvii). This has to be taken into account even if at some other moment 
he stresses more the centrality of Pop art in leading to the end of the master 
narratives of art (After: 122). 
 
  
4.4 Some problems with Danto’s theory of the end of art 
 
A) The history of art as the search for the definition of art 
 
Danto argues that the historical development of art has been a quest, led by artists, 
to understand what art is and means. He claims that the end of art is reached when 
the question, about what art is, is posed in its proper form. Once this occurs, 
philosophers can then give a proper answer and thus an adequate definition of art 
that shows that all styles and forms are equally valid in art – i.e., that everything is 
now possible in art.  
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However, in After he has to respond to criticisms that show that actually not 
everything is possible after the end of art. One of the examples Danto responds to, 
is that of an artist whose Rembrandt-style paintings were rejected for an exhibition 
for being in a style already superseded (After: 207). In response, he suggests that 
after the end of art, anything can be presented as an artwork with certain provisos. 
He thus introduces the binary distinction use/mention (After: 205 – 206) and argues 
that we must distinguish between the use of a particular style, corresponding to the 
historical context of the artist, and the mention of past styles. That is to say, an artist 
attempting to use past styles will automatically fail to present his works as artworks 
but he can mention past styles in order to produce an interesting posthistorical 
artwork. 
 
This argument, however, has a number of problems: in the first place Danto is 
acknowledging that it is not true that after the end of art anything can be an artwork. 
In the second place, any provisos that might be offered to rule something out as an 
artwork after the end of art, can also be used to explain why not everything was 
possible in art before the period of the end of art either. The problem, in other 
words, is that Danto‟s provisos undermine the idea of a radical break between 
posthistorical art and its predecessors (Davies argues something similar in his 
review of Danto‟s book – See: Davies, 2001b: 215). 
 
Of course, Danto could answer that he didn‟t really claim that anything would be 
possible nowadays in art, but merely that with Warhol‟s Brillo Boxes and the like, it 
became clear that artistic objects could be, since then, indiscernible from non-
artistic ones. If this were his claim, however, it then poses additional problems 
because:  
 
1) Duchamp, with his snow shovel In Advance of Broken Arm (1915), had 
already done this, several years before Pop Art appeared and even before 
modern art as understood by Greenberg was first proposed. Thus if Danto 
wants to be consistent with the idea that post-historical art appears with the 
indiscernibility of artistic and non-artistic objects, then he ought to take 
seriously into consideration the possibility that the end of art should have 
occurred, not with Warhol‟s Brillo Boxes but earlier on with Duchamp‟s 
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works, particularly with his snow shovel and perhaps also with his urinal (as 
he seemed to hold earlier – see: „Disenfranchisement‟: 15). In fact, in After, 
he recognises Duchamp as precursor of Warhol in asking the question about 
art‟s nature in its proper form (After: 112 – 113). Ultimately, however, he 
finally dismisses the similarity between Duchamp and Warhol, supposedly 
to better support his thesis that the end of art occurs with the art produced 
during the 1960s, especially with the set of Brillo Boxes that had inspired his 
theory in Transfiguration (After: 132).  
 
2) Carroll suggests that if Danto argues that (a) his theory is similar to Hegel‟s 
and (b) that the definition of art (and thus also the end of art) becomes 
possible with the discovery of the problem of indiscernibles, then the end of 
art would have occurred, not in 1964 A.D. but in 1964 B.C. or earlier. This, 
Carroll argues, is because Danto, in holding these two ideas, seems to be 
implying that Hegel was already aware of the problem of indiscernibles, 
with the Symbolic type of art – otherwise he couldn‟t have formulated his 
own theory, which is so similar to Danto‟s, and which takes as a point of 
departure, this early type of art (i.e., Symbolic art). In fact, in Danto‟s 1991 
paper „Description and the Phenomenology of Perception‟ – that I examined 
in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.5) – he seems to point in the direction that 
Carroll suggests. However, in that case, it seems that Danto is endorsing the 
idea that art had ended with Classical, or maybe with Romantic art, because 
Danto appears to assert – at least in the following passage – that the 
artworks of these periods already showed perfectly the nature of art. I quote 
again Danto‟s passage because I find it strikingly counter to his own claims 
that the end of art occurs in  the 1960s with the appearance of Readymades 
(because it is only then when it is possible to discover the „true‟ definition of 
art): 
 
What further takes place [when interpreting the work of Guercino presented by Danto, 
and in fact, following him, when interpreting all artworks] may not take place at the 
level of perception but at the level of interpretations and connotation. The entirety of 
what Hegel calls Symbolic Art is in external relationship to its meaning: we don‟t see 
the meaning through the symbol, but connect it with the symbol. But there may be a 
more internal connection than this, as Hegel acknowledges in his category of 
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Classical, and especially of Romantic art, where what we see is determined by what 
we don’t […]. So art attains here the level of thought, and the artwork is a thought 
given a kind of sensuous embodiment […] I have taken over a view of Hegel‟s (above) 
that art has the power of thought (Danto, 1991: 211 – 212; italics mine). 
 
3) Claiming that artworks can be indiscernible from non-artistic objects is not 
sufficient for also claiming that today there is a complete atmosphere of 
pluralism in art. There is no causal relation between one idea and the other. 
The most Danto can claim is that this shows that artworks don‟t need to be 
abstract to be art, and that they don‟t need to be clearly different from 
everyday objects.  
 
4) With the theory of artistic objects indiscernible from non-artistic ones, 
Danto makes the claim that today anything can be an artwork. But to be 
consistent with his theory, Danto has to claim that these artworks (in order 
to be artworks) also have to possess the rest of the elements in the definition 
of art he proposed in Transfiguration. That is to say, artworks have to be 
semantic vehicles of meaning, have to be intended by artists to be art, and so 
on. Otherwise that earlier theory would not apply to all artworks (for 
example would exclude post-historical artworks) and thus would be an 
invalid universal definition of art. Although, if he concedes the former 
(against the latter idea), then contra what he claims, there would be a high 
degree of continuity between post-historical art and previous art rather than 
a radical break between them. 
  
Danto also says, in „End‟, that the end of art occurs once we know what art is and 
means. In this, he takes for granted that we do now know what art is and means. 
Alternatively, he says in After that the end of art occurs once we have answered the 
question of what distinguishes artworks indiscernible from non-artistic objects. 
Again, in this case, he still assumes that the correct answer to this question has been 
given. In fact, his theoretical chronology locates the end of art with the introduction 
of artworks indiscernible from non-artistic objects during the 1960s, especially with 
Warhol‟s Brillo Boxes. This, he argues, made possible his own philosophical 
theories corresponding to D1 and D2. Presumably, then, Danto believes that we 
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know what art is and means because he was capable, in Transfiguration, of 
explaining what distinguishes artworks from their non-artistic indiscernible 
counterparts.  
 
But if this is so, then the whole theory of the end of art rests on the assumption that 
his theory in Transfiguration (or its 1997 reformulation), which attempts to explain 
what art is and means, is correct (see for example his claims in: After: 195). If the 
theory in Transfiguration, or its later reformulation, is incorrect, however, as many 
philosophers of art have claimed, then we don‟t really know what art is and means 
and thus we have not yet a final answer to the question of what distinguishes 
artworks indiscernible from mere „real‟ things. In that case the entire theory of the 
end of art collapses because it rests on a false assumption: that the proper question 
about the nature of art had finally and correctly been answered. And if Danto‟s 
theory is incorrect, we can claim that the fundamental condition for the history of 
art to end hasn‟t yet been fulfilled and therefore there hasn‟t been any end of art 
whatsoever, (unless the end of art occurs for a reason different from that conceived 
by Danto).  
 
In his later paper „Narrative and Neverendingness‟ (1999), Danto presents an 
alternative version, already hinted at in „Consciousness‟, about the end of art. He 
claims in this paper that the end of art occurs just when the right question about the 
nature of art is posed. Once this happens, art ends, and the search for a proper 
philosophical answer is handed to philosophers. Yet he never states here that an 
answer has or needs to be given for the narrative of art to reach its end, perhaps in 
order to avoid the above mentioned criticism. So here Danto could say that his 
theory of the end of art does not depend upon the theory in Transfiguration being 
the final correct answer to the question of what art is and means. But if this is the 
case, how can we know that the question posed by artists, that he claims leads to the 
end of art, is correct if we haven‟t given any answer yet to this question? Here 
Danto is just making the unproven assumption that we may know that this question 
is correctly posed (see also: Carroll, 1999 [1997]: 37). So in this case he leaves 
unanswered why he believes that the question about „what makes the difference 
between a work of art and something not a work of art when there is no interesting 
perceptual difference between them?‟ is the correct and final one. 
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B) Hegel and the philosophy of the history of art 
 
Danto claims that the history of art developed teleologically until it reached its end 
in the 20
th
 century with Pop Art and other artistic movements of the 1960s. To 
support this idea, he frequently refers to Hegel‟s theory. However, Danto‟s theory 
would make sense only in so far as it can demonstrate that the history of art has 
been developing in such a way as to explain finally what art is and means.  
 
Danto thus insists that the history of art has developed teleologically, and that the 
history of art has ended, even when there is no empirical proof for this: only his 
own theoretical assumptions. So each time he has to choose between whether the 
history of art is teleological (as Vasari or Greenberg would have it), or not (as the 
Expressionists or Panofsky seem to imply), he provides Hegel‟s theory as an 
alternative. Curiously, he does this as if it would resolve the debate in favour of the 
teleological view.  
 
This, of course, is not enough, and in fact Danto may say that this is an incorrect 
interpretation of his occasional references to Hegel. He may say that his references 
to Hegel are not ultimately to justify his own theory but to clarify for his readers 
what he has been attempting to claim so far. But if this is so, then he ought to be 
able to present his thesis without the need to mention Hegel, something which he is 
unable to do. And because he takes such frequent recourse to Hegel it looks as if he 
is introducing a fallacy of authority to support his own controversial ideas. 
 
Additionally, Danto tends to reinterpret Hegel in his own favour: that is, in a way 
that misleadingly suggests his own theory to be claiming similar things about art 
than Hegel. But contrary to Danto‟s claim, and against Solomon and Higgins 
interpretations of Hegel (Solomon & Higgins, 1993), this is not the case, because: 
 
1) Hegel‟s philosophy of art is a coherent part of his overall philosophy of 
history while Danto‟s is not. Danto‟s theory, on the contrary, as he stresses 
in After (After: 43), is a philosophy of the history of art which is not in 
continuity with the overall view of the philosophy of history he offered 
some 20 years before he first submitted his thesis about the end of art.  
102 
 
 
2) Moreover, Hegel‟s philosophy of history is very different from Danto‟s: 
Hegel attempted to explain how history developed progressively from 
Symbolic art, to an (idealised) artistic Classical Greek culture leading finally 
to the philosophical culture of German Idealism. In this, he believed that the 
Geist, or Spirit of Human Consciousness, evolved consecutively from one to 
the next of the three forms of the Absolute Spirit: art, religion and 
philosophy.
25
 Hegel, in fact, believed that art was in the past the best way to 
achieve the best representations of the „most sublime ideas and interests 
from the Spirit‟. Greek (or Classical) art, for Hegel, achieved the best 
harmonic balance between material exteriority and internal spirituality. This 
led him to understand Greek art as the paradigm for art. The balance 
characteristic of Classical art, however, would break down with the 
appearance of what he termed Romantic art, in the medieval period. This 
occurred, Hegel asserts, because Romantic Art was characterised by its 
religious spirituality, thus making inwardness and religiosity more relevant 
in artistic representations. He further argues that this period, in which art 
played a central role for the spirit of humankind, was itself replaced by the 
next one characterised by religion, and then the latter by philosophy. He 
believed that religion and, later on, philosophical thought were better than 
art at (self-) understanding and (self-) representing the Zeitgeist, first during 
the medieval period, and then reaching its climax with the philosophical 
culture of German Idealism, and more particularly, with Hegel himself.   
 
This theory, as I have hinted, is very different from Danto‟s. Danto is not interested, 
as Hegel was, in showing how (Classical) art is „something of the past‟, art being 
progressively replaced by religion and then religion by philosophy as the best ways 
to represent and understand the Spirit of Human Consciousness. On the contrary, 
we could say that Danto is interested in showing that art today is still central to the 
representation of the highest ideals and notions of the human spirit. However, he 
                                                 
25
 In the Phenomenology of the Spirit Hegel calls these three stages respectively „the religion of art‟, 
„manifest religion‟ and „absolute knowledge‟. 
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assumes that Hegel‟s claims about the progression of the three absolute forms of the 
spirit is analogous to his own claim that during the last period art has been 
immersed in a stage of philosophical self-reflection. These are, however, two very 
different sorts of claim, although Danto tends to regard the latter as a plausible 
interpretation of Hegel‟s theory (as can be observed for example in: „End‟: 109 – 
111; also in: After: 47). Danto‟s claim that art becomes philosophical is very 
different from Hegel‟s argument that philosophy replaces religion, which has itself 
replaced art, as the current highest form of representing and understanding the 
Spirit.  
 
3) In addition, Danto often confuses Hegel‟s reflections on the end of art, or 
more precisely, his claim that art is now „something of the past‟, with 
Hegel‟s reflections on the end of history. Hegel‟s end of history supports the 
idea that the spirit has reached absolute self-reflection, thus making possible 
the realisation, in empirical reality, of his spiritual freedom. The end of 
history occurs after the third form (philosophy), has replaced the second 
form (religion), a process that ultimately leads to the stage of self-
understanding. For Hegel, however, the end of art occurs before that, when 
the first absolute form of the spirit (art) is substituted by the second form 
(religion). The problem with Danto is that he misinterprets Hegel by 
conflating these two different moments of the Spirit: the end of art and the 
final moment of self-understanding of the Spirit. He apparently does this to 
justify his account of why art has ended once it has reached its final moment 
of self reflection, with the appearance of artworks indiscernible from non-
artistic objects during the 1960s.
26
  
 
Furthermore, Danto believes that his 1997 explicit definition (presented in After) is 
not only a good account of his 1981 implicit definition of Transfiguration but that it 
is also very similar to Hegel‟s way of understanding art (After: 194 – 195). 
However, this is deeply misleading because while Hegel‟s theory and definition are 
                                                 
26
 Forsey also points out some of these differences between Danto‟s and Hegel‟s theories (Forsey, 
2001: 406). 
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still framed in a mentalist type of philosophy (the Geist is understood as a sort of 
collective and historicised Kantian subject or consciousness) Danto‟s definition is 
framed, instead, in a philosophy of language and more specifically, upon his 
interpretation of Wittgenstein‟s Tractatus (even though he attempts to obscure this 
fact during his D3 period by presenting a formula reminiscent of the philosophy of 
language characteristic of the PI and the post-Wittgensteinian theorists of science).  
 
It is true, however, that Hegel‟s ideas about art summarised in terms of the 
relevance of the content and the means of presentation, could be held without 
endorsing any type of mentalism à-la-Hegel. However, Danto‟s own version of the 
definition, relying on the notion of „aboutness‟, unlike Hegel‟s, does intrinsically 
rely upon a theory of language that does not easily lend to the notions of content 
and means of presentation. Yet Danto seems to be implying that Hegel‟s notions of 
„content‟ and of „means of presentation‟ are respectively similar to those of „being 
about something‟ and „incarnating its meaning‟ introduced by him. This seems 
deeply implausible and thus points towards the idea that Danto, again, is attempting 
to explain Hegel as if both were claiming similar things.  
 
 
C) Historical necessity and the development of history 
 
In his theory about the end of art, Danto attempts to account for why the history of 
art followed a particular line of development, until the break that occurred during 
the 1960s which led to a post-historical era of pluralism. 
 
However, in attempting to understand the logic of historical development in 
retrospect, Danto, like Hegel, tends to understand historical contingency in terms of 
historical necessity, and what actually happened as what had to happen: every event 
in the history of art is presented as if it were necessary. This is because Danto 
endorses a priori the idea that everything that happened in history was the result of 
the rational development of the Geist of the Kunstgeschichte towards self-
understanding. In claiming this, however, he takes the controversial position that the 
history of art makes the artists, not that artists make the history of art: the artists and 
their actions are for him by-products of the internal drive of the Geist of art – i.e., 
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the consequences of what art wants. His reasoning thus leads him to conclude, 
implicitly, that nothing in art can be really unexpected, or really the product of the 
artist‟s will, imagination and rebelliousness: if an event occurs in the artworld, that 
is because this is what art wanted.  
 
Furthermore, Margolis claims that, in supporting this idea, Danto is closely 
following Greenberg‟s very controversial idea (that Danto himself rejects) that 
artists such as Van Gogh ought to be evaluated in terms of „what art wanted‟. Danto 
criticises Greenberg because „he once considered Van Gogh‟s work as due to his 
finding what went on in the canvas more interesting than what went on in the 
world‟ (Margolis, 1999 [1997]: 14); that is, Danto criticised Greenberg for his 
attempt to understand the works of a great artist only by means of what Greenberg 
believed to be essential in art, namely, their formal properties (particularly the flat 
surface of the painting and the properties of the pigment). Yet, Danto, even if 
critical to this way of understanding art, also follows ideas similar to Greenberg‟s: 
when criticising the works of Kiefer as (inferior) „Symbolic art‟, Danto seems to 
argue that the works of all artists ought to be examined in terms of „what art wants‟, 
that is, in terms of the search for the essence of art that shows how „meaning 
penetrates the work‟ (Margolis, 1999 [1997]: 8). Danto believes, following Hegel, 
that this doesn‟t occur with Symbolic art because in these types of artworks, their 
meanings are completely arbitrary in relation to their media. Thus, following this 
conception, those works that fail in following „what art wants‟ (i.e., to show that the 
meaning penetrates the work), such as, in Danto‟s opinion, Kiefer‟s, are not even 
worth considering in extenso.  
 
Moreover, in supporting the idea that good artists follow „what art wants‟ (i.e., to 
make artworks that reveal their nature as „embodied meaning‟, following Danto‟s 
latest formulation – Danto, 2009 [2007]: 112), Danto seems to believe that the 
works of artists such as Beuys, Duchamp or Warhol have to be understood basically 
as philosophical efforts to explain and exemplify what art is, rather than, for 
example, as efforts to make claims about ecological devastation (Beuys), political 
claims against the bourgeoisie (Duchamp) or claims about the beauty of everyday 
objects of consumption, against the ideological-marxist rejection of consumerism 
and representational art held by the members of the abstract expressionist 
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movement (Warhol). That is to say, Danto, like Greenberg, seems to be endorsing 
the idea that the works of all artists (including Van Gogh‟s) have to be understood 
as efforts to progressively reveal the essence of art, rather than as efforts to reflect 
the particular artist‟s interests or points of view. This, however, seems to be a 
completely unacceptable and oversimplified way of examining the works of all 
these great artists.  
 
Moreover, there is no way to empirically validate the historical necessity that Danto 
believes that the history of art follows – i.e., there is no way to verify whether the 
historical events were a matter of historical necessity or of historical possibility. 
How can we say for sure that the history of art couldn‟t have been otherwise? There 
is simply no way to be certain that artistic events happened because of historical 
need or an intrinsic drive. We cannot claim this, unless we really can empirically 
validate that the internal drive of art is guided by the attempt to define what art is 
and means, an attempt that is finally reached with Danto‟s reflections in 
Transfiguration, something which has already been put into question (further, 
Carroll also suggests that even Danto‟s way of understanding philosophy in terms 
of indiscernibility is also controversial in itself – see: Carroll, 1999 [1997]: 37).  
 
Additionally, Danto often stresses the role of historical context to account for why 
certain artists, such as Duchamp, could introduce certain instances of art in terms of 
the logical development of the history of art. Yet, in doing this, he disregards the 
fact that artists often presented their artworks, not as a result of the logical 
development of the history of art, but completely counter to it. In fact, Danto admits 
that when post-impressionists exhibited their work, they were met with criticism 
and rejection on all sides (see for example: After: 55 – 56); and Fountain was not 
accepted as an artwork by those responsible for the exhibition in which Duchamp 
presented his Ready-Made. Furthermore, some of these objections still endure; e.g., 
Beardsley and Cohen, for example, still reject the idea that Duchamp‟s Fountain is 
an artwork. Thus artists often presented their artworks not because of the historical 
context that made this possible. Au contraire, they often presented their artworks as 
responses against the historical context that made their work until then, and even 
later, completely unthinkable as art for the majority of the public, other artists, art 
critics, art collectors and curators.   
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In fact, Danto‟s theory, in stressing the teleological development of history that 
ultimately follows the criteria of „what art wants‟, faces the same difficulty as 
Hegel‟s. In attempting to explain everything in terms of the rationale of the Geist, 
Hegel confused methodological explanation with empirical justification: all 
historical events were justified in so far as they ultimately helped to fulfil the 
teleological process of self-understanding of the Geist. In this case, Danto‟s theory 
will always find a justification for all art events, in so far as he believes them to be, 
in one way or another, part of the logic followed by the Geist of the 
Kunstgeschichte. Actually for Hegel, even the period of self-alienation of the Geist 
(i.e., the period of its self-misunderstanding) was also justified; he holds that it was 
a necessary painful moment in the process of reaching the final stage of self-
understanding of the Spirit. Danto claims something similar when he says that: 
 
In my own version of the idea of “what art wants”, the end and fulfilment of the 
history of art is the philosophical understanding of what art is, an understanding that is 
achieved in the way that understanding in each of our lives is achieved, namely, from 
the mistakes we make, the false paths we follow, the false images we come to abandon 
until we learn wherein our limits consist, and then how to live within those limits. The 
first false path was the close identification of art with picturing. The second false path 
was the materialist aesthetics of Greenberg, in which art turns away from what makes 
pictorial content convincing, hence from illusion, to the palpable material properties of 
art, which differ essentially from medium to medium […] in my sense, once art itself 
raised the true form of the philosophical question – that is, the question of the 
difference between artworks and real things – history was over. The philosophical 
moment had been attained [...]. To say that the history is over is to say that there is no 
longer a pale of history for works of art to fall outside of. Everything is possible. 
Anything can be art (After: 107 – 114). 
 
However, the mere possibility of proving that previous historical paths were wrong, 
doesn‟t imply necessarily that a final (self-)understanding of art is or can be 
achieved at all. It rather shows that art may have followed wrong paths that are 
discovered as such only a posteriori, for example by discovering that some paths 
lead to theoretical cul-de-sacs. Yet Danto seems to expect that once these wrong 
paths are discovered, we are in position to tell what the correct path of art history is 
in a way analogous to the theory of negative theology: we know what God is by 
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knowing what God is not. But applying the theory of negative theology to art also 
has inconvenient consequences: we can only make hypotheses (not conclusive 
statements) about what God – and by analogy, the Geist of Art – might not be, 
without conclusively demonstrating what either of them de facto are.  
 
 
D) Danto’s eager claims about the end of art  
 
After presenting his first paper on the end of art in 1984, Danto was accused of 
being self-contradictory because a few months later he began working as an art 
critic. How is it possible, for someone claiming that art had reached its end to 
expect, at the same time, to deal with newly produced artworks? Danto responded 
to this criticism by claiming that he never said that the production of art would end 
(After: 25 – 26):  on the contrary, he believed that this new posthistorical period, 
marked as it was by a radical break with previous art, would lead to a new 
pluralistic and very creative era in art production.  
 
Because he had proposed his theory of the end of art before he began his work as an 
art critic for The Nation – and thus before he acquired a much deeper understanding 
of the history of art – the objection could be reformulated differently. It could be 
argued that Danto was overly eager to produce a major philosophical statement with 
insufficient empirical evidence to validate this thesis. Danto claims, however, that 
his was an empirical claim not a philosophical one (Danto, 1999: 29).  So in this 
case he could argue that he wasn‟t just playing with philosophical ideas but that he 
had already grasped empirically what was going on in art, even before beginning his 
career as an art critic. That career, he could say, only served to provide him with 
more material which confirmed his early hypothesis about the end of art.  
 
Yet, as I have shown earlier, Danto‟s later approaches, after developing his career 
as an art critic, led him in After, to minimise his major claim, that in the 
posthistorical era anything can be presented as art – i.e., he says that in the 
posthistorical era, only „with qualification, anything goes‟ (After: 47). Thus, 
perhaps, if he had thought of presenting the idea of the end of art for the first time 
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twenty years later, after further developing his career as an art critic, he would have 
hesitated to make such a grandiloquent claim.  
 
Danto further asserts that after the end of art, there is a progressive dissolution of 
the boundaries between high art, craft and commercial art. In part, he argues this 
because he holds that the end of modern art meant the end of the Greenbergian 
aspirations of purity and faithfulness to the media of the different art disciplines. 
Given that both Greenberg‟s and Vasari‟s histories of art gave a central role to 
painting, the end of art meant also for Danto that painting was no longer the 
paradigm of art. This, he affirms, allowed for a greater pluralism, both in the 
production of artworks and in the introduction of new and previously unthinkable 
hybrid art disciplines: video art, sound art, land art, body art, happenings, site-
specific art, and so on. It also permitted the introduction of new materials and 
media, leading to a new diversified panorama which questioned the previous 
distinction between art and craft. As he says: 
 
[Painting], since no longer the chief vehicle of historical development [in 
posthistorical art], was now but one medium in the open disjunction of media and 
practices that defined the art world, which included installation, performance, video, 
computer and various modalities of mixed media, not to mention earthworks, body art, 
what I call “object art” and a great deal of art that had earlier been invidiously 
stigmatized as craft (After: 136). 
 
In fact, he observes, the introduction in art of new media and materials, previously 
„stigmatized‟ as craft, makes posthistorical art more similar to the art produced 
before Vasari (i.e., before „the era of art‟) than to the art produced during Vasari‟s 
and Greenberg‟s narratives (After: 114). This, he argues, is because before Vasari 
there was not yet a clear distinction between art and craft. In posthistorical art, 
Danto argues, this difference is again blurred because, although „with qualification‟, 
now everything is possible, even the introduction of craft objects as art.  
 
Nevertheless Danto‟s claim, that posthistorical art (i.e., the art after the 60‟s) 
allowed craft objects, materials and media to be considered as art, is undercut by his 
acknowledgement that the breaking of these generic boundaries had already 
occurred in the period of Modernism. Modernist art, he observes, emphasised a 
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formalist appreciation of other sorts of cultural artifacts and works of craft, making 
it possible to consider them as art (After: 109). So in this case, contrary to what he 
claims, he recognises that it was already in Picasso‟s period, and not the art of the 
1960s (when the end of art begins in his chronology), that these boundaries between 
art and craft began to break down. As he says: 
 
During the course of modernism, African art rose in esteem, making a transition from 
the museum of natural history […] to the museum of art and the art gallery […]. When 
these objects became pivotal to the history of modernism, spectacularly in the case of 
Picasso, whose visit to the anthropological museum at Trocadero proved momentous 
for his own development and the subsequent development of modernist art, critics and 
theorists began to look at them in a new way, no longer seeing the need to distinguish 
between modern and “primitive” art, since they were presumed to be comparable at 
the level of form. Roger Fry wrote a powerful essay on “negro Sculpture” in 1920 and 
emphasized the immense change that had taken place […] But in fact modernism 
dissolved a great many boundaries, largely by aestheticizing or formalizing objects 
from diverse cultures which Riegl‟s contemporaries […] would have found beyond the 
pale of taste (After: 108 – 109). 
 
Of course, Danto could answer that he never claimed that the difference between art 
and craft began to disappear with the end of the narrative of modern art. He could 
argue that actually his claim was that the new condition of pluralism in art that 
began with modernism consolidated in the post-historical period of art, without 
further discussion, the conversion of craft-objects into art objects. The claim would 
still be dubious, however, because today there is still considerable controversy 
about the extent to which craft objects ought to be considered as art (see for 
example: Corse, 2009; Lemkow, 2011b).  
 
Additionally if, as Danto claims, it was formalism, during the development of 
modernism, which first allowed the appreciation of certain works of craft as 
artworks, then perhaps we could conclude that he was also too eager in 
disenfranchising formalism as vitally important in opening the pluralism typical of 
the era of „posthistorical‟ art.  
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5. DICKIE’S EARLY INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF ART 
 
The debate over definitions of art among Weitz, Danto and Mandelbaum was later 
followed by Dickie‟s attempts to define art. Dickie‟s early definitions of art, 
however, raised even more objections than Danto‟s, partly because of his crude 
institutionalist stance, and partly because of his misconceptions about art. Further 
controversy was generated by some misinterpretations of Dickie‟s theories in 
relation to the rest of his philosophical ideas. As a result, he progressively 
reformulated the ideas he had first presented in 1969, to defend and refine the core 
of this earlier theory (DK1) and his earlier institutional definition of art (DK1Def). 
Later he presented a very different theory (DK2) and definition of art (DK2Def), 
although it remained an institutional theory. Dickie‟s later definition, however, will 
be examined in the next chapter and only his earlier definition and its subsequent 
refinements will be taken into consideration here. 
 
Dickie‟s early definition of art was presented in his 1969 paper „Defining Art‟.  As 
he explains in one of his more recent papers (Dickie, 2001: 52 – 53) two 
refinements of this earlier definition were presented in two of his later books, 
respectively in Aesthetics, an Introduction (hereinafter, Introduction) in 1971 and in 
his Art and the Aesthetic in 1974. The papers corresponding to or postdating these 
years reflect on the ideas presented in these later versions. Among Dickie‟s relevant 
papers that touch on the earlier and revised versions of this institutional definition 
of art are: „The Institutional Conception of Art‟ („Institutional‟), „Defining Art: II‟ 
(„Defining II‟), „A Response to Cohen: The Actuality of Art‟ („Response‟) and „A 
Reply to Professor Margolis‟ („Reply‟). 
 
Thus, to better understand Dickie‟s earlier institutional theory (DK1) and definition 
(DK1Def), we need to understand the changes he made in his different versions. To 
an extent, some of this has been done (Davies, 1991; Carroll, 1994). Nevertheless, 
as Dickie himself points out, these assessments often examine only one of his 
theories and definitions in isolation (as in the case of Davies‟s and Carroll‟s works 
mentioned above), thus leading to misinterpretations or unfair oversimplifications 
of the overall body of his thought and work – as Dickie protests later in responding 
to Davies‟s, Wollheim‟s or Danto‟s critiques (Dickie, 2001: 38 – 39; 53 – 54).  
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Further, when they look at Dickie‟s attempts to define art, the various different 
interpreters tend to isolate his ideas about the definition of art from his other earlier 
and later criticisms of theories of psychical distance (Bullough), aesthetic 
perception (Aldrich) disinterested attention or intransitive apprehension (Stolnitz, 
Vivas) and aesthetic object (Beardsley). This, I claim, is unhelpful, and as I will 
show, it overlooks the continuity and thus the internal consistency of what I claim 
to be Dickie‟s overall philosophical project. This project began in the mid-50‟s as a 
criticism of thinking that psychological-aesthetic explanations are required to 
understand how we identify and appreciate aesthetic features and artistic objects 
(Dickie, 1956). As he developed this project, he came to claim that psychological-
aesthetic explanations of art were false because the identification, assignation and 
appreciation of the features of artworks were actually due to a set of norms and 
conventions internal to each type of „art game‟ (Dickie, 1962: 299 – 300) or, as he 
says later in Art and the Aesthetic, some norms and conventions were internal to 
each „system‟ of the artworld, and, some others, such as the act of „status conferral‟, 
to the artworld itself as a whole (see: Art and the Aesthetic: 30 – 33). 
 
If this is correct, then the already traditional (if not orthodox) interpretation, from 
Davies, Tilghman and others such as Danto, which argues that Dickie basically 
develops Danto‟s and Mandelbaum‟s theories, is wrong or at best only partial: 
Dickie‟s institutional theory, as Carroll suggests, is a consequence of his earlier 
critical reflections on the relevance of aesthetics to art (Carroll, 1994: 3; also in 
Carroll‟s section in the chapter on Dickie in: Davies, Higgins et al, 2009: 249). 
Moreover, it is later on, after attempting to refine and build on the logical 
implications of Beardsley‟s theories on metacriticism (i.e., which provide the basis 
for Dickie‟s institutional explanations, based on the role of norms and 
presentational conventions as the preconditions for art criticism) that he converges 
with Danto‟s interests. This convergence occurred as a result of both Danto and 
Dickie attempting to respond to Weitz‟s criticisms of any attempts to define art. I 
will demonstrate this in the course of the chapter. 
 
Now, in order to understand better Dickie‟s earlier definition of art, I will examine 
in this chapter, the three versions of Dickie‟s early theory and definition of art 
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(DK1/DK1Def), that respectively correspond to „Defining Art‟ (his DK1a theory, 
where he also presents his DK1aDef), Introduction (DK1b/DK1bDef) and Art and 
the Aesthetic (DK1c/DK1cDef). This will make the refinements of the theory more 
visible, and will also indicate where to look in order to better understand and 
critically examine the early stage of Dickie‟s overall theory of art (DK1). In 
addition, the possibility of making a comparison between Dickie‟s theories and 
Danto‟s (examined in the previous chapters), provides a better opportunity to reveal 
some positive and negative elements of their thinking that are often ignored when 
examining only one of these philosophers in isolation.  
 
I will attempt, however, to avoid repetition and to focus on the central aspects of 
Dickie‟s three versions of his early definition of art. To do so, I will treat in each 
subsection just the novelties introduced in each definition and the modifications he 
thus introduced after each attempt at improving his DK1 theory. Only in few cases, 
and for heuristic reasons, will I eschew this procedure by referring to later 
developments of his theory. In fact Dickie attempted later, in The Art Circle, to 
reformulate his institutional theory of art completely (see Chapter 6) in reply to the 
objections his earlier DK1 theory had received. Owing to this, I will examine some 
of the problems in Dickie‟s earlier theory in this chapter; and other objections, such 
as the problem of circularity, and Beardsley‟s reflections on the Romantic artist, in 
the next. This is because Dickie‟s later DK2 theory is in part a direct response to 
those objections.  
 
 
5.1 DK1a: Dickie’s first paper on the institutional definition of art. 
 
In „Defining Art‟, Dickie presented the first version of his earlier institutional 
definition of art. Here, he attempts to respond to Weitz‟s claim that art cannot be 
defined. To do so, he takes into account some of Margolis‟s, Mandelbaum‟s and 
Danto‟s ideas, to develop further his own thesis.  
 
Thus, he first endorses the idea that artworks correspond to the genus of artifacts 
and that the definition of art ought to be formulated in terms of genus et differentia 
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(Margolis
27
). Secondly, he takes into account the relevance of the non-exhibited and 
relational properties of artworks (Mandelbaum). Finally he makes reference to an 
„artworld‟ to explain the production of new instances of art (Danto).  
 
To arrive at his first definition (DK1aDef), Dickie also takes into account Weitz‟s 
idea about the difference between the evaluative sense and the descriptive sense 
when talking about works of art. In doing so, he attempts to avoid confusing 
evaluative claims about non-artistic objects that in a particular context might be 
metaphorically called „works of art‟ (e.g., in such phrases as „this piece of driftwood 
is a work of art!‟). 28 He also makes it clear that not all artworks are necessarily 
good artworks, but that au contraire, it is in fact fairly common to find bad works of 
art in galleries and museums.  
 
In order to proceed with his attempt to define art, Dickie also responds to Kennick‟s 
sceptical arguments against universal definitions of art that attempt to explain what 
art is by means of what we do with certain objects. Kennick is critical of such 
approaches, in part because we are largely ignorant of how past cultures related to 
art; Dickie responds that he is not engaging a universal concept (one that could also 
                                                 
27
 It is disappointing to see that often, if not always, Dickie‟s interpreters have disregarded the 
influence of Margolis‟s definition of art on Dickie‟s. This influence can be traced to Dickie‟s 
different versions of the DK1 definition and to his other reflections related thereto.  It is thus 
worthwhile to quote here Margolis‟s definition, for a heuristic comparison between his and Dickie‟s 
definition (as well as to recover his early, and forgotten, attempt to define art) that shows their 
several similarities. Margolis argues that „a work of art is an artifact considered with respect to its 
design‟. And he adds that „By “design”, I have in mind only the artist‟s product considered as a set 
of materials organized in a certain way […] I should say that critics of the various arts are, among 
other things, concerned to describe the design of particular works of art […] we must define “work 
of art” in a value-neutral way to allow for speaking about evaluations of works of art […]. To say 
that a work of art is an artifact is to say that some human being deliberately made it […] 
corresponding to the artist‟s being engaged in deliberate activity, the work of art he produces is said 
to have some purpose (Margolis, 1965: 44 – 45). 
28
 Later, in Art and the Aesthetic, he adds Sclafani‟s suggestion of a third sense of a work of art: the 
secondary or derivative sense of art. In doing so, Dickie now says that both the descriptive and the 
evaluative can be applied to works of art, while the secondary or derivative can be applied 
metaphorically to non-artistic objects.  
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refer, for example, to Egyptian art) but only „the concept of art which we have (we 
present-day Americans, we present day Westerners […] since the organisation of 
the arts in or about the 18
th
 century‟[...]) („Defining Art‟: 254). Thus he avoids on 
the one hand the potential charge of anachronism, a criticism that applies to Danto 
and many other philosophers of art who attempt to define all historical types of art 
without pondering the theoretical risks of doing so. Dickie also avoids the charge of 
having presented an ethnocentric theory of art, claiming explicitly that he is only 
examining the concept of art „we present day westerners‟ have, without necessarily 
precluding the idea that artifacts
29
 from other, non-western cultures could also de 
facto be works of art. 
 
Having made these limitations clear, and to develop his definition further, Dickie 
quotes Danto‟s claim in „The Artworld‟ that „to see something as art, requires 
something the eye cannot descry – an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of 
history of art: an artworld‟ („Defining Art‟: 209 – see also Chapter 2 on Danto‟s 
„The Artworld‟). Dickie claims that the differentia he seeks is the „atmosphere‟ 
Danto is talking about, but understood as a social property. Thus Dickie introduces 
the idea that this particular social „atmosphere‟ is constituted by „some society or 
subgroup of a society‟, which acts upon certain artifacts and confers upon them „the 
status of candidacy for appreciation‟.  Hence, the first version of his earlier 
definition states that:  
 
[DK1aDef]: A work of art in the descriptive sense is (1) an artifact (2) upon which 
society or some sub-group of a society has conferred the status of candidate for 
appreciation. 
 
What follows in Dickie‟s early paper is an attempt to clarify or qualify certain 
aspects of this definition. In the first place, he argues, being a candidate for 
appreciation doesn‟t imply that the artwork will actually be appreciated (e.g., it may 
always remain hidden in a cupboard). Secondly, he says, not all aspects of the work 
of art are there to be appreciated (e.g., the colour of the back of the painting is not 
                                                 
29
 To be faithful to Dickie‟s terminology, I will hereafter use the American version of the term 
„artefact‟ (i.e., „artifact‟). 
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there to be appreciated as part of the artifact qua artwork). Thirdly, he explains that 
the artwork is a candidate for appreciation within the system of the artworld, rather 
than within other systems such as, let‟s say, that of the carworld. A car with the 
status of candidate for appreciation within the carworld would not be an artwork, 
while a car with the status of candidate for appreciation within the artworld would 
be de facto a work of art. 
 
Finally, Dickie stresses that being a candidate for appreciation is not the same as 
placing something before somebody in order to appreciate it. This is because 
Dickie, again in terms similar to Margolis, is well aware that one may be able to 
appreciate artworks, aesthetically or non-aesthetically, as well as any other objects, 
artificial or natural, without this implying that the latter are works of art.
30
 Thus 
Dickie aims to show that an artwork receiving the status of candidate for 
appreciation, such as Duchamp‟s Fountain, differs from a mere non-artistic object, 
such as a non-artistic urinal placed before someone to be appreciated for its physical 
or aesthetic/visual properties. 
 
To avoid confusing „appreciation‟ with „aesthetic appreciation‟, he explains that by 
appreciation he means „the kind [of appreciation] characteristic of our experiences 
of paintings, poetry, novels and the like […] something like “in experiencing the 
qualities of a thing one finds them worthy or valuable” ‟ („Defining Art‟: 255). He 
also stresses that some objects foreign to our current artworld may be enfranchised 
by this artworld system in order to allow appreciating them as artworks if and when 
candidacy status is conferred on them by a society or sub-group of this society. 
Nevertheless, he argues, this doesn‟t mean that once they are artworks, they lose 
their previous ontological condition. Thus Dickie supports the possibility that an 
artifact may be both a religious artifact and an artwork, implying neither an internal 
contradiction nor any ontological inconsistency at all („Defining Art‟: 255). This 
latter idea would be irrelevant if it weren‟t the case that Dickie is clearly supporting 
a different position from Danto‟s: while Danto always argues in dichotomic–
atomistic terms (i.e., something is one thing or another, following Danto‟s 
                                                 
30
 See also Margolis‟s reflections on the problem of conceiving aesthetics as central to the definition 
of art (Margolis, 1965: 42). 
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terminology, either an artwork or a „real‟ object31), Dickie accepts that something 
may be both an artwork and the object it was before being enfranchised by the 
artworld.  
 
In examining Dickie‟s theory, it is also relevant to point out, as I stressed in the 
previous chapters, that his notion of the „artworld‟ is different from what we find in 
Danto‟s „The Artworld‟ and in most of Danto‟s references in Transfiguration. 
Dickie‟s notion of „artworld‟ is to be understood as a social atmosphere defined in 
legalistic terms and as a loose customary institutional practice, because contra 
Davies‟s criterion, there are no codified lines of authority (see: Davies, 1991: 85 – 
90). Additionally, the act of conferring the status of candidate for appreciation 
within the artworld doesn‟t require any kind of formal utterance or ceremony to be 
socially sanctioned.  In point of fact, Dickie argues, everything depends on the 
institutional setting which allows for the conferral of status of appreciation as a kind 
of christening, but in a very informal way.  
 
This conception of the artworld is clearly different from Danto‟s, the latter being 
understood in terms of the historically organised community of artworks. The only 
exceptions are those few cases where Danto later on refers to the artworld in terms 
of its members and institutions (see Chapter 3, Section 3.6C), and thus, 
inaccurately, brings his theory closer to Dickie‟s notion of „artworld‟, which he 
otherwise attempts to reject.  
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 I put „real‟ in inverted commas because in Chapter 3 on Danto, I have discussed the problem of 
how Danto contrasts artworks with „real‟ things, as if it was clear what a „real‟ thing is in opposition 
to non-real things in his theory (because maps, diagrams and artworks, for example are not sensu 
strictu real things for him). Additionally there is the huge ontological problem of contrasting 
anything (semantic vehicles of meanings, for example, such as words, illocutions or artworks) to 
„real‟ things, without clarifying whether these other non-real things are illusions, transcendental 
ideas, supra-real entities and the like, or if Danto was just talking about „real‟ and non-real things in 
the loose sense. 
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5.2 DK1b: Dickie’s revision of his earlier attempt to define art 
 
After presenting the first version of his early institutional definition of art in 
„Defining Art‟, Dickie offers a more thorough formulation of it (DK1bDef) in his 
book Aesthetics, an Introduction (henceforth Introduction) – retaining many of the 
ideas first introduced in „Defining Art‟ and adding a number of new reflections that 
help him better support his institutional approach. In Introduction, however, he 
modifies his previous definition, now formulated in the following terms: 
 
[DK1bDef]: A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) upon which 
some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld) 
has conferred the status of candidate for appreciation. 
  
This DK1b definition now presents the idea of „acting on behalf of a certain social 
institution (the artworld)‟. In saying this, he now explicitly states in the definition, 
that the candidacy of appreciation is given by a person or persons that form part of 
the artworld and that acts on behalf of it. However, Dickie insists that even if a 
person or persons might act on behalf of the artworld, this doesn‟t mean that the 
artworld is a formal institution. He still stresses that the artworld is an informal 
institution, that is, that it functions informally, at the level of customary practice, 
without any defined lines of authority and lacking any codified procedures 
(Introduction: 103). He argues for this because he thinks that an excessively formal 
conception of the artworld would undermine the „freshness and exhuberance of art‟ 
(Introduction: 104). Then he goes on to state that the artworld is informal to the 
extent that anyone „who sees himself as a member of the artworld is an “officer” of 
it and is thereby capable of conferring status in its name‟ (Introduction: 104).   
 
Before, in „Defining Art‟ (DK1a), Dickie had raised the example of the paintings 
made by Betsy the chimpanzee and argued that if these paintings were exhibited in 
the Chicago Art Institute rather than in the Baltimore Zoo, they would then be 
regarded as artworks. This, he claimed, would be because everything would depend 
on the institutional setting. The problem with this argument, however, is that it 
seemed to imply that if this were the case, then Betsy ought to be seen as an artist. 
To avoid this implication, he now argues in Introduction (DK1b), that the work 
119 
 
shouldn‟t be attributed to Betsy but to the (human) person(s) responsible for the 
conferral of its status. This is because Betsy would be incapable of seeing herself as 
an agent of the artworld. Only a human conferrer would be able to see 
himself/herself as such an agent.  
 
This idea, pointing towards the relevance of human intention in art, was in fact 
already implicit in „Defining Art‟. There, Dickie argued that a society or sub-group 
of a society could confer the status of candidate of appreciation although actually 
that status would be conferred by a single person (i.e., a person conferring a status 
implies a human being, intentionally doing so) and in fact he finally talks explicitly 
about the role of human intentionality in his later book Art and the Aesthetic (see: 
Art and the Aesthetic: 46).  
 
However, there is an apparent internal inconsistency in that original DK1a claim: 
there, he says that a sub-group of a society confers the status, but he later goes on to 
say that only a single person can do so. Thus he further clarifies this idea in 
Introduction, observing that: 
 
A number of persons are required to make up the social institution of the artworld but 
only one person is required to act on behalf of or as an agent of the artworld and to 
confer the status of candidate for appreciation […] of course nothing prevents a group 
of persons conferring the status, but it is usually conferred by a single person, the artist 
who creates the artifact (Introduction: 103) 
 
In considering whether a single person or a group may confer the status of 
candidacy for appreciation, Dickie avoids the Romantic ideal of the artist 
understood as a lone producer. That ideal is often implicitly endorsed by Danto and 
other philosophers, who tend to assume the conception of an artwork as being 
always the product of a single artist. Dickie avoids this, because he takes into 
account the fact that in theatre or in films, and even often in painting and sculpture 
as well, the work is the product of a group of people: the primary artist and his 
collaborators, the director and his film crew, and so on.
32
  
                                                 
32
 It is surprising that even Danto passes over the fact that many of Warhol‟s artworks made in The 
Factory resulted from this collective way of artmaking. 
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However, while avoiding the Romantic notion of the lonely artist, Dickie also 
accepts that often it is a single person, for example the director or the primary artist, 
who finally decides whether the work is the thing that will be exhibited as the 
artwork, or just a sketch/essay of the artwork to be exhibited at some later time.
33
 
Dickie also makes it clear that while a given person or a group of people cannot be 
mistaken in conferring the status of candidacy for appreciation on some artifact, 
they nevertheless may be accountable for that conferral. This is clear in cases where 
the status is conferred on a bad or inferior artwork. 
 
Additionally, in Introduction, Dickie further clarifies an idea he had held in 
„Defining Art‟ – the idea that the „status conferral‟ is analogous to the process of 
christening. He now adds in Introduction the proviso that „[just] as christening a 
child has as its background the history and structure of the church, conferring the 
status of art has as its background the Byzantine complexity of the artworld‟ 
(Introduction: 107). Presumably, then, the background  of certain historical and 
structural elements, similar to those required to understand and support the complex 
of institutions and practices underlying religious rituals, are also relevant for the 
artworld. This is, however, just a presumption because, as Sclafani argues, the 
analogy with „christening‟ is left unexamined, hence leaving many questions 
concerning the act of „christening‟ artworks unanswered (Sclafani, 1973: 113 – 
114): Dickie neglects to clarify what he means by the „Byzantine complexity of the 
artworld‟ or to what degree it is possible to extend his analogy between the history 
and structure of the church and its rituals and that of the artworld and its 
institutionalised actions and procedures – e.g., who can confer the status of 
candidacy, and with what powers is he invested? Which are the conventions that 
allow the process of „christening‟ artworks? etc.  
 
Cohen also criticises Dickie for failing to provide a thorough examination of the 
notions of „conferring the status of candidacy for appreciation‟ and of „christening‟ 
                                                 
33
 In the case of painting, or as an „unfinished‟ version of the performance in the case of theatre and 
cinema. 
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(Cohen, 1977). He suggests that Dickie‟s notions fail, because he argues that while 
Dickie thinks that anyone can make this type status conferral (or that anyone can 
„christen‟ an artwork), this seems to be far from what actually occurs.  
 
In order to prove this, Cohen claims that there are constraints in artmaking (Cohen, 
1977: 188), which, he argues, shows that Dickie is wrong in thinking that anyone 
can confer status. Cohen argues that only artists previously enfranchised by the 
artworld who have previously shown their mastery in art – by making previously 
more socially-accepted types of artworks as, for example, Duchamp did with Nude 
Descending a Staircase before he presented Fountain – can go on and confer the 
status of candidacy of appreciation to other more problematic objects. Yet, Cohen‟s 
attempts to find a better way to explain Dickie‟s notion of conferring status by 
understanding this act analogously to the illocutionary act of „promising‟ (Cohen, 
1977: 189 – 193), fails. This is because Cohen interprets Dickie to be supporting the 
idea that artworks, like promises, can be made by everyone, while Dickie clarifies 
much later in „Wollheim‟s Dilemma‟ (1998) that he never thought that anyone 
could make art, but that he thought that only artists could do it.
34
 
 
 
5.3 DK1c: Dickie’s final revision of his early attempt to define art 
 
After presenting a second version of his earlier definition of art, Dickie felt it 
necessary to further revise some aspects of his theory. In the first chapter of Art and 
the Aesthetic he provides his third and final version of his early definition 
(DK1cDef). He also adds a number of reflections and provisos by way of 
clarification. In fact, most of the ideas submitted in Art and the Aesthetic are already 
contained in the papers „Institutional‟ and „Defining II‟, as well as in his response to 
Cohen („Response‟). 
 
                                                 
34
 In the next Section I present a more detailed account of Dickie‟s claims concerning the agents of 
status conferral in DK1 which show that – to be fair with Cohen (and Wollheim) – until his 1998 
paper „Wollheim‟s Dilemma‟ Dickie was very unclear about who could confer status in art and who 
couldn‟t. 
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Now, Dickie summarises in Art and the Aesthetic the final version of his early 
definition of art (DK1cDef) as follows: 
 
[DK1cDef]: A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact  (2) a set of the 
aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by 
some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld). 
 
In this new version, of Dickie‟s early definition, he introduces the idea that it is not 
an artifact in toto but a set of its aspects that have obtained the status of candidacy 
for appreciation by means of the procedure of status conferral. This reinforces the 
idea that the object of appreciation is not the artwork broadly speaking, but rather a 
set of aspects of an artifact that the established conventions and norms of the 
different systems and subsystems of the artworld allow. These are the target of 
(artistic) appreciation.  
 
In proposing this, Dickie is presumably also attempting to clarify that what is 
conferred is not the status of art but rather the status of candidacy for (the) 
appreciation of a set of aspects of a given artifact so to present it as an artwork. 
Later criticisms, however, such as those of Wollheim, show that Dickie was not 
clear enough about this idea. This is because Wollheim tends to understand Dickie 
as talking about the act of conferring the status of art upon artifacts (see: Wollheim, 
1984; 1992 [1980]). As a result, Dickie insists in his paper „Wollheim‟s Dilemma‟ 
that in his DK1 theory what is conferred is not the status of art but rather the status 
of candidacy for appreciation (to a set of its aspects). In Art and Value, Dickie also 
criticises Davies for making the same misinterpretation as Wollheim, although he 
concedes that part of the problem may have arisen from his previous 
characterisation of the act of status conferral (Dickie, 2001: 38 – 39).  
 
Thus, Dickie is not completely fair in „Wollheim‟s Dilemma‟, because in Art and 
the Aesthetic, before introducing his definitions, he talks about Duchamp conferring 
the status of art on his works (Art and the Aesthetic: 32 – 33). He then attempts to 
be more specific, presumably to avoid the type of misunderstanding Wollheim had 
made, but in the process he reinforces even further the identification of the act of 
conferring the status of candidacy of appreciation with the act of conferring the 
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status of art. This can be observed in his assertion that „[the] definition will be given 
in terms of artifactuality and the conferred status of art or, more strictly speaking, 
the conferred status of candidate for appreciation‟ (Art and the Aesthetic: 33 – 34; 
italics mine). In fact, to add more confusion, at the end of the chapter, Dickie talks 
again about conferring the status of art, rather than about conferring the status of 
candidacy for appreciation to a set of aspects of a given artifact. Thus he says that „a 
mistake cannot be made in conferring the status of art, a mistake can be made by 
conferring it. In conferring the status of art on an object one assumes a certain kind 
of responsibility for the object in its new status‟ (Art and the Aesthetic: 50; italics 
mine). 
 
Moreover, Dickie‟s ambiguity concerning the act of status conferral leads Wollheim 
to argue, also contra Dickie‟s intentions, that Dickie‟s theory implies that the status 
of art can be conferred by anybody elected or self-elected, thus having the 
appropriate status within the institution of the artworld. Dickie, owing to this, insists 
in „Wollheim‟s Dilemma‟ that, in his final DK1c reformulation, he attempted to 
make it clear (a) that he never talked about conferring the status of art but about 
conferring the status of candidacy for appreciation (Dickie, 1998: 129 – 130); and 
(b) that only artists can confer the status of candidacy for appreciation (Dickie, 
1998: 131). 
  
Yet, to be fair to Wollheim (and Cohen – see previous section), it is nevertheless 
true that, at the time he presented his critique, it was never very clear whom Dickie 
considered capable of conferring status. In the earlier definition, he proposes that 
the status is conferred „by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain 
social institution (the artworld)‟; later, in his 1974 book, he talks about „artists [as 
those who] create the works‟ (Art and the Aesthetic: 36) although later on in the 
same book he is again ambiguous about those capable of conferring status. Thus, he 
says that „the status is usually [i.e., not always] conferred by a single person, the 
artist who creates the artifact‟ (Art and the Aesthetic: 38; italics mine). Moreover, 
he even claims, in relation to the example of the paintings of Betsy the chimpanzee 
being exhibited in the Chicago Art Institute, that: 
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For example, a year or two ago the Field Museum of Natural History in Chicago 
exhibited some chimpanzee and gorilla paintings. We must say that these paintings are 
not works of art. If, however, they had been exhibited a few miles away at the Chicago 
Art Institute they would have been works of art – the paintings would have been art if 
the director of the Art Institute had been willing to go out on a limb for his fellow 
primates […]. Please note that although paintings such as Betsy‟s would remain her 
paintings even if exhibited at an art museum, they would be the art of the person 
responsible for their being exhibited [e.g., the director of the Art Institute?]‟ (Art and 
the Aesthetic: 45 – 46; italics mine) 
 
Now, in „Wollheim‟s Dilemma‟ Dickie tries to close this debate, on the notion of 
„status conferral‟ and on the idea that artists are those responsible for making 
artworks. Yet while we must take Dickie‟s late clarifications in „Wollheim‟s 
Dilemma‟ of his earlier DK1 ideas at face value, we should concede here that 
Wollheim‟s critique (and that one of Cohen that I have earlier examined) is also 
perfectly valid. 
 
As to the idea that what is to be appreciated is a set of the aspects of the work, not 
the work in toto, I have mentioned earlier that Dickie already argued, in „Defining 
Art‟ and in Introduction that some parts of the artwork – the colour of the back of 
the painting, for example – are not there to be appreciated by the artworld public. 
But now Dickie feels compelled to introduce this in the definition, perhaps in order 
to reinforce also the connection with his pre-1969 views, before he first published 
his paper „Defining Art‟. In these pre-1969 papers, especially in „Is Psychology 
Relevant to Aesthetics?‟  (1962 – two years before Danto‟s publication of „The 
Artworld‟) and in his „Art Narrowly and Broadly Speaking‟ (1968), Dickie had 
already postulated a requirement for the identification of the aesthetic features of 
artworks for art criticism: the previous endorsement by the public of a set of 
conventions and norms, corresponding to the different types of „art games‟, that 
would help isolate the relevant features of those artworks.  
 
It is now possible to see how Dickie‟s final version of his early definition in Art and 
the Aesthetic (DK1cDef) is continuous with the theories he had presented before he 
outlined his institutional definition of art.  If this interpretation is correct then it is 
also plausible to argue that Danto‟s „The Artworld‟ (1964) – contra the criterion of 
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Davies, Tilghman, Stock and Danto himself – is not so much the main source of 
inspiration for Dickie (Danto, 1981: viii; Davies, 1991: 81; Tilghman, 1984: 48; 
also in Stock‟s section on „Definitions of Art‟ in: Davies, Higgins et. al., 2009: 232) 
but rather the logical implication of his previous views. This is because his 
attention, before 1964, was already directed towards defending an institutional 
approach to critical appreciation in art, and he had begun to develop it, at least, as 
early as the 1962 paper mentioned above. 
 
Thus, in the preface of Art and the Aesthetic, Dickie explicitly distinguishes his 
theory from Danto‟s and stresses that it comes from a different source.35 In this 
preface, he explicitly traces the continuity of his thought from his pre-1969 papers 
which argue against the aesthetic attitude and perception theories. He also explains 
the genesis of his institutional definition of art as mainly the logical development of 
Beardsley‟s ideas rather than Danto‟s. Moreover, it is noteworthy that in this 
preface he avoids relating his theory to Danto‟s by not mentioning him at all. Below 
I give a long quotation to prove this, because the true origins of Dickie‟s views have 
been systematically ignored by interpreters and critics: 
 
When I first began teaching aesthetics in 1956, I assumed, without having thought 
about it, that […] an aesthetic attitude, is a necessary ingredient of and a foundation 
for any aesthetic appreciation of art or nature […] I began using Monroe Beardsley‟s 
Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism for my aesthetics course […]. The 
account of the field of aesthetics that Beardsley gives in his book in no way depends 
on the notion of the aesthetic attitude […]. The significance of Beardsley‟s omission, 
that aesthetics does not rely on the aesthetic attitude, was not apparent to me at first 
[…]. About 1961, I used an aesthetic-attitude text for my course and in the middle of 
the term came to feel […] that the aesthetic-attitude approach was profoundly 
mistaken […]. The search first took the form of a deeper criticism of psychical 
distance, was later broadened to include criticism of other aesthetic-attitude theories, 
and led finally to an attempt to give an account of the aesthetic object which is free of 
                                                 
35
 Although it must be stressed also that his previous book Introduction follows a structure parallel to 
Dickie‟s theoretical development: from the critique of aesthetic theories he had already presented 
before 1969, to the institutional definition of art that he developed in 1969 and later. Such a structure 
seems to invite the readers to conclude that Dickie‟s later theory derives from his pre-1969 theories, 
rather than from Danto‟s „The Artworld‟ (even if Danto‟s paper was an important source of 
inspiration for Dickie). 
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dependence on the conception of aesthetic attitude. This account followed the general 
metacritical approach of Monroe Beardsley, although I rejected some parts of his 
theory and developed notions he leaves undeveloped. In 1967, as a commentator on a 
paper by Morris Weitz, I began thinking about Weitz‟s well-known claim that “art” 
cannot be defined. This endeavour resulted in a short paper on the topic which 
subsequently went through several stages of development […] I then realized that the 
conception of aesthetic object which I had worked out earlier is also an institutional 
concept and came to think that perhaps the institutional concept of art and the 
institutional concept of [the] aesthetic object might be brought together as related 
features of a single theory. This book is the attempt to develop such a theory (Art and 
the Aesthetic: 9 – 11).
36
 
 
Thus Dickie attempts to demonstrate that his institutional definition of art is in part 
a logical implication of his reflections on the failure of the aesthetic theories to 
explain the nature and preconditions of the experience of artworks. His institutional 
approach also appears to be the logical implication of the (partial) success of 
Beardsley‟s attempt to clarify the principles that organise the preconditions for art 
criticism.
37
  
 
Finally, to make it clear that his theory derives from Beardsley, rather than from 
Danto, Dickie also acknowledges, later on, that: „[in] developing my own 
conception of [the] aesthetic object I will be following the lead of Monroe 
Beardsley. In so doing, it will be necessary to reject one part of his theory and to 
develop a network of ideas underlying his theory but not explicitly recognized by 
him‟ (Art and the Aesthetic: 147). Later still he adds that „[in] the Preface to this 
book I claimed that the theory of art developed in Chapter 1 and the theory of 
aesthetic object [based on Beardsley‟s theory of metacriticism] worked out in this 
chapter are parts of a single institutional theory. That they are two parts of a single 
whole is perhaps now clear‟ (Art and the Aesthetic: 179). Dickie‟s theory, then, 
                                                 
36
 Some of the papers Dickie refers to in this Preface, that predate his institutional definition of art 
but that provide the theoretical basis for this type of institutional definition, are: „Bullough and the 
Concept of Psychical Distance‟ (1961), „Is Psychology Relevant to Aesthetics?‟ (1962), „The Myth 
of the Aesthetic Attitude‟ (1964), „Beardsley‟s Phantom Aesthetic Experience‟ (1965), „Attitude and 
Object: Aldrich on the Aesthetic‟ (1966), „Art Narrowly and Broadly Speaking‟ (1968). 
37
 Beardsley does this, particularly, by means of the principle of distinctiveness and the principle of 
perceptibility. 
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contra the criterion of some interpreters (such as Davies: see Chapter 7), is not so 
much in opposition, but rather in continuity with Beardsley‟s. 
 
Actually, in Art and the Aesthetic, Dickie not only attempts to improve his earlier 
definitions of art. He also attempts to clarify what he means by the artworld, 
particularly its institutions, conventions and procedures.  
 
Dickie argues that the different institutions of the artworld, such as that of the 
theatre qua set of established practices and conventions, come from a long tradition 
that can be dated at least back to ancient Greece (Art and the Aesthetic: 30), He 
thinks that this is relevant to justify the continuity of „an established way of doing 
and behaving‟ fixed by a set of „primary and secondary conventions‟ of a given 
system (Art and the Aesthetic: 33; 174 – 175). Thus, Dickie argues that Primary 
conventions indicate to the audience how to relate to the different artworks; 
secondary conventions indicate, rather, how to identify the relevant aesthetic 
features of artworks that will be the object of critical assessments and appreciations 
(Art and the Aesthetic: 174 – 175).38  
 
To clarify further what he understands by the artworld qua institution, Dickie cites 
the Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary in order to stress that by institution he 
means „an established practice, law, custom, etc.‟ rather than „an established society 
or corporation‟ (Art and the Aesthetic: 31), because some of his interpreters had 
misunderstood this point. The misunderstanding, however, would later persist, 
particularly supported by Wollheim‟s caricature of the artworld as a sort of society 
or corporation of members nominated by obscure procedures and making almost 
random decisions in relation to art that would be hardly accountable to society 
(Wollheim, 1984).
39
 In addition, Dickie argues that the artworld is in fact 
                                                 
38
 To understand better Dickie‟s criticism of the aesthetic attitude as precondition for art criticism 
and his stressing that such attitude is only a product of a „primary convention‟, see also Chapter 4 in 
Art and the Aesthetic (particularly the paragraphs corresponding to: Art and the Aesthetic: 102 – 
105). 
39
 This leads him to ask: „[is] there really such a thing  as the artworld, with the coherence of a social 
group, capable of having representatives, who are in turn capable of carrying out acts that society is 
bound to endorse? (Wollheim, 1984: 15). 
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constituted by an open, and often overlapping, bundle of systems or subsystems 
(sculpture, theatre, literature, music, painting, etc.) that have emerged in different 
historical moments and that provide the basis for the introduction of very different 
instances of art. In fact, Dickie argues that „[one] central feature all of the systems 
[within the artworld] have in common is that each is a framework for the presenting 
of particular works of art‟ (Art and the Aesthetic: 31). 
   
In pointing out these two ideas, Dickie allows for the elasticity and creativity that, 
as Weitz also stresses, is characteristic of art (Art and the Aesthetic: 48). Thus 
artworks do not depend on the existence of institutional corporations or a particular 
enclosed locus. They are a set of practices determined only by the norms and 
conventions of the tradition of each of its systems. When new atypical artworks are 
introduced in these systems, Dickie argues, then a new subsystem can be introduced 
allowing different procedures and artworks to appear without disrupting the 
tradition. Thus, for example, he argues that it seems plausible to think of 
„happenings‟, as arising from the theatre system as a new subsystem (Art and the 
Aesthetic: 33).  
 
However, even if Dickie understands the notion of the artworld institution as an 
established set of practices, laws, and so on, nevertheless he asserts that in order 
successfully to conduct these practices, a „minimum core‟ of roles is required. The 
„minimum core‟ is constituted by the „presentation group‟ (the artist or artists who 
create the work), the presenter(s) (actors, curators, etc.), and the „goers‟(i.e., the 
general public that appreciate the works – Art and the Aesthetic: 36). Of course, one 
person can perform some or all of these roles, as for example a lonely Robinson 
Crusoe making art on an island and appreciating it himself. Once this presentation 
group exists, additional roles can be introduced, such as those of producers, 
museum directors, newspaper reporters, critics for publications, art historians, art 
theorists, philosophers of art, and so on (Art and the Aesthetic: 35 – 36).  
 
The important issue here is that the institutionalised roles performed in the artworld 
and the primary and secondary conventions of artworks, „must be learned in one 
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way or another by participants. For example, a theatregoer […] is a person who 
enters with certain expectations and knowledge about what he will experience and 
an understanding of how he should behave in the face of what he will experience‟ 
(Art and the Aesthetic: 36).   
 
Once these conventions are endorsed, then it is possible for someone seeing 
himself/herself as an agent of the artworld, to act on behalf of it and to confer the 
status of candidate of appreciation to a set of aspects of an artifact. He/she does this 
apart from some other better known actions such as drawing representational 
figures, painting the canvas, etc. (Art and the Aesthetic: 32). In conferring this status 
of candidacy for appreciation, Dickie argues, the relevant aspects of the work will 
be available for appreciation and critical assessment as a work of art. 
 
5.4 Some problems with Dickie’s theory 
 
A) Dickie’s notion of ‘appreciation’ 
 
Dickie stresses very clearly that by „appreciation‟, he doesn‟t mean „aesthetic 
appreciation‟ but a more generic type of appreciation, which can be directed as well 
towards both non-artistic objects and non-aesthetic artworks possessing qualities 
worth appreciating qua relevant parts of the work to be assessed. As he says in Art 
and the Aesthetic:  
 
I shall argue later […] that there is no reason to think that there is a special kind of 
aesthetic consciousness, attention or perception. Similarly, I do not think there is any 
reason to think that there is a special kind of aesthetic appreciation. All that is meant 
by “appreciation” in the definition is something like “in experiencing qualities of a 
thing one finds them worthy or valuable”, and this meaning applies quite generally 
both inside and outside the domain of art (Art and the Aesthetic: 40 – 41).  
 
These reflections may have been in part a response to Cohen‟s critique of the idea 
of thinking that all artworks are „candidates for appreciation‟: Cohen claims, 
quoting Fried, that Dickie‟s criterion fails because Dada attempted to introduce new 
instances of art that couldn‟t be appreciated at all (Cohen, 1977: 185 – 186). Cohen 
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seems to be on the right track about Dada‟s rejection of traditional value or quality 
in art. Nevertheless he is surely wrong in arguing that this shows that Dadaist 
artworks cannot be appreciated in Dickie‟s sense. In that regard he seems to take 
Dickie‟s notion of „appreciation‟ wrongly in the restrictive sense of what Dickie 
terms, and rejects, as „aesthetic appreciation‟.  
 
Dickie, in his „Response‟, is nevertheless ambiguous about how to understand the 
notion of „appreciation‟. He goes on in this paper to claim that no objects couldn‟t 
be appreciated (i.e., when understanding appreciation in the generic non-restrictive 
sense). However, when he focuses specifically on the example of Duchamp‟s 
Fountain, he seems to claim that this artwork, contra Cohen‟s criteria, could 
actually be appreciated in aesthetic terms in much the same way we would 
appreciate the works of art of Brancusi and Moore. As he says: 
 
Fountain has many qualities which can be appreciated – its gleaming white surface, for 
example. In fact it has several qualities which resemble those of works of Brancusi, 
and Moore. Also, the very things which Cohen cites as paradigms of things which 
cannot be appreciated – ordinary thumbtacks, cheap white envelopes, and plastic forks 
– have appreciatable qualities which can be noted if one focuses attention on them [...] 
it is unlikely that any object would lack some quality which is appreciatable 
(„Response‟: 199 – 200).  
 
As a result of this response which seems to contradict Dickie‟s previous rejection of 
aesthetic appreciation, it is necessary to clarify these reflections. To do so, we need 
to take into account Dickie‟s ideas that:  
 
1) What makes an artifact an artwork is not its possession of any aesthetic 
features. Rather, as Dickie controversially claims, to be an artwork it is 
enough for it to be immersed in the institutional framework of the 
artworld. This, he argues, allows one to confer the status of candidacy 
for appreciation on a set of aspects of that artifact, when one is acting on 
behalf of the artworld.  
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2) Non-artistic objects can be worthy of appreciation. This becomes clearer 
when, for example, we apply the evaluative or derivative sense of art to 
non-artistic objects (e.g., this piece of driftwood is beautiful! It is a work 
of art!). Thus, non-artistic artifacts can be the object of aesthetic 
appreciation and even of appreciation in Dickie‟s broader sense, and yet 
not be works of art because they are not located within the institutional 
matrix of the artworld. 
 
Now, when these ideas are taken into account, it becomes clearer that Cohen and 
other critics such as Iseminger fail to see the distinction Dickie makes between 
„appreciation‟ of artworks and „aesthetic appreciation‟. In doing so, they also fail to 
see Dickie‟s distinction between the domains of „art‟ and „aesthetics‟. 
  
However, it is also true that Dickie‟s response to Cohen is in a sense superfluous 
because if artworks don‟t require aesthetic properties in order to be artworks, then it 
is not really important whether or not Fountain has a gleaming white surface similar 
to the works of Brancusi or Moore. It would suffice to say that the important thing 
is that a set of primary and secondary conventions, within a certain artworld system, 
allow the „appreciation‟ of a set of aspects of this artwork in question, 
independently of whether Fountain has aesthetic features similar to Brancusi‟s and 
Moore‟s or not. The problem here is that for Dickie there is no „aesthetic‟ type of 
appreciation but only appreciation in this generic sense; yet, to better shield his 
theory from objections, he nonetheless responds by talking about aesthetic 
appreciation, thus leading, to even more confusions concerning the notion of 
„appreciation‟.  
 
Dickie‟s ideas are yet more ambiguous when he refers to „aesthetic objects‟ when 
talking about artworks (Introduction: 47 – 68; also: Art and the Aesthetic: 147 – 
181). In doing so, he explains, he is basically trying to make clear that by „aesthetic 
object‟ he means Beardsley‟s coined notion of „the object of criticism‟ 
(Introduction: 61) and more specifically „the object of appreciation and/or criticism‟ 
(Introduction: 68); here „appreciation‟ is understood to be the un-aesthetic and more 
generic type of appreciation he repeatedly points out he is referring to.  
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Furthermore, when talking about the act of conferral, Dickie seems to be claiming 
that those features of the artwork that are to be appreciated, in the sense of being 
„worthy or valuable‟, are the product of the secondary conventions (as Iseminger 
understands Dickie‟s theory: Iseminger, 1976), while in fact this is not the case. 
Dickie claims instead that the secondary conventions distinguish those pre-existing 
features, within the artifact, both aesthetic and non-aesthetic, that are to be part of 
the artwork, and thus that are „worthy or valuable‟ for appreciation, from those that 
aren‟t.  
 
From this standpoint, then, Iseminger‟s critique also falls short, because both he and 
Dickie think that aesthetic features exist prior to primary and secondary 
conventions. Thus Dickie would agree with Iseminger‟s claim that:  
 
[Appreciation] surely can take place outside the artworld […] the central claim of the 
institutional theory of the aesthetic – that the status of a state of affairs as aesthetic is 
conferred in accordance with the convention of the artworld – must be wrong. The 
importance of the artworld lies not in its making the aesthetic possible but rather in its 
facilitating the aesthetic, by encouraging the production of things whose function is to 
be appreciated and by providing a suitable context in which they may be appreciated 
(Iseminger, 1976: 130) 
 
In fact, given that Dickie rejects the idea of aesthetics as a necessary condition for 
artworks, he cannot be considered a supporter of what Iseminger understands to be 
„an institutional theory of the aesthetic‟. Rather, he supports an institutional 
conception of the aesthetic object (see: Art and the Aesthetic: 11), understood in 
terms of its being „an institutional theory of the object of (artistic) appreciation 
and/or criticism‟, something that Iseminger clearly fails to see. 
 
Iseminger is on the right track, however, if what he is really trying to do is to point 
out that Dickie‟s articulation of his ideas in DK1 is misleading. Thus, he could 
claim that his attempt is actually to correct Dickie by stating that what he (Dickie) 
in fact means, but fails to state clearly, is that what is conferred is a status for 
artistic appreciation/criticism on a set of pre-existing aesthetic and non-aesthetic 
features of an artifact. If Dickie does not clarify this, then his theory might be 
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wrongly interpreted as claiming that the features to be appreciated are always 
aesthetic features and that they don‟t predate the artwork but are always the product 
of the secondary conventions of the various artworld systems (i.e., as if Dickie 
supported an „institutional theory of the aesthetic‟).  
 
Thus to avoid confusion about the notion of appreciation in DK1, Dickie‟s latest 
version of his definition ought to be as follows (let‟s call it DK1c*Def because of 
the change of (2) for (2*); the suggested modifications are in my italics): 
 
[DK1c*Def]: A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2*) which has 
had conferred upon a set of its pre-existing aesthetic and non-aesthetic aspects, by a 
series of conventions, the status of being candidate for criticism (or critical 
appreciation) by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution 
(the artworld). 
 
However there remains a problem. Responding to Cohen‟s critique, Dickie argues 
that, if we follow his own notion of „appreciation‟ in generic terms, then anything 
could be appreciated. But if this is so, what is the point of introducing the notion of 
„appreciation‟ in his definition to clarify what an artwork is? To meet the objection, 
Dickie ought to claim explicitly in his definition, that an artifact is an artwork only 
when it is a candidate for appreciation within the artworld. Thus the revised 
definition (DK1c**Def) could be as follows (again the suggested modifications are 
in my italics): 
 
[DK1c**Def]: A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2**) which 
has had conferred upon a set of its pre-existing aesthetic and non-aesthetic aspects, by 
a series of conventions, the status of being a candidate for criticism (or critical 
appreciation) in a certain social institution (the artworld) by some person or persons 
acting on behalf of this institution.   
 
 
B) Dickie on the artworld and the diversity of rules and procedures in art 
 
Given that Dickie‟s definition of art is dependent upon the institutional setting of 
the artworld and its institutionalised conventions and procedures, he is obliged to 
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clarify what these conventions and procedures are, and how they relate to the 
artworld settings. More particularly, Dickie‟s earlier controversial claim in DK1a 
(„Defining Art‟), concerning the analogy between the process of christening and 
that of status conferral, required further explanation.  In order to do this, he later 
claims in DK1b (Introduction) that to better understand the analogy, it is necessary 
to understand and take into account the history and structure of the church and the 
„Byzantine complexity‟ of the artworld.  
  
Unfortunately, in DK1b, Dickie leaves aside any further examination of this 
„Byzantine complexity‟ of the artworld and only later, in his paper „Institutional‟, 
examines it more thoroughly. He does this by introducing the idea of the artworld as 
a particular form of life.  The ideas summarised in this paper, as a sort of 
experimental and sympathetic first approach to Wittgenstein, are later revived in his 
book Art and the Aesthetic, where he introduces his DK1c definition of art. 
However, there he leaves aside any further suggestion of understanding the artworld 
as a form of life, perhaps because of objections similar to those Tilghman later 
made, that his conception of the artworld is actually very different from 
Wittgenstein‟s original notion of „form of life‟ (see: Tilghman, 1984: 47 – 70) 
 
Dickie does persist, however, in Art and the Aesthetic, with his reflections about the 
nature of the artworld. He does this by insisting that the artworld is historically 
constituted by a set of systems and subsystems that may have an ancient origin, 
such as is the case of theatre. He also claims that to exist, the artworld requires a 
„minimum core‟ of members constituted by artists, presenters, and „goers‟ (Art and 
the Aesthetic: 36).  
 
Now, in conceiving the artworld as historically constituted by a set of even more 
basic systems, a number of concerns arise in relation to his definition of art. More 
particularly some problems arise concerning Dickie‟s idea that there is a common 
procedure (i.e., conferring the status of candidacy for appreciation) that would make 
possible the introduction of instances of art within the artworld.  
 
Firstly, there is a problem with the idea that the artworld is constituted by its 
systems and subsystems: in claiming this, Dickie is suggesting that to understand 
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the institutionalised procedures of the artworld, it is necessary to first understand 
the institutionalised conventions and procedures of the systems and subsystems that 
together constitute this artworld.  However, if this possibility is seriously held, it 
may turn out that the procedures and rules of the various different art systems and 
subsystems diverge from each other to the extent that is not possible to find a 
unique procedure (such as conferring the status of candidacy for appreciation) 
available in all the art disciplines within the artworld. If this is so, it would 
jeopardise Dickie‟s efforts to find a universal definition of art in terms of the unique 
convention whereby the status of candidacy for appreciation is conferred. 
 
Another problem arises when Dickie suggests that it is plausible for these different 
art systems to have been associated in the past with very different institutionalised 
practices and corporations. He argues, for example, that theatre has been historically 
associated with such different institutions as Greek religion and the Greek state in 
its origins; the church in medieval times; and with private business and the state 
today (Art and the Aesthetic: 30). Owing to this, he allows for the possibility that 
the procedures of the different systems of the artworld, such as the theatre-system, 
may have radically changed since ancient times in response to changes in the social 
and political demands of the different institutions and practices with which it was 
associated.  
 
Yet, after arguing in favour of the development of the different artworld systems 
(i.e., in this case of the theatre-system) in relation to other institutions and practices, 
he nevertheless insists that „what has remained constant with its own identity 
throughout its history is the theatre itself as an established way of doing and 
behaving‟ (Art and the Aesthetic: 30). But surely this is too much of a concession, 
and in fact begs the question, as to whether this is actually so. Moreover, even if we 
concede that theatre may have remained more or less within the same „established 
way of doing and behaving‟ since ancient Greece (something about which I have 
serious reservations), it is not clear that the same occurred with other systems 
constitutive of the artworld, such as let‟s say, the music system.40  
                                                 
40
 Larry Shiner, for example, argues in his The Invention of Art that both the theatre system and the 
music system underwent important changes in the course of its recent history since at least the 18
th
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Moreover, Dickie argues in his paper „Institutional‟, following Weitz‟s reflections, 
that in the course of time it is perfectly acceptable to modify the rules of some sorts 
of games, apparently without this implying much ontological difficulty. As he says:  
 
At any given time the rules of major-league baseball are set, that is, closed. The 
reason, as Weitz correctly states, is the need to have definitive criteria to ensure that all 
disputes on the field can be resolved – the game must go on. However periodically 
[…] it is possible to change the rules. For example, it has been suggested recently in 
the newspaper that the rules may be changed so that the foul lines in back of first and 
third base are angled out slightly […]. We have the closed concept “major league 
baseball” at time one. Then at some time when the concept is not being applied […] 
the concept is opened up, altered and closed. And finally we again have a closed 
concept – “major-league baseball” at time two („Institutional‟: 22 – 23). 
 
If this is so, then it is possible to argue analogously that some rules of an artworld 
system, understood as a game of sorts, valid at time one, could also be changed at 
time two. This could be done, for example, by introducing a new procedure for 
„conferring the status of candidacy for appreciation‟ in art to ordinary objects at 
time two, without this implying much of a problem for the practice of artmaking in 
general.  
 
However Dickie has some reservations in this case as to the extent to which the 
concept has suffered a change or has been altogether replaced by a different one 
(„Institutional‟: 23). Furthermore, he could argue that his remarks about games 
cannot be extrapolated to art: he seems to think that, in different way from the 
concept of „major league baseball‟, the concept „art‟ (or the subconcept of theatre or 
painting, for that matter), has been clearly the same all along because the same rules 
are always applied. (This seems to be the implication in Art and the Aesthetic: 32).   
 
                                                                                                                                        
century. He insists that a number of rules and procedures were introduced that radically modified the 
practices of its „presenters‟ and the expectations and the behaviour of its publics („goers‟), and as a 
result the works, practices and types of performances of its „artists‟ (Shiner, 2004). 
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Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, Dickie also takes into account the 
possibility that from time to time, new sub-concepts or subsystems (he often uses 
these notions interchangeably) may appear, so as to make possible the creative 
introduction of new unexpected instances of art, without this leading to problems in 
the long run („Institutional‟: 29; Art and the Aesthetic: 33).  
 
If this is so, then it could be argued that the procedure of „conferring the candidacy 
of status for appreciation‟ is characteristic of the subsystem „Dadaist sculpture‟ 
arising out of the artworld system „sculpture‟ to allow the creation of new 
readymade instances of art. This would not imply, however, that the „sculpture‟ 
system would thus have to share the same procedure characteristic of its newly 
created subsystem. In fact Dickie is often aware of the fact that different rules may 
apply in different art games or art systems (Dickie, 1962: 299 – 300; Dickie, 1968: 
75), or even within the same type of artistic system (of the theatre, for example, 
when he says that „there is no point in trying to lay down rules to which every play 
must conform independently of the kind of play it is‟: Dickie, 1964: 57), without 
implying any ontological problem or contradiction or even the idea that a different 
concept is being used. Thus, he shouldn‟t have any substantial problem either in 
accepting the existence of different conventional procedures in the different art 
systems. 
 
Moreover, Dickie points out in Art and the Aesthetic that „[the] obstacle to 
creativity no longer exists […] [If] the new work is very unlike an existing work 
then a new subconcept will probably be created. Artists today are not easily 
intimidated, and they regard art genres as loose guidelines‟ (Art and the Aesthetic: 
48). In this case, then, the conferral of the status of candidate for appreciation could 
be just a loose guideline, maybe amongst others, characteristic of a new type of art 
genre or subsystem (Dadaist sculpture) that appeared in the early 20
th
 century.   
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C) Dickie’s implicit ‘Trojan’ fourth definition of art? 
 
From Dickie‟s first formulation of his earliest definition of art in 1969 to the final 
formulation (of his earliest definition) in 1974, he brought to bear several new ideas 
in the attempt to respond to the criticisms that his theory received. He also 
progressively modified his early definition in an attempt to make it more accurate.  
 
Even so, it is debatable whether Dickie‟s third version of his definition (DK1cDef) 
is a valid definition of all art. Moreover, Dickie introduced other ideas, when 
justifying his position, that could have improved that early definition but which 
nevertheless he did not include as part of his definition (i.e., in DK1bDef or 
DK1cDef). This may have been in part because he didn‟t want radically to modify 
the core of his DK1 definition, but just to add a few improvements to it.  
 
Nevertheless, in adding further detailed reflections on the nature of the artworld, 
and on the „aesthetic object‟ qua institutional object of (artistic) appreciation and/or 
criticism, he accidentally formulated an implicit definition of art that acted as a sort 
of „Trojan horse‟. This is because this „Trojan‟ definition was (implicit) in Dickie‟s 
theory, although was different from and incompatible with those definitions he had 
explicitly given and which have so far been presented in this chapter (i.e., 
DK1aDef, DK1bDef, DK1cDef); in fact, this „Trojan‟ definition would render 
possible a very different definition from those summarised above, and that would be 
presented later in his 1984 book The Art Circle (DK2def).  
 
Additionally, one of the most striking aspects of Dickie‟s DK1 definitions is his 
concern to explain in detail the differentia of artworks, while leaving its genus (i.e., 
condition (1) of the definition) undeveloped in each of his subsequent revisions 
(DK1aDef, DK1bDef, DK1cDef). The problem with this, as Davies also points out 
(Davies, 1991: 123 – 141), is that it remains unclear what Dickie really means by an 
artwork being an „artifact‟. So clarifying what Dickie means by „artifact‟ might also 
be of help in clarifying what Dickie thinks art is and to determine whether the 
different interpretations in current analytic aesthetics of Dickie‟s DK1 definitions 
are correct or not.  
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It is on reprinting his Introduction in 1997, with the slightly modified title of 
Introduction to Aesthetics - An Analytic Approach (hereinafter Introduction1997), 
that Dickie first provides an explicit definition of artifactuality for his DK1 
definition. It is important to note, however, that this definition is in accordance with 
his later DK2 definition, presented in The Art Circle (1984). In his 
Introduction1997, in accordance with his new ideas in The Art Circle, he defines 
„artifact‟ as „an object made by man, especially with a view for a subsequent use‟ 
(Introduction1997: 83). Note however that this definition is a reformulation, 
corresponding to his DK2 period that he also applies in retrospect to his earlier 
implicit view concerning artifactuality. 
 
In fact, Margolis had earlier criticised Dickie for failing, during his DK1 period, to 
provide any account or justification whatsoever for why artifactuality would be the 
genus of art. After the publication of Art and the Aesthetic, Dickie responds in his 
1975 paper „Reply‟, with the assertion that Margolis does not provide any 
justification for his (Margolis‟s) idea that artworks are artifacts either. However, 
Dickie might be wrong, because actually Margolis‟s explanation of why an artwork 
is an artifact, seems to provide a good justification of why it is so. Actually 
Margolis says that  „to say that a work of art is an artifact is to say that some human 
being deliberately made it […] corresponding to the artist‟s being engaged in 
deliberate activity, the work of art he produces is said to have some purpose‟ 
(Margolis, 1965: 45). So it seems that Margolis defines artifactuality, more or less, 
as „something made deliberately by a human for some purpose‟; and as such he 
justifies that „artifactuality‟ is the genus of art (i.e., because he believes artworks, as 
a species of artifactuality, ipso facto are to be considered as man-made and 
deliberately created for some further purpose). Note the similarity between this 
conception of artifactuality and Dickie‟s later DK2 definition of artifact above.  
 
Now, it is unclear to what extent Dickie in DK1 already shares the same conception 
of artifactuality as Margolis. Clearly, in the works in which we find DK1a and 
DK1b, he takes a different position from Margolis, claiming that artifactuality is not 
due to an act of creation (the condition of having been made) but to an act of status 
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conferral. However, in DK1c he is no longer sure that artifactuality is the sort of 
thing that can be conferred, at least in cases such as that of the exhibited driftwood 
(Art and the Aesthetic: 45). In any case, in Art and the Aesthetic he would still 
disagree that an artifact is necessarily the product of an act of creation, as Margolis 
argues, although he doesn‟t explain what type of action makes something an 
artifact. As for the other elements of Margolis‟s conception of artifacts, they seem 
to be endorsed by Dickie in his DK1 period, when contrasting natural objects with 
artifacts (i.e., the latter involving some type of human agency intending to use the 
object in one way or another). So in this case Dickie seems to understand implicitly 
the notion of „artifact‟ in Art and the Aesthetic as:41  
 
(1*) an object with a status conferred or acquired by means of a human agency, 
especially with a view to a subsequent use 
 
Thus, if the above (plausible) implicit definition of „artifact‟ suggested in Art and 
the Aesthetic is introduced in his DK1cDef, the definition would take more or less 
the following form (note that below I modify only part (1) of the definition, 
corresponding the notion of „artifactuality‟ that I have attempted to clarify, and 
leave part (2) untouched – i.e., as is already presented by Dickie in DK1c):  
 
[DK1c+(1*)Def]: A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1*) an object with a status 
conferred or acquired by means of a human agency, especially with a view to a 
subsequent use (2) a set of its aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of 
candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social 
institution (the artworld). 
 
Or, if introduced in its revised form DK1c**Def presented in Section 5.4-A, after 
taking into consideration the problems of its original version, it would run as 
follows: 
                                                 
41
 Note: the suggested definition is introduced as (1*) rather than as (1) because it is just an attempt 
to reconstruct Dickie‟s implicit definition of artifact, from the clues given and the language used in 
his paper Defining, as well as in his books Introduction and Art and the Aesthetic. Also I have taken 
into account the explicit definition of artifactuality in his Introduction1997 and Margolis‟s definition 
of art and artifact as guidelines for Dickie‟s (possible) implicit definition of „artifact‟. 
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[DK1c**+(1*)Def]: A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1*) an object with a 
status conferred or acquired by means of a human agency, especially with a view to a 
subsequent use and (2**) which has had conferred upon a set of its pre-existing 
aesthetic and non-aesthetic aspects, by a series of conventions, the status of being a 
candidate for criticism (or critical appreciation) in a certain social institution (the 
artworld) by some person or persons acting on behalf of this institution.   
 
In any case, Dickie, in stressing the artifactual condition of artworks, implies that an 
artwork qua artifact is always to be regarded as being for some subsequent use. 
Furthermore, he persists with the idea that an artwork, or some of its features, exists 
in order to be appreciated within the artworld system(s) and in order to be the object 
of (art) criticism. Given both ideas, there is an additional reason for thinking that 
Davies is not completely successful in his attempt to understand Dickie‟s 
institutional/procedural definition of art as a definition unconcerned with the 
function of art, and hence in his attempt to show that Dickie‟s theory radically 
differs from Beardsley‟s functional theory of art (Davies, 1991). In this regard, 
Rowe and Oppy point towards the idea that if Dickie regards artworks as human 
artifacts, then they ought to be understood as functional items, having either a 
particular use or function (Rowe, 1991) or a diversity of proper uses or functions 
that may or may not be fulfilled in particular instances of art (Oppy, 1993). 
 
Dickie also argues that artists do not have much trouble in introducing radically 
new instances of art; this is not only because they often create new artworld systems 
or subsystems for this specific purpose, but also because they take the rules of these 
new systems or subsystems just as loose guidelines for the production of new 
instances of art (Art and the Aesthetic: 48).  
 
Now, this seems to be incompatible with Dickie‟s assertion that all artworks are 
ultimately the product of an action of „conferring the status of candidacy for 
appreciation‟: if conferring this status were enough to produce art, then the creation 
of new subsystems in art and the usage of the rules of each art system and 
subsystems, as loose guidelines for artmaking, would be unnecessary. Also note, 
vice versa, that if the rules are just loose guidelines for artists, and if new 
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subsystems can come into being allowing creativity and freshness in art, then this 
universal act of conferral becomes unnecessary. 
 
In the case of theatre, Dickie insists that „[what] the author, management, and 
players present is art, and it is art because it is presented within the theatreworld 
framework. Plays are written to have a place in the theatre system and they exist as 
plays, that is, as art, within that system’ (Art and the Aesthetic: 30; italics mine). He 
also claims that „[one] central feature all of the systems have in common is that 
each is a framework for the presenting of particular works of art‟ (Art and the 
Aesthetic: 31; italics mine). What he is actually claiming here, then, is that 
something is art if it loosely follows the rules of the system it pertains to, rather than 
if it strictly follows the rules or procedures of the artworld in general (i.e., the 
alleged general rule of conferring the status of candidacy for appreciation). This is 
because he insists that the framework of reference for understanding artworks is 
always the system or subsystem it pertains to, rather than the whole artworld in 
general. 
 
In short, considering all this, Dickie‟s assertion that artists, in order to create art, 
follow a strict general rule that consists in conferring the status of „candidate for 
appreciation‟ on their works, completely misrepresents the complexities of his real 
views. 
 
Thus if we take into account Dickie‟s alternative reflections, summarised here, to 
explain what an artwork is within a particular system, an implicit definition arises. 
This implicit definition undermines Dickie‟s explicit insistence on the act of status 
conferral and on the idea of a person or persons acting on behalf of the artworld. It 
also allows a transition towards the new definition he is going to propose in his 
DK2 period, where he, in fact, disregards these two notions, as well as others held 
so far in his DK1a, DK1b and DK1c theories.  
 
This „Trojan‟ definition, let‟s call it DK1(t)Def, if we take into account the 
additional reflections in Art and the Aesthetic, can be stated as follows – note that I 
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will call (2t) the second part of this „Trojan‟ definition DK1(t)Def so to clearly 
distinguish it from the others: 
  
[DK1(t)Def]: A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1*) an object with a status 
conferred or acquired by means of a human agency, especially with a view to a 
subsequent use (2t) which has had a set of its aspects specifically directed towards 
public presentation. This set of aspects is presented in accordance with the primary 
and secondary conventions of a particular artworld system or subsystem. The 
conventional presentation of this set of aspects allows them to be the proper object of 
criticism (or critical appreciation). 
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6. DICKIE’S LATER INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF ART 
 
Dickie‟s theory soon drew the attention of many aesthetic theorists from the 
analytic tradition. However, Dickie‟s insistence, against many objections, on the 
institutional nature of art, led to the accusation of his providing oversimplifying 
explanations of art and artistic practices. He was also accused of misconceiving the 
types of institutions involved in artmaking and art exhibiting. Revising his ideas in 
response, he ultimately presented a theory of art different from that discussed in the 
previous chapter, as DK1. 
 
Dickie‟s later institutional theory and definition of art (hereinafter, respectively, 
DK2 and DK2Def) were first sketched out in his paper „The New Institutional 
Theory of Art‟ („New‟), and were fully developed in his book The Art Circle. 
Further reflections came in his Introduction to Aesthetics, an Analytic Approach 
(the 1997 revision of his earlier Introduction – i.e., Introduction1997) and in his 
recent book Art and Value (Value). Other relevant papers published after presenting 
his DK2 definition are: „Art: Function or Procedure: Nature or Culture?‟ 
(„Nature/Culture‟ – Also in his Art and Value); „Art and the Romantic Artist‟ (later 
introduced in The Art Circle: this paper forms part of a selection of articles about 
Beardsley and is briefly replied towards the end of the book in: Fisher, 1983: 300 – 
301); and „Wollheim‟s Dilemma‟ (also summarised in: Value: 63 – 71). The latter 
was presented in the previous chapter because in this paper Dickie basically 
attempts to defend his earlier DK1 theory against Wollheim‟s criticisms. 
 
 
6.1 Dickie’s DK2 theory in relation to the earlier DK1 version 
 
Dickie insists that his later theory (DK2) and definition (DK2Def) are an attempt to 
correct his earlier ideas to the extent that they have to be conceived as a clearly 
different approach from his DK1 conception of art (Circle: 7; Introduction1997: 82; 
Value: 52). However, and to Dickie‟s dismay, this new DK2 theory – together with 
its definition and its implications – have been generally ignored by major figures 
like Danto, Carroll and Davies, when they attempt to describe Dickie‟s institutional 
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theory. These philosophers often talk about Dickie‟s DK2 in terms of DK1‟s theory 
and definitions – for example, when misconceiving Dickie‟s later DK2 theory in 
terms of its DK1 notion of status conferral (as in: Davies, 1991; also in Stock‟s 
section on „Definitions of Art‟ in: Davies, Higgins et. al., 2009: 232). In other cases, 
DK2 has been taken as irrelevant to a proper representation of Dickie‟s theory qua 
institutional theory (Carroll, 1999b); in other cases it has been simply ignored (as 
Dickie protests about Danto in: Value: 55 – 56).  
 
It is true that in DK2 and DK2Def, Dickie keeps some elements first presented and 
developed in DK1 and the three versions of DK1Def. For example, he still endorses 
the idea of the artifactual nature of artworks. He also continues to argue that the 
institutional framework of art is constituted as an informal practice guided by a set 
of informal rules and conventions. However, in this new definition, Dickie leaves 
aside most of the formal and legalistic terminology that he now sees as inadequate 
for explaining an informal practice such as artmaking. He also recants most of the 
ideas presented in part (2) of his DK1aDef, DK1bDef and DK1cDef that attempted 
to explain artmaking in terms of an act of status conferral analogous to the act of 
christening.  
 
Thus, on the one hand, it is possible to argue that the core of Dickie‟s DK2 theory is 
already contained in the several DK1 versions, and as a result, that an examination 
of DK2 also requires taking DK1 into account. Ignoring the changes Dickie 
introduces in DK2, however, as the above mentioned authors did, brings us no 
closer to explaining Dickie‟s institutional theory as it is currently understood. There 
are in fact important implications in the changes he introduced in DK2, in his 
attempt to explain anew the (institutional) nature of art.  
 
That said, the general tendency to ignore the content of DK2 theory in favour of the 
earlier versions of DK1, is in part Dickie‟s own fault. To be sure, he does defend, 
against the misconceptions of his critics, ideas in DK1 that he later goes on to 
repudiate. Dickie is thus responding, later in his DK2 period, to the objections 
(particularly those of Cohen and Wollheim – see: Value: 54; 63 – 71; also in 
„Wollheim‟s Dilemma‟) raised against those aspects of DK1 that he has already 
rejected. But those responses are irrelevant and misleading when we are trying to 
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understand DK2 – because the changes introduced in DK2 per se already render 
these objections beside the point. Perhaps he ought not to have responded at all, 
because by doing so, he seems still to endorse the earlier ideas he no longer holds.  
 
Dickie‟s DK1 theory, as I have argued in the previous chapter, had several 
controversial aspects; others, misleading at this stage, needed further clarification. 
Dickie made several attempts to resolve these problems in successive revisions of 
DK1, but several other problems remained, and his theory is still widely contested.  
 
One of the problems that remained in all of the DK1 versions, and that Dickie 
attempted to correct in DK2, was his earlier insistence on the central role of the act 
of status conferral in art. This idea lacked any kind of empirical evidence, and 
appeared implausible (see for example: Wollheim, 1984). Further, Dickie‟s idea 
that certain artifacts were artworks in virtue of their institutional placement rather 
than in virtue of having a nature distinctively different from other types of artifacts, 
was counterintuitive. Moreover, Dickie‟s argument reminded some critics of 
Euthyphro‟s way of presenting his argument about piety42 (see: Young, 1995; also 
Davies, 1991: 78).  
 
Additionally, Dickie‟s attempts to refine DK1, led to a succession of larger and thus 
more ungraspable definitions. This was because in DK1 he focused upon 
increasingly refining condition (2) of the definition. This implied a growing 
unbalanced relation between condition (1) – that is, just being an artifact, without 
any explicit clarification of what an artifact was – and condition (2) where Dickie 
defines the differentia in relation to the genus of artifactuality of artworks. Critics 
noted as well that the circularity in the DK1 definition, when explaining art in terms 
of the artworld, could not explain the meaning of the term „art‟ without already 
presupposing it in the definition (i.e., because the definition contained the term to be 
defined). 
 
                                                 
42
 i.e., the argument that piety is good because the gods like it; an argument that is contested by 
Socrates/Plato who says that the correct formulation seems to be the other way round: that is, that 
gods like piety because it is good. 
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In DK2, Dickie sets out to solve these problems and to reinforce nevertheless the 
plausibility of an institutional definition of art. To do so, his focus of attention now 
is part (1) of the definiens (i.e. artifactuality) rather than part (2); that is to say, the 
differentia that had become by then the larger and more complex part of the 
definition. In fact, he claims now that „the whole approach is through the 
artifactuality condition and although the new definition retains the two part form, it 
will be evident that the two parts are intimately related‟ (Circle: 11).  
  
To do this, he explicitly defines for the first time, in „New‟, the nature of artifactual 
objects qua genus of artworks („New‟: 216). By doing so, he can now have a better 
chance to construct a more adequate definition of art. This is because in DK1, as we 
have already seen (in Chapter 5), he had simply offered the idea of artworks as 
members of the genus artifacts without explicitly defining what an artifact is. 
Unfortunately, he thus obscured a relevant part of the definition of art. He now 
attempts to correct this flaw, but the implications of these later efforts to clarify 
explicitly the meaning of artifactuality, in DK2, seem not to have always been 
grasped completely by certain critics. This can be observed for example in 
Rickman‟s paper on Dickie‟s conception of artifactuality – that is contested in a 
very brief but emphatic response by Dickie (see: Rickman, 1989; Dickie, 1989) 
 
 
6.2  Dickie’s reformulation of his institutional theory and definition of art 
 
As in the case of DK1, Dickie‟s new DK2 institutional definition of art cannot be 
fully understood without taking into account his debt to Beardsley. In this case, 
Dickie accepts Beardsley‟s criticisms in relation to the types of institutions that his 
DK1 theory seems to endorse (Beardsley, 1976). The basis for Beardsley‟s criticism 
is that Dickie attempted to make it clear, in his three versions of DK1, that the 
artworld ought to be understood as an informal institution, without defined lines of 
authority or strictly codified rules and procedures; yet, his notions of „status 
conferral‟, „candidacy for appreciation‟ and „acting on behalf‟ of the artworld, 
sounded to Beardsley – and to Wollheim and Danto as well – much like the actions 
typical of institutions, organisations or legal bodies with formally codified 
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regulations and norms (in fact Dickie has acknowledged this problem explicitly in: 
Circle: 67).  
   
Hence Dickie accepts Beardsley‟s criticism concerning the need to distinguish 
between institution-types and institution-tokens – or, following Wieand‟s 
distinction, between action-institutions and person-institutions (Circle: 52). 
Institution-tokens/person-institutions are organisations such as General Motors, the 
Church of Rome, or the Tate Modern. Institution-types/action-institutions are 
institutionalised actions that may or may not involve institution-tokens/person-
institutions. For example, storytelling or marriage, Dickie says, would be typical 
action-institutions. Offering food to visitors, or saying „hello‟ as a way of 
welcoming somebody, are also action-institutions that do not require any 
organisation or corporation for them to exist. However, institutionalised actions of 
the sort of status conferral are action-institutions that do involve person-institutions 
(i.e., in the form of organisations, corporations or legal bodies). This is because 
such actions always involve collective actors, such as the judicial system of a 
country (conferring the status of heir on someone), the church (conferring marital 
status) or a constitutional monarchy (conferring knighthoods and other honours). 
Thus Beardsley insists that Dickie‟s misleading terminology seems to indicate that 
artmaking qua action-institutions involves person-institutions, but this is actually 
contrary to what Dickie sets out to establish. So Dickie also accepts Beardsley‟s 
suggestion that art as an action-institution doesn‟t require any person-institution to 
exist. 
 
As a result, Dickie‟s new definition of art (DK2Def) leaves aside this type of 
legalistic terminology and is now presented as follows: 
 
[DK2Def]: A work of art is an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld 
public. 
 
To better grasp the meaning of this definition, it is worth taking into consideration 
also Dickie‟s definition of artifact [Af] as: 
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[Af]: An object made by man, especially with a view to subsequent use. 
 
Thus we can understand art in DK2Def, provisionally, as (in italics the definiens of 
[Af] introduced in [DK2Def] in place of the term „artifact‟): 
 
[DK2Def+Af]: A work of art is an object, made by man, especially with a view to 
subsequent use, of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public. 
 
In this definition Dickie attempts to make clear that the action involved in 
submitting new instances of artifacts, and hence also of art, is always an act of 
making, rather than a product of the formal act of status conferral, as he had 
suggested in DK1. This implies that, as he remarks in The Art Circle and in his 
response to Rickman, the act of pointing and calling something „art‟, as in the case 
of Dalí doing this with some rocks, is not an act of making (the rocks are neither 
altered nor used) and thus Dalí would not thereby be creating an artifact nor hence 
an artwork out of them (Circle: 46; Dickie, 1989). One of the most important 
consequences of this change in Dickie‟s view is that he no longer supports the idea 
that anything is possible in art. This represents a relevant alteration in his theory 
that has important ontological implications for the types of objects that can or can‟t 
be artworks. It should also be pointed out that this new consideration is in 
disagreement with Danto‟s D3 theory (see Chapter 4), which supports the idea that 
after the end of art, it is possible to present anything as an artwork.
43
 Thus Dickie 
asserts the following concerning the creation of artifacts and artworks:  
 
It now seems to me that artifactuality is just not the sort of thing that can be conferred 
and that Fountain and its like must be construed as the artifacts of artists as the result 
of a kind of minimal work on the part of those artists […]. An added benefit of this 
change is that the minimal work requirement acts as a limiting factor on the 
membership of the class of works of art, a factor which so many have pointed out is 
                                                 
43
 Later he slightly modifies this idea by claiming that anything is possible in art although with 
certain provisos. 
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lacking in the old version. According to the new version, it is clear that not everything 
can become a work of art (Circle: 11 – 12) 
 
Even if Dickie does accept most of Beardsley‟s critique – that he had introduced an 
excessively formal and legalistic terminology in his DK1 definition of art – he also 
claims that Beardsley is not completely right in his criticisms. In particular, he 
disagrees with Beardsley‟s claim that understanding art as an action-institution 
independent of person-institutions allows artists isolated from art institutions to 
create art in a way that renders the institutional theory incorrect.  
 
Hence, Dickie asserts that „[in] a way, what I shall want to argue against Beardsley 
is that although an artist can withdraw from contact with various of the institutions 
of society, he cannot withdraw from the institution of art because he carries it with 
him as Robinson Crusoe carried his Englishness‟ (Circle: 49 – 51). This is because, 
for Dickie:  
 
1) The institution of art is an action-institution, that is, an institutionalised 
action, that doesn‟t require, in particular, any corporation to exist (such as 
the Saatchi and Saatchi Gallery, the Royal Academy of Art, and so on). 
 
2) An artist, in order to be one, needs to be somebody already acquainted with 
certain cultural notions about art qua action-institution. Thus, even if an 
artist is isolated from institutions, he cannot be incapable of producing art 
because, as an artist, he already carries with him certain cultural notions 
about the institutionalised actions involved in artmaking and art 
appreciation.   
 
Actually, his new DK2 approach, that insists on the idea of artmaking as an action-
institution, leads him to cast aside his earlier terminology about the role of 
institutions in art. In DK2, he supports the idea that the framework required to 
produce art should be understood in terms of a cultural matrix, rather than in terms 
of an institutional matrix or framework that contains some actions socially 
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sanctioned or institutionalised. As he argues, „what I now mean by the institutional 
approach is the view that a work of art is art because of the position it occupies 
within a cultural practice, which is of course in Beardsley‟s terminology an 
institution-type [i.e., an action-institution]‟  (Circle: 52; italics mine). Then he says 
more specifically that „[art] cannot exist in the contextless vacuum that Beardsley‟s 
view requires; it must exist in a cultural matrix, as the product of someone fulfilling 
a cultural role‟ (Circle: 55; italics mine) 
 
This change of perspective and terminology has major implications for Dickie‟s 
theory, even though Beardsley argues that these changes render Dickie‟s thesis 
trivial (in Fisher, 1983: 300). Now Dickie believes that artworks, qua artifacts, are 
man made objects, and the only requirements for them to exist, are:  
 
1) That the person who makes them is situated within a cultural matrix or 
acculturated in some way or another. 
 
2) That the (artifactual) work is made with a certain cultural understanding of 
art. This understanding is that the work in question is to be presented to, and 
estimated by, a particular stable type of acculturated public, capable of 
seeing the work as distinct from other types of cultural artifacts.  
 
As a consequence, the only cases in which an isolated individual would be 
incapable of producing art wouldn‟t be, as we have seen earlier, an artist who lives 
in an ivory tower, or an artist who (like Robinson Crusoe carrying his Englishness 
with him) carries with him the action-institution of art. It would be rather a member 
of a primitive tribe lacking the most basic notions of art (Circle: 55) or someone 
completely isolated since the very beginning of human culture, such as a sort of 
Romulus-figure (Hagberg, 2002). As Dickie says: 
 
Beardsley‟s notion of a Romantic artist, as I have interpreted it, holds open the 
possibility that art-making in at least some cases could be totally a product of 
individual initiative, a process which could occur in a cultural vacuum. Suppose that a 
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person totally ignorant of the concept art (the member of a primitive tribe or the 
culturally isolated individual mentioned above, for example) and unacquainted with 
any representations were to fashion a representation of something out of clay […] he 
would not have any cognitive structures into which he could fit it so as to understand it 
as art. Someone might make the mistake of identifying art with representation (a 
deeply ingrained identification) […]. Once this temptation is put aside, we can see that 
the creator of the representation cannot recognize his creation as art and that, therefore, 
it cannot be art […]. In the case in question, the person who creates the representation 
could not have the relevant thought or thoughts because he lacks the relevant cognitive 
structures (Circle: 55). 
 
 
6.3 Towards a cultural theory of art  
 
In fact Dickie‟s conception of the institution required for artmaking progressively 
changes: first, in DK1, it is understood as a particular „regional‟ institution (i.e., the 
artworld) that exists at least in Western cultures (this seems to be implicit in his 
reflections in: „Defining‟: 254; also in: Art and the Aesthetic: 28). In DK2, the 
artworld is presented as being a human institution („New‟: 217). There he explains 
that artmaking is a cultural phenomenon and as such subsumes the artworld 
institution under the institution of human culture („New‟: 219, Circle: 52). This 
formulation takes its fullest shape in Introduction1997 and Art and Value. Thus in 
chapter 7 of Introduction1997 Dickie talks about the existence of a new direction in 
art theory (taken by Mandelbaum, Danto, Cohen and himself) that stresses the 
central role of cultural context (Introduction1997: 77); in fact, it is worth pointing 
out that in this short section (barely half a page) he uses the word „cultural‟ as many 
as seven times to clarify this distinctive approach. It is also relevant to point out that 
this way of talking about his own theory (and that of the other above mentioned 
philosophers) cannot be found in any of his papers or books previous to DK2.  
 
Furthermore, in Art and Value, and in his paper „Nature/Culture‟, he finally decides 
to classify his institutional theory as a cultural theory of art, as an alternative to 
Davies‟s suggestion of classifying it as a procedural theory (Davies, 1990; 1991 – 
for a detailed account of Davies‟s view of procedural theories of art, see Chapter 
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7).
44
 Owing to this, Dickie now stresses that cultural theories of art such as his are 
to be contrasted with natural theories (rather than with functional theories) that 
explain art in terms of biological/psychological mechanisms (in „Nature/ Culture‟; 
also in: Value: 33 – 51).45 In fact, in Art and Value, Dickie argues that art is not a 
natural product arising from the human species qua biological sub-product. He 
argues, perhaps in an oversimplified manner, that the theories supporting this latter 
approach conceive of humans making artworks in the same way that bower birds 
make bowers. Against this, Dickie argues that art is a cultural phenomenon and not 
just the product of simple physical human instinctual labour (Value: 20 – 46).  
 
With this later conception of art as a cultural phenomenon, Dickie now claims that 
his own methodological approach is closer to that of an anthropologist than to that 
of a philosopher (Value: 12 – 31). Actually he stresses in Art and Value that his 
theory has been, since the very beginning, more anthropological than Danto‟s 
(Value: 7). 
 
Thus, in DK2 Dickie now distinguishes between the artworld framework and the 
cultural framework. He does this in order to claim that the precondition of art is the 
cultural framework which allows the appearance of art and, with it, its structurally 
related institutional elements (that presuppose each other): that is to say, not only 
the artworld, but also the artist, the artworld public, etc. (Circle: 84). In fact, Dickie 
argues, the artworld structurally arises together with the first works of art, and he 
also claims that each of the elements related to art presuppose and „bend in‟ on each 
other in a circular or an „inflected‟ manner (Circle: 79). Where in DK1 he seemed 
to endorse the idea that the artworld was the actual precondition of art, in DK2 he 
claims something entirely different, based on his conception about the 
interrelatedness of this set of elements. Owing to this, he lays claims in DK2 that 
his theory is now to be understood as a structural theory of art (Value: 42).  
 
                                                 
44
 Interestingly, Davies later on in The Philosophy of Art accepts Dickie‟s alternative classification. 
45
 The classification of his theory as cultural rather than natural is already implicit in Circle, where 
he distinguishes between cultural objects such as artworks, and natural objects (Circle: 98). 
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Furthermore, Dickie says that the artworld ought to be understood as constituted by 
a number of roles (as core members): Thus he says that „described in a somewhat 
more structured way, the artworld consists of a set of individual artworld systems, 
each of which contains its own specific artist roles, plus specific supplementary 
roles‟ (Circle: 74). These roles, he says, first appear as a consequence of the 
progressive institutionalisation of a certain type of acculturated human labour 
(artifact-making). The first artworks thereby produced are then first addressed to a 
transitional particular type of public possessing certain knowledge about how to 
deal with them. As Dickie says: 
 
[It] is perfectly reasonable to suppose that art did not have the instantaneous beginning 
that the Romantic-origin thesis requires. Art may have emerged (and no doubt did 
emerge) in an evolutionary way out of the techniques originally associated with 
religious, magical, or other activities. In the beginning these techniques would have 
been no doubt minimal and their products (diagrams, chants and the like) crude and in 
themselves uninteresting. With the passage of time the techniques would have become 
more polished and specialists have come to exist and their products would have come 
to have characteristics of some interest (to their creators and others) over and above 
the interest they had as elements in the religious or whatever other kind of activity in 
which they were embedded. At about this point it becomes meaningful to say that 
primitive art had begun to exist, although the people who had the art might not yet 
have had a word for its art. (Circle: 56) 
 
6.4 Dickie’s set of interrelated definitions in DK2 
 
Dickie thus concludes that artworks are intrinsically embedded within the structure 
of the artworld, once this structure has gelled (Value: 62). This, he claims, occurs as 
a result of the evolution of the institution of culture which progressively allows the 
institutionalization of a number of activities that are finally grouped together as art. 
This does not imply, however, that the making of art requires an explicit knowledge 
of these correlative or co-dependent (i.e., circularly-inflected) structures, but 
merely, at least, to have some previous experience with certain types of art (Circle: 
54).  
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What, then, are these other co-dependent or circularly-inflected elements that 
Dickie considers constitutive of the institution of art qua action-institution? They 
include the following: the artist, the work of art, the public, the artworld and the 
artworld systems. However, the definitions of these elements, he argues in The Art 
Circle, need not follow a particular order when being presented (Circle: 80). He 
defines them as follows (Circle: 80 – 82): 
 
 
(I) An artist [At] is a person who participates with understanding in the making 
of a work of art 
 
(II) A work of art [DK2Def] is an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an 
artworld public 
 
(III) A public [Pb] is a set of persons the members of which are prepared in some 
degree to understand an object which is presented to them 
 
(IV) The artworld [Aw] is the totality of all artworld systems 
 
(V) An artworld system [AwS] is a framework for the presentation of a work of 
art by an artist to an artworld public 
 
Before examining how these definitions relate to each other, and more particularly 
to examine in extenso Dickie‟s new definition of artwork (here summarised as 
DK2Def), some explanations are required.  
 
First, the reason Dickie proposes this series of definitions is his need to respond to 
the accusation that his theory is circular. In Circle, he argues that in DK1 he just 
didn‟t have any problem with agreeing that his theory was circular (Circle: 12). He 
even argues that this previous definition wasn‟t viciously circular 
(Introduction1997: 92). Furthermore, in these two books, he accepts that his new 
DK2 version is circular, although he now claims that the reason why these concepts 
are circularly interrelated is that they form part of an „interrelated system‟: the 
different interlocking definitions he provides attempt to show that they have an 
inflected nature qua cultural concepts.  They refer to different roles, systems and 
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actions that once arose together and thus can only make sense in their 
interrelatedness. 
 
Secondly, although Dickie introduces these definitions explicitly and together here, 
none of them, except that of „work of art‟, are very different from the explanations 
of these concepts he provided earlier in DK1. In particular, the definitions of 
„artworld‟ and „artworld system‟ are almost identical. Also, the definitions of 
„artist‟ and „public‟, although not explicitly summarised in DK1, carried implicitly 
the same meaning, given that Dickie already insisted there on the fact that both 
artists and public, to perform these roles appropriately, need to have some basic 
notions about the rules and conventions of the various different artworld systems 
(Art and the Aesthetic: 36). Perhaps the only additional idea in DK2 is Dickie‟s 
claim that the understanding which both public and artist must have is not merely an 
understanding of the conventions and procedures of art. It is also necessarily an 
understanding of the different artistic media as well (Value: 59 – 60), and the 
understanding that comes with the process of acculturation, corresponding to a 
society that already makes and appreciates the most basic types of artworks.  
 
Thirdly, we should note that Dickie‟s definition of „public‟ is not a definition of an 
„artworld public‟; it is merely a definition of „public‟ in general. This will avoid 
confusion when we attempt to reconstruct the whole definition of art – which  I will 
do here, by substituting each of the terms in the definition of a work of art 
[DK2Def], by its definiens whenever Dickie provides it in his DK2 series of 
interrelated definitions: that is, the definiens of [Af], [At], [Pb], [Aw] and [AwS]).  
 
Thus, it is possible to reconstruct Dickie‟s DK2 implicit definition. To do so, let us 
consider again the definition of art [DK2Def] summarised earlier, together with that 
of artifactuality [Af]: 
 
[DK2Def+Af]: A work of art is an object, made by man, especially with a view to 
subsequent use, of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public. 
 
If we introduce the definiens of „public‟ [Pb] into this definition we derive the 
following (the suggested modifications are in italics; hereafter, I will substitute, in 
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the last part of the definition, „the‟ – in brackets – for „an‟, as this seems to be more 
in accordance with the rest of the definition): 
 
[DK2Def+Af+Pb]: A work of art is an object, made by man, especially with a view to 
subsequent use, of a kind created to be presented to a set of persons from the artworld, 
the members of which are prepared in some degree to understand [the] object which is 
presented to them. 
 
However, to continue „unfolding‟ Dickie‟s new definition of art, it is not possible to 
substitute the term artworld [Aw] by its definiens, as Dickie currently presents it, as 
„the totality of all artworld systems‟. This is because, presumably, he doesn‟t 
believe that a particular artwork has to be appreciated by the publics of all the 
artworld systems, but only by at least some of them. The more plausible 
interpretation of Dickie‟s definition when incorporating the modified definiens of 
[Aw], would run as follows (modifications in my italics – I shall also slightly 
modify the second section of this definition by cutting it in two parts, so to make it 
more comprehensible):  
 
 [DK2Def+Af+Pb+Aw]: A work of art is an object, made by man, especially with a 
view to subsequent use. This object is of a kind created to be presented to a set of 
persons from, at least, a subset of the totality of all artworld systems, the members of 
which are prepared in some degree to understand the object which is presented to 
them. 
 
Next we can substitute the term „artworld system‟ [AwS] by its definiens. Observe 
that in the following definition, the term „artist‟ included in [AwS] will be 
introduced earlier when referring to the maker of the artwork qua artifact (again 
modifications are in my italics – I will also cut the last section in two parts to make 
it more comprehensible, although, at the same time, I will attempt to follow the 
original meaning): 
 
[DK2Def+Af+Pb+Aw+AwS]: A work of art is an object, made by man (i.e., an artist), 
especially with a view to subsequent use. This object is of a kind created to be 
presented to a set of persons from at least a subset of the totality of all the frameworks 
for the presentation of a work of art. These persons are prepared in some degree to 
understand the object which is presented to them. 
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This leads us to the final step in which it is possible to include the definiens of 
„artist‟ [At] in the reconstruction of Dickie‟s definition. Note here that the term 
„person‟ introduced in the definition of [At] always refers to a human person (and 
hence it can substitute for the term „man‟ introduced earlier in the definition of 
artifact [Af]). Also, although in this definition the term „work of art‟ is included in 
the definition of [At] and as we have just seen, also of [AwS], it seems unnecessary 
to mention it in the final definiens presented here. In fact, it seems that the resulting 
definition makes perfect sense without it (my modifications in my italics):  
 
[DK2Def+Af+Pb+Aw+AwS+At]: A work of art is an object, made by a person who 
participates with understanding in its making, especially with a view to subsequent 
use. This object is of a kind created to be presented to a set of persons from at least a 
subset of the totality of all the frameworks for the presentation of this type of object. 
These persons are prepared in some degree to understand the object which is presented 
to them. 
 
Now, owing to the fact that this „unfolded‟ definition is, up to this point, 
excessively large and complex, I will organise the phrases in a more 
comprehensible manner. Also for heuristic reasons, this definition will be divided 
into three numbered parts. This is, however, only a methodological suggestion to 
make the definition more digestible to the reader, rather than an attempt to recover 
Dickie‟s DK1 attempt (rejected in DK2) at establishing a clear division between the 
different parts of the definition, (i.e., the genus and the differentia). To do so,               
and to avoid confusing the above [DK2Def+Af+Pb+Aw+AwS+At]                        
version with the numerically-organised one below, I will call the latter 
[(DK2Def+Af+Pb+Aw+AwS+At)*]: 
 
 [(DK2Def+Af+Pb+Aw+AwS+At)*]: A work of art is [1] an object made especially 
with a view to subsequent use, by a person who participates with understanding in its 
making. [2] This object is of a kind created to be presented to a set of persons prepared 
in some degree to understand the object which is presented to them. [3] The set of 
persons to whom the object is presented corresponds to, a least, a subset of the totality 
of all the frameworks for the presentation of this type of object.  
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6.5 Some Problems with Dickie’s later DK2 theory 
 
A) Definition of art or definition of something else?  
 
Dickie wrote The Art Circle primarily to develop a thorough alternative DK2 theory 
and definition of art (DK2Def). His other purpose, however, was to support the idea 
that art is the product of a series of inflected circularly-interconnected elements, an 
idea that was already latent in DK1 (see for example: Art and the Aesthetic: 34). He 
argues that in stressing this, he is finally demonstrating his idea of artmaking as an 
institutionalised practice.  
 
So far, however, we have seen that appealing to circularity when talking about art 
can be problematic; the circularity can render a definition vacuous or, in this case, a 
series of interrelated definitions. Dickie was aware of the problem, but insists that 
his theory is nevertheless informative and that its circularity is an attempt to show 
the indissoluble structurally interrelated set of elements required to make art 
(Circle: 82).  
 
Yet, in this case, the amount of information that Dickie‟s theory provides is very 
limited. As Carroll points out, in fact, Dickie‟s definition can be applied to many 
other practices different from art, such as philosophy or even wisecracking (Carroll, 
1994: 12). We can observe that Carroll is correct because we can also claim, for 
example, that Dickie‟s definition (as reconstructed in Section 6.4) is also perfectly 
intelligible when applied to other things – for example, a work of philosophy: 
 
A work of philosophy [φ] is [1] an object made especially with a view to subsequent 
use, by a person who participates with understanding in its making. [2] This object is 
of a kind created to be presented to a set of persons prepared in some degree to 
understand the object which is presented to them.  [3] The set of persons to whom the 
object is presented correspond to, a least, a subset of the totality of all the frameworks 
for the presentation of this type of object.  
 
We can also substitute „scale model‟ or „prototype computer‟ for „work of art‟ 
without affecting the rest of the definition. Thus, Carroll seems to be on the right 
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track with his assertion that Dickie fails to provide a definition exclusively 
applicable to artworks.  
 
In this case, Carroll points out that Dickie only succeeds in formulating a definition 
of what it is to be a „coordinate communicative practice‟ that requires a whole 
structure to persist in time. Thus Carroll would argue that Dickie fails to show the 
differentia of artworks from the genus of which he considers artworks to be a 
species: that is to say, of the genus of „coordinated communicative practices‟.  As a 
result, he only provides a definition that can be applied to many different things 
corresponding to this particular genus. Stecker, similarly argues that Dickie, in 
attempting to define artworks, is actually defining only a class of public artifacts 
(those to be exhibited and examined publicly) which can include many things other 
than artworks (Stecker, 1986).  
 
Thus Dickie‟s theory can only explain the art of those societies, like ours, which 
have the determinate notions of artists and artworld publics, and determinate and 
distinct artworld systems or subsystems. The theory, however, is incapable of 
providing a final proof that these structural elements in DK2 (i.e., [At], [AwS], etc.) 
are sufficient or even necessary to create art in our western culture(s) or even in 
others.  
 
Moreover, Dickie also thinks that he has demonstrated, with his critique of 
Beardsley‟s conception of the Romantic artist, that art cannot be created outside 
culture. But again, he doesn‟t demonstrate this: he just demonstrates that Beardsley 
is wrong to think that the possibility of an isolated „artist‟ creating art shows the 
failure of the institutional theory. Dickie then goes on to claim that Beardsley‟s 
failure demonstrates that art cannot be created outside culture.  
 
In fact, however, Dickie just demonstrates that artists, qua creative individuals 
already acculturated, even in isolation, can make art. He never takes into 
consideration, as Levinson in fact does, the possibility of a socially isolated 
individual, completely ignorant of art and art institutions and practices, making art. 
This shows that Dickie‟s structuralist theory of art, and more particularly his thesis 
about the indissoluble link between artworks and artists, is used as the premise that 
161 
 
helps him to justify this same thesis as a conclusion (i.e., the fallacy of begging the 
question).   
 
 
B) The shift towards an anthropological perspective 
 
Dickie attempts to overcome some of the major problems in his DK1 theory and 
definitions by presenting a different DK2 theory and DK2Def. In doing so, he 
changes the scope of the inquiry. Where he had earlier made use of legalistic 
examples and terminology to support his idea about the relevance of the artworld 
institutions and practices, he now resorts in DK2 to examples and terminology from 
the field of anthropology. This would seem to provide better support for his idea 
about the relevance of culture and cultural practices in explaining what art is. Thus 
in DK2 he establishes parallelisms, above all in Art and Value, between his 
approach and that of anthropological research (Art and Value: 7 – 28; for a first 
attempt at this approach, see: Circle: 45). 
 
As we have seen, some of the changes Dickie introduced pointed towards the idea 
of art as something created by means of an institutional action; he then argues 
explicitly that understanding art as an institutionalised action points towards its 
cultural nature. Later on he argues that this demonstrates the anthropological basis 
of his enquiry.  
 
This idea of understanding art as an action-institution rather than as a person-
institution allowed Dickie to avoid some of the strongest objections to his earlier 
theory, particularly those of Wollheim and Beardsley. Wollheim argued that 
Dickie‟s theory raised a number of problematic questions, concerning the how, 
when and where of the process of nomination of membership (within the world of 
art or artworld understood as a person-institution) that allowed these new members 
to confer the status of art upon artifacts (Wollheim, 1992 [1980]: 16; see also: 
Wollheim, 1984). Beardsley argued that an isolated artist could make art 
independently of any person-institutions in a way that rendered false the 
institutional theory (which he understood as supporting the idea of the institution of 
art as a person-institution). In stressing the idea that art ought to be understood as an 
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action-institution rather than as a person-institution, Dickie now avoids the idea that 
artists need artistic institutions (i.e., person-institutions) or nomination of status for 
membership to make art, and thereby also avoids Beardsley‟s and Wollheim‟s 
objections against the role of institutions in art.  
 
Dickie‟s later terminological reformulations, however, end up exchanging one 
problem for another: instead of misusing in DK2 certain types of legalistic notions, 
he now misuses the notions from anthropology. He does this particularly with the 
central concepts of „role‟ and „culture‟. Moreover Dickie misconceives the 
methodology of anthropology when he compares it with his own theoretical 
approach.  
 
In the first place, Dickie insists that „roles‟ are central to the artworld (when he 
speaks, for example, about the role of artists and publics – see for example: Circle: 
26, 55, 57, 65 – 67, 71 – 75, 81, 84; also Value: 59 – 62; and in: Introduction1997: 
89). His use of the term „role‟ is misleading, however, because it confuses different 
meanings of the term, as we shall see.  
 
For example, having a role can be understood as having a function understood in 
causal terms, as for example, when talking about the role of sugar in diabetes. 
Dickie clearly uses this meaning when talking about „the role of art‟ in fulfilling 
certain human needs (Circle: 85). He also uses this meaning in several other places, 
in discussing the role of status conferral in creating art, or the role of definitions, the 
role of artistic theories and so on (Circle: 58, 78, 65, 86). In this sense, the „role‟ of 
artists could mean the „function‟ of artists: an artist could be understood as someone 
who has the function of creating art, although this function might just be a result of 
a causal relation between artworks and artmakers. In this regard, the use of the term 
„role‟ is not exclusive to anthropological research, as Dickie seems to think, but 
attaches to any attempt to understand the necessary causal relations between two 
successive events.  
 
Having a „role‟ can also be understood, in anthropology or sociology, as having an 
acknowledged social status that places an individual in a particular socially 
distinctive stratum, thus determining his/her particular behaviour, as well as his 
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rights and duties, within a given cultural group. This latter meaning would apply, 
for example, to artists such as Duchamp or Warhol who were already socially 
acknowledged as artists. However, this distinctive role doesn‟t apply to certain 
other artists who already have the causal function of artmakers (e.g., housewives, 
shamans, university students, office workers and so on) but who are less well 
known, or not at all known, by the publics in general. These individuals thus might 
be artists in virtue of their place in the causal chain of events (i.e., their making 
artworks) but do not have yet the distinctive socially acknowledged role of artists.  
 
Dickie seems to be using this latter meaning of „role‟ when he claims that „[art] 
cannot exist in the contextless vacuum that Beardsley‟s view requires; it must exist 
in a cultural matrix, as the product of someone fulfilling a cultural role‟ (Circle: 55; 
italics mine), and when he claims that „[in] order to obtain an adequate account of 
the framework, as a first step it must be discovered what it is that makes it possible 
for someone to assume the role of artist‟ (Circle:  65; italics mine).   
 
However, it seems that Dickie, in other places, conflates the two meanings because 
he appears to switch between them (or at least to fail to distinguish the two distinct 
meanings of „role‟) in several passages. Thus, sometimes it looks as if he is using 
the second notion of „role‟, when actually he means to use the first. At times he 
seems to conceive of the „role‟ of the artist in terms similar to the way we may talk 
about the role of red wine in the production of antioxidants. At other times he seems 
to characterise the role of the artist in ways similar to when we talk, let‟s say, about 
the role of the shaman: the social figure that compiles and transmits the communal 
knowledge and practices of the tribe, and creates cohesion amongst its members. 
The latter usage is similar, we might say, to the anthropological approach, but in 
fact Dickie often just refers to the former when he talks about the role of artists as 
those having the causal function of making and presenting artworks to the artworld 
publics.  
 
Thus, in Circle, he first says that: „[these] failures [of certain ideas in his previous 
theory] arose because the statements occurred within a discussion of the 
presentation of works of art to audiences, a context within which the creators of 
works of art do not ordinarily play a big role [i.e. function]‟; then in the next phrase 
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he again uses the notion of „role‟, apparently with the same meaning. Thus he says: 
„[any] description of what earlier I mistakenly called “the primary convention” must 
exhibit a role [i.e., again „function‟?] for playwrights, poets, painters and the like‟ 
(Circle: 74; italics mine).  
 
Dickie‟s notion of „role‟ becomes more confusing in those passages where the 
ambiguity of the term „role‟ is stronger (i.e., where the term „role‟ can be 
understood either as „function‟ or as an „acknowledged social status accompanied 
by certain rights as well as certain duties towards the community). Thus, he talks 
about the „function‟ of the „presenters‟, and two pages later he talks instead about 
the „role‟ of these „presenters‟, thus apparently implying that by „role‟ he now 
means „function‟, although the notion of „role‟ understood more or less as an 
„acknowledged status with certain obligations towards the community‟ could also 
apply here. Thus first he says „[if], however, artists create and publics perceive and 
understand, there is a function which lies between them and brings them together. In 
Art and the Aesthetic I characterized this function as the task of the “presenter” ‟ 
(Circle:  72; italics mine). And two pages further on he says that: „[if], however, 
there is no primary convention, there is a primary something […]. What is primary 
is the understanding shared by all involved that they are engaged in an established 
activity or practice within which there is a variety of different roles 
[functions?/acknowledged social status?]: creator roles, presenter roles and 
“consumer  roles” ‟ (Circle: 74; italics mine). Thus, given Dickie‟s ambiguous use 
of the term, here and elsewhere, it is difficult to determine whether he understands 
„role‟ in one way or another. This is because he seems to play with the ambivalence 
of the statements regarding the role (function? socially acknowledged status?) of 
artists, publics and other members of the artworld (especially in: Circle: 71, 74, 75). 
 
At times, moreover, Dickie uses quite other meanings of the term „role‟, thus 
making it harder to know whether he has been all along talking about very different 
things in his formulation of the role of artists and of the members of the public. 
Hence for example in the following he uses the notion of „role‟ to signify some sort 
of knowledge that artists or the public might have. He says: „[the] framework which 
I have begun to describe owes something to Danto‟s suggestion about art history, 
although it is hard to pinpoint exactly the relationship; that is, I have stressed the 
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historical dimension of the artist‟s and the public‟s role [knowledge?] – what they 
have learned from the past‟ (Circle: 67). This is clearer when he says that „[the] role 
[knowledge?] of the artist has two central aspects. First, there is the general aspect 
which is characteristic of all artists, namely, the awareness that what is created for 
presentation is art. Second, there is the wide variety of art techniques of which the 
ability to use one in some degree, enables one to create art of a particular kind‟ 
(Circle: 72; italics mine).  
 
Finally, the term becomes even more confusing when he explicitly uses „role‟ as 
synonymous with „activity‟. He says: „one can see that the activity or role of artist, 
the conception of the product of this activity as a work of art, and the activity or 
role of public, had to develop together‟ (Circle: 84; italics mine).  
 
This confusion of meanings becomes especially marked where he uses some or all 
of these different meanings of „role‟ in the same page (such as in Circle: 65, 74, 
84). 
 
In the second place, Dickie is very unclear about the relation between art and 
culture in DK2, particularly when he attempts to clarify whether art can be found 
only in certain cultures or in all human cultures. On the one hand, he insists that his 
is a structural theory, and so stresses the idea that art only occurs in those cultures in 
which the other related structural elements (i.e., artist, artworld, artworld public, 
and artworld systems) can also be found. Thus, he claims, a member of a primitive 
tribe lacking the concept „art‟ may be incapable of creating art. Here Dickie seems 
to be arguing that art depends upon a certain type of culture to exist, because, of 
course, a primitive tribe does have a culture of its own. In fact, Dickie accepts 
Catherine Lord‟s suggestion that his is an „indexical‟ theory of art – by which Lord 
means that art is an activity particular to the context of a given culture, rather than 
an activity shared by all cultures – although he also leaves open the idea that art 
may nevertheless exist in cultures different from ours, having not identical but 
analogous structural elements (Lord, 1987; Dickie, 1987).  
 
However, contrary to these claims that regard art as a non-universal activity, Dickie 
also argues in The Art Circle that it is possible for a primitive culture to produce art 
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even though it lacked the very concept of art (Circle: 56). Pursuing this idea, it is 
also plausible to imagine that a culture might make art even though it still lacks any 
determinate conception of „an artist‟. Moreover, Dickie claims that art is a human 
(transcultural?) practice (Circle: 111). He also refers to „the human activity of the 
artworld‟ (Introduction1997: 88). In both cases, he seems to argue that art is not 
something characteristic of a particular culture or cultures but that it can occur 
everywhere because it requires only the institution of „human culture‟ to exist. 
 
Thus it is possible to observe here how ambiguous Dickie is about the relations 
between art and culture: resulting from his reflections, in some cases he seems to 
imply that art is related to a particular type of cultural reality, and in others he 
seems to imply that is intrinsically related to the „institution‟ of human culture. 
 
Additionally, Dickie claims in Art and Value, that: 
 
In any event,  even if cultural anthropologists could not find a cultural structure 
identical with that described by the institutional theory, I believe they would find a 
structure very much like it. That is, they would find a structure of the general sort that 
the five declarations I gave as definitions in The Art Circle can serve as a summary 
account of (Art and Value: 28) 
 
This is surely an enormous assumption, because Dickie never supports this idea 
with any proof that an anthropologist would ultimately have a view similar to his. 
Moreover, a theorist from the opposing side (e.g., someone supporting a biological 
explanation of art, for example, such as Dutton‟s – see for example: Dutton, 2010), 
could claim in similar terms and without any further proof, that a biologist would 
probably support his theory or a theory similar to his. Yet, both claims would be 
just hypothetical and useless for validating either of the two theories. This is 
because even if, as Dickie claims, his theory or one similar to it could be accepted 
by anthropologists, some aspects of a biological explanation of art could also be 
defended by this same anthropologist (or by a biologist) without proving that 
Dickie‟s (or Dutton‟s) theory is correct in toto .  
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Dickie‟s argument, then, is a fallacy of authority: he attempts to defend his theory 
by appealing to a higher authority that, hypothetically, would validate it, rather than 
by just solid arguments, careful specifications and empirical proofs. 
 
Given that it is central to his new DK2 theory of art, Dickie is therefore obliged to 
clarify what he understands by the notion of „role‟; he should also clarify what he 
understands by the relations (that he constantly stresses), between art and culture 
(i.e., does mean that art exists in some cultures or that art is the product of human 
culture?). He ought also to justify the claim that his methodology is similar to that 
of anthropology, and that an anthropologist would support his theory. Otherwise, 
his analogy between his own theory of art and an anthropological one will fail in the 
way he claims Carney‟s suggested analogy between art and science fails (Value: 16 
– 20).  
 
 
C) The word ‘art’ and other analogous terms 
 
Furthermore, we can observe how Dickie takes for granted, without further 
discussion, the idea that art is a cultural product rather than a biological-ethological 
one. In Circle he argues that the word „art‟ is closer to the word „brother‟ than to the 
words „tiger‟ and „gold‟ (Circle: 43 – 44); some words, he argues following Ziff‟s 
ideas in Semantic Analysis, have a particular meaning and others do not because 
they lack necessary and sufficient conditions. Terms like „tiger‟, Ziff argues, do not 
contain within them necessary and sufficient conditions (there could be tigers with 
three or five legs); words such as „brother‟, however, do have a particular meaning 
because – as Dickie seems to imply – they are culturally or socially stipulated to 
have distinctive meaning in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.  
 
From this point of departure, Dickie says: „I believe that “art”, like “brother” has a 
particular meaning in English – at least one distinct sense‟ (Circle: 44; italics mine). 
He makes this claim, however, without providing any proof, and without 
considering the possibility that the word „art‟ may be like other words lacking a 
particular meaning, like „tiger‟ or „gold‟, because he bases his theory merely upon a 
belief. Dickie takes this as a postulated premise of his theory, but in fact it seems 
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perfectly plausible to argue that if words such as „tiger‟ and „gold‟ cannot be 
defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (thus allowing us to include 
within the category „lions‟ exceptions to the rule, such as spotted lions or dwarf 
lions, without much difficulty), then the term „art‟ could also be similarly defined. 
 
In Art and Value, where he asserts the similarities between his approach and that of 
cultural anthropology, he also compares the word „art‟ with the word „bachelor‟ and 
the (imaginary) word „puka‟. He posits an anthropologist searching for the meaning 
of a word such as „puka‟, used by an imaginary primitive tribe. He thus argues that 
such an anthropologist, to understand the meaning of this word, needs to understand 
the underlying structures (roles, actions and so on) that allow for its existence and 
appropriate usage (Value: 25). Then he goes on to suggest that this (imaginary) 
culture may use the word „puka‟ in a way similar to the way in our society we use 
the word „bachelor‟.  
 
This example is provided in order to defend the idea that when we attempt to 
understand the meaning of the word „art‟, we are also required to understand its 
usage and the practices to which it is related. Dickie believes it can be shown that 
the word „art‟ cannot be segregated from the practices of artists, publics and the 
different artworld systems, and we are thus required to explicate these practices 
when we try to explain what art is. 
 
However, Dickie‟s analogy between the words „art‟ and „bachelor‟ reveals an 
important problem. Clearly, for the word „bachelor‟ to exist, a series of cultural 
conventions and institutions must also exist, but it is not that clear that the same is 
true of the word „art‟. In drawing the analogy, Dickie hopes to have the reader take 
for granted the idea that art also depends upon certain cultural conventions and 
institutions. But this similarity between the notion of „bachelor‟ and the notion of 
„work of art‟ is what he has to demonstrate; it is not something he can assume as an 
undisputable fact. Moreover, just as he claimed, without any proof in Circle, that he 
believes the term „art‟ to be like the term „brother‟, so he claims in Art and Value, 
that „I believe the concept art is like the concept bachelor (and the concept puka)‟ 
(Value: 23; italics mine). Again, his thesis is based on the belief that supports his 
point of departure, not upon any clear empirical proof or self-evident truth.  
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For his explanation to succeed, Dickie needs to have given, in the first place, proofs 
for the belief that „art‟ has a particular meaning (following Ziff‟s terminology) and 
that, for it to exist, it must be examined together with other cultural notions and 
practices (such as occurs with the term „bachelor‟). 
 
In the second place, Dickie should also have compared the term „art‟ with other 
words about which there is controversy as to whether their referents require cultural 
institutions to exist or not. Only in this way could he start clarifying, by means of 
empirical observation and theoretical research, the extent to which art is a 
phenomenon more or less related to particular cultures – as for example the notions 
of „bachelor‟ (or „puka‟) – or whether it is more similar to terms that can be applied 
cross-culturally – such as „family‟ or „hunting‟.  It may be that, by comparing the 
term „art‟ with other words not obviously related to a particular culture – such as 
those two mentioned above – he could discover that the term „art‟ (in contrast to 
„brother‟ or „bachelor‟) can be applied cross-culturally to all human societies, by 
virtue of being for example, following Dutton, a natural product of the human 
species. 
 
Besides this, Dickie notes that the word „bachelor‟ might be wrongly used to 
translate the word „puka‟ (Value: 21), thus inviting the idea that the way we use the 
word „art‟ should also be handled carefully when we talk about other cultural 
artifacts. However, he uses the analogy between „art‟ and „bachelor‟ only to justify 
(but not to demonstrate conclusively) the need to understand the word in relation to 
an institutionalised set of cultural practices; but he does not reflect at any point on 
whether using the word „art‟ can be as problematic as using the word „bachelor‟ to 
explain other cultures‟ institutionalised practices. He might also have stressed this, 
in order to support his own thesis better, by showing how often we refer 
misleadingly to certain works as „art‟, when speaking about the products of other 
cultures or even of other historical periods. 
 
 
 
 
170 
 
7. STEPHEN DAVIES: ON INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES OF ART  
 
Stephen Davies‟s Definitions of Art (1991) was written to provide a better 
understanding of the debate surrounding the different institutional theories of art. 
Davies organises the contending theories into four main groups: functionalism, 
proceduralism, historicism and intentionalism; in that, however, he argues that the 
two latter theories are always to be ultimately classified as part of either of the two 
former ones. In presenting and examining the pros and cons of these different 
theoretical positions, Davies argues in favour of his own proceduralist definition of 
art, which in turn is based on Dickie‟s ideas. 
 
Davies‟s efforts to provide a synthesis of this debate in Definitions of Art, in terms 
of a main divide between functionalism and proceduralism, has received 
considerable support. In particular, major figures involved in this debate about 
institutional definitions, among them Dickie, Carroll and Levinson, have recently 
endorsed or commented on Davies‟s distinction between these contending groups 
(Carroll, 1993; Levinson, 1993; Dickie, 1997c). Other current theorists have also 
used Davies‟s distinction in trying to understand better the current debate about 
institutional definitions of art (Scholz, 1994; Graves, 1998; Österman, 1998; 
Matravers, 2000; Corse, 2009; for additional reflections on Corse‟s ideas on Davies, 
see also Lemkow, 2011b). Also some of Davies‟s ideas are raised in Stock‟s section 
on „Definition of Art‟ (Davies, Higgins et al, 2009: 231 – 232) and references to 
Davies‟s book are made by Yanal – in the introduction to his edited book on Dickie 
– as well as by Brand and Margolis in their respective papers (Yanal, 1994; Brand, 
2000; Margolis, 2010).  
  
After his Definitions of Art, Davies continued to refine his ideas about the basic 
opposition between the contending functionalist and proceduralist theories of art. 
He has also developed a broader understanding of Dickie‟s and Danto‟s earlier and 
later theories. As a result, he is now more open to accept the plausibility of hybrid 
definitions, such as Stecker‟s, and even Danto‟s (now understood as hybrid too), 
and to think them superior to purely functionalist and purely proceduralist 
definitions (Davies, 2003).  
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Recently, Davies has also published an introductory book on aesthetics (Davies, 
2006) in which he seems to endorse Dickie‟s alternative classification of natural 
versus cultural theories of art (see Dickie, „Nature/Culture‟; also in Dickie‟s: Art 
and Value). In this later work, Davies follows Dickie in framing the debate in terms 
of natural versus cultural theories of art, rather than in terms of functionalisms 
versus proceduralisms. This may have resulted from Davies‟s revision of his earlier 
conception of the radical divide, presented in his Definitions of Art, between 
functionalists and proceduralists. It may also be related to his better understanding 
of Danto‟s and Dickie‟s theories, that he had very superficially summarised in his 
1991 book, even though he claimed that this same book attempted to „outline and 
develop a perspective on the debate in Anglo-American philosophy about the 
definition of art‟ (Davies, 1991: 1). 
 
In this chapter I will examine Davies‟s ideas mainly contained in his Definitions of 
Art and his position concerning Danto‟s and Dickie‟s earlier and later theories – 
given that Davies‟s Definitions of Art is still considered the guide to the debate over 
institutional definitions of art in analytic aesthetics. I will also examine Davies‟s 
book because there he proposes his own version of a proceduralist definition of art 
based on a (mis)interpretation of Dickie‟s and Danto‟s theories that I have already 
attempted to dispel (see Chapters 2 and 3 on Danto and 5 and 6 on Dickie). Further, 
I will also provide grounds in this chapter for arguing against the idea that Davies‟s 
examination of the debate in terms of a functionalist/proceduralist divide adequately 
explains the current debate about definitions of art. In addition, I will also examine 
Davies‟s ideas in Definitions of Art rather than his later views, because even if his 
later work evidences a better understanding of Dickie‟s and Danto‟s theories, he 
still continues to refer to his 1991 book in his approach to the subject. The problem 
is that he does this without assuming any degree of self-criticism about his previous 
oversimplified views of these two theories. I argue that this is unacceptable, if 
Davies‟s attempt is to provide an actualised and more thorough assessment of the 
debate over institutional definitions of art. 
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In this chapter, I will first briefly summarise Davies‟s reflections about the divide 
between functionalists and proceduralists. I will examine the problems of 
conceiving the debate about definitions of art in terms of such a divide, and the 
problem created by Davies‟s superficial account of Danto‟s and Dickie‟s theories. 
This last chapter will thus make clear why the account of institutional definitions I 
give in this thesis provides a better understanding than Davies‟s of their nature, 
plausibility and development. 
 
 
7.1 Davies’s Definitions of Art: on Functional versus Procedural Definitions 
 
In Definitions of Art, Davies explains the distinction between functional and 
procedural definitions of art, and the debate between them, as follows:  
 
I conceive of the debate as revealing a division between two approaches to the question 
of art‟s definition – the functional and the procedural. The functionalist believes that, 
necessarily, an artwork performs a function or functions (usually that of providing a 
rewarding aesthetic experience) distinctive to art. By contrast, the proceduralist believes 
that an artwork necessarily is created in accordance with certain rules and procedures 
(Davies, 1991: 1).  
 
Davies then uses an argument based on a process of elimination: if functionalist 
theories fail to explain all instances of art, then proceduralist theories ought to be 
held as the correct approach. He notes that, apart from functional and procedural 
definitions, there are also historical and intentional definitions, but asserts that these 
latter two can be understood in terms of either functionalism or proceduralism – as, 
for example, he argues, occurs with the different historical approaches of Levinson 
and Carroll.  
 
To proceed with an analysis of both positions, Davies first establishes what he 
understands respectively by „functionalism‟ and „proceduralism‟, and why certain 
concepts should be defined in terms of functionalism and others in terms of 
conventions and procedures. He gives further details about functionalism in the 
following passage:  
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[It] might be thought that what makes a thing an X is its serving […] the point of the 
concept of X. In some cases this is so, but in others it is not. Where it is the case that what 
makes a thing an X is its functional efficacy in promoting the point of the concept in 
question […] then I shall say that X is to be defined functionally. (Davies, 1991: 27). 
 
He then explains why, in some cases, proceduralist approaches are more suitable for 
providing an adequate definition of the concept in question: 
 
When conventions and the point of the concept they were instituted to serve part 
company, it may be revealed that instances of the concept in question are to be 
characterized in terms of the conventions or procedures giving rise to them and not in 
terms of the concept‟s point. In other words, sometimes that which falls under a concept 
is properly to be defined in procedural, rather than in functional terms (Davies, 1991: 
33). 
 
Thus, Davies claims, a concept might be defined in terms of the function its 
instances are intended to serve. Nevertheless, he also argues that in some cases, the 
conventions and procedures allow the introduction of new instances of this concept 
that are no longer in accordance with its original point. This, he argues, occurs 
when conventions and procedures „part company‟ from the point of the concept: 
sometimes conventions and procedures take on a life of their own,  in a way in 
which they are no longer required to produce functional instances of the concept. In 
these cases, it becomes important to clarify whether a concept should be defined in 
either functional or procedural terms, or in a mixture of both.  
 
In Definitions of Art, Davies seeks not only to provide a general overview of the 
current debate between the supporters of functionalist and proceduralist definitions, 
as he had done in a previous paper (Davies, 1990); he seeks also to defend his own 
procedural definition of art. Functional theories, he believes, have failed to provide 
a definition adequate to all instances of the concept „art‟ (Davies, 1991: 46); owing 
to this, he believes that only pure procedural definitions provide adequate 
alternatives. Davies asserts that the current break, between the original function of 
art and the procedures and conventions that allow the introduction of new instances 
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of art, has made it no longer possible to provide a definition of art in a mixture of 
functionalist and proceduralist terms: 
 
When it comes to defining the nature of that which falls under a concept, it may be found 
either to be essentially functional or to be essentially procedural or to be essentially both 
[…]. When the evolution of the procedures leads to the use of those procedures in ways 
that go so far as to conflict with the point of the concept (so that the concept cannot be 
defined in jointly procedural and functional terms) the question of whether or not items 
of the type in question are to be defined functionally or procedurally is crucial […]. How 
is the definition of art to be approached? The character of much modern art and the 
attitude adopted toward it by the public is symptomatic of a separation between the point 
of art and its works (that is, the products of the procedures in terms of which art status 
commonly is taken to be conferred). There is a tension between both the forms and 
approaches of modern and of more traditional art. For this reason the otherwise attractive 
option of defining art in jointly functional and procedural terms seems not to be viable. 
Equally unattractive, I think, is the option of defining art disjunctively – as either 
functional or as the product of certain procedures. Such an approach deals with the 
tension I have identified only by ignoring its existence […]. So the question becomes: Is 
art to be defined functionally or procedurally? (Davies, 1991: 36 – 38).  
 
Davies then examines the pros and cons of the functional definition. Beardsley, he 
argues, represents the best attempt so far to define art in functional terms, and he 
also claims that any fair assessment of functionalism should take that attempt into 
account. On the other side, Davies believes that proceduralism is best represented 
by Dickie‟s work. Addressing the pros and cons of Beardsley‟s functionalism, and 
concluding that it cannot explain all instances of art, Davies moves to an 
examination of the validity of procedural definitions. To do so, he focuses on 
Dickie‟s theory, and concludes that Dickie‟s, and more particularly his own, 
procedural definition (based above all on Dickie‟s, although it derives some ideas 
from Danto and Diffey), are more plausible and reliable approaches to the definition 
of art. 
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7.2 Some problems with Davies’s reflections on Functionalism versus 
Proceduralism  
 
A) Aesthetic functionalism and other functionalisms 
 
Davies claims, in an argument based on a process of elimination, that if 
functionalism fails to explain all instances of art, then proceduralism offers the only 
alternative. To assess functionalism, he examines what he claims provides the best 
attempt to define art in functional terms: Beardsley‟s theory. 
 
In fact, Beardsley‟s functionalism is a form of aesthetic functionalism. Davies 
explains that Beardsley‟s theory „characterizes an artwork as either an arrangement 
of conditions intended to be capable of affording an aesthetic experience with 
marked aesthetic character, or (incidentally) an arrangement belonging to a class or 
type of arrangement that is typically intended to have this capacity‟ (Davies, 1991: 
52). Beardsley thus rejects as artworks things that do not meet either of these two 
conditions.  
 
In the article Davies published a year before his Definitions of Art, he proposes that 
the function of art is to provide a distinctive aesthetic experience (Davies, 1990: 
99). In Definitions of Art (1991), he offers several ways of characterising art 
although always under the assumption that its primary function, if any, is to provide 
an aesthetic experience that promotes pleasure and enjoyment. This is also implied 
by his acceptance of Beardsley‟s theory as the best representation of functionalism. 
 
Thus, Davies claims that „[the] functionalist believes that, necessarily, an artwork 
performs a function or functions (usually that of providing a rewarding aesthetic 
experience) distinctive to art‟ (Davies, 1991: 1). He goes on to make four 
observations about this function. First he notes that „many artworks play an 
important role as art in our lives‟ and that the experience can be „rewarding and 
enjoyable‟ (Davies, 1991: 38). Second, he mentions Beardsley‟s assertion that „art 
enriches life by integrating and reconciling us to our world‟ (Davies, 1991: 55). 
Third, he says that „[there] is no single way in which the experience of art is 
pleasurable. The experience, or an element within it, may be simply sensuous (and 
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even sensual) [...]. Additionally, the experience may be variously and complexly 
cognitive, and the pleasure that goes with the experience is the pleasure of 
understanding a pattern, of solving a puzzle, of grasping connections […]. What I 
mean is that the experience is a thoughtful one‟ (Davies, 1991: 59 – 60). Finally, at 
the end of the book, he proposes that „[the] primary function of art is to provide 
enjoyment, but this is not to deny that an interest in art can have far-reaching social 
benefits […]. One good reason for creating an artwork is that it is enjoyable when 
approached in one or another of the ways in which art has been approached in the 
past‟ (Davies, 1991: 220), 
 
Having examined Beardsley‟s functionalism he then opposes to it his own version 
of Dickie‟s theory, although he claims to be providing a general overview of the 
current debate about definitions of art in Anglo-American philosophy. This reveals, 
first, that his theory is actually a very narrow overview of the current debate, mainly 
focused on the dispute between Beardsley‟s functionalism and his own procedural 
definition of art. It is narrow as well in that he basically conceives functionalism in 
terms of aesthetic functionalism (i.e., Beardsley‟s), without considering other kinds 
of functionalisms on equal terms.  
 
In fact, there are, contra Davies, other non-aesthetic functionalisms that he could 
have taken into consideration, such as, for example, Goodman‟s cognitive 
functionalism. As Goodman says: 
 
The worlds of fiction, poetry, painting, music, dance and the other arts are built largely 
by such nonliteral devices as metaphor, by such nondenotational means as 
exemplification and expression, and often by use of pictures or sounds or gestures or 
other symbols of non-linguistic systems. Such worldmaking and such versions are my 
primary concern here; for a major thesis of this book is that the arts must be taken no 
less seriously than the sciences as modes of discovery, creation, and enlargement of 
knowledge in the broad sense of advancement of understanding, and thus that the 
philosophy of art should be conceived as an integral part of metaphysics and 
epistemology (Goodman, 1978: 102). 
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Goodman here conceives the central function of art as providing an advancement of 
understanding almost akin to that of science, a view which Davies ignores, without 
any good justification.  
 
Another type of functionalism that should be considered is Danto‟s, which stresses 
that all artworks have „aboutness‟ (i.e., they are about something, have a meaning or 
content or a subject – see Chapter 3). In claiming this, Danto points towards a type 
of semantic functionalism that Davies completely overlooks in his analysis of 
Danto‟s theory, but which Dickie acknowledges in his paper „Nature/Culture‟.  
 
Davies in effect claims that if aesthetic functionalism fails to explain all instances 
of art, then we must resort to procedural definitions – but it is not at all clear that 
other types of functionalisms (cognitive functionalism, for example) would 
similarly fail to explain all instances of art, thus leaving proceduralism as the only 
possible alternative. Further, it is plausible to argue that a functionalism of the 
cognitive or a semantic type would be able to explain non-aesthetic „hard cases‟ of 
works of art such as Piero Manzoni‟s Merda d’Artista, Warhol‟s Silver Disaster: 
Electric Chair or even Duchamp‟s Fountain. This is because all these artworks 
seem to be about something and at the same time they seem to promote new 
(cognitive) reflections on our relation to certain facts about the world, and about our 
current social and cultural environments.  
 
Moreover, Davies does accept the possibility that instances of a concept may have 
different functions at the same time (i.e., synchronical functionalism). He also 
accepts that at different times a particular function might be substituted for another 
(i.e., diachronical functionalism), without this implying that functional definitions 
are no longer valid to explain what art is. As he says: „I do not mean to imply that 
there can be no more than a single point for any given concept; nor that the point or 
points of a concept might not alter through time‟ (Davies, 1991: 27). He further 
observes that „art might have long since lost its original function […] if art in 
general has taken on some new function or functions, then it serves as a functional 
concept and might be definable in terms of its function or functions‟ (Davies, 1991: 
50). Thus Davies leaves open the possibility of a synchronical or diachronical 
combination of aesthetic, cognitive and semantic functionalisms to explain all 
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instances of art in a way that would render procedural definitions of art 
unnecessary.  
 
Davies believes, however, that procedures and conventions have drifted apart, or as 
he says, that they have „taken a life of their own‟ apart from the original intended 
function or functions of art. He conceives this process to have reached a point 
where it is necessary to leave functionalist definitions behind and embrace 
procedural definitions as the only alternative for defining art. But in fact Davies 
merely takes this for granted, because he supports the idea that conventions and 
procedures have separated from the aesthetic function of artworks (especially with 
the „hard cases‟ in art), without demonstrating that they also have drifted apart from 
the cognitive or semantic function of artworks. Before championing the procedural 
approach, then, he should first examine whether cognitive and/or semantic 
functionalism (or any other types of functionalism), are still valid in art and 
compatible with past and current conventions and procedures. 
 
 
B) Instances of the concept and definitions of procedures 
 
Davies argues that functionalism fails to explain all instances of art. He explains 
that this is because „hard‟ cases in art that do not provide any aesthetic function, are 
rejected by functionalists as representing true instances of art. Yet proceduralists 
have no problem in taking these cases as art, because they believe that the 
conventions and procedures of art have drifted apart from the traditional goal of 
providing an aesthetic function. Davies, additionally, claims that while the 
traditional function of artworks does not necessarily apply in all instances of art, the 
same procedures and conventions do apply in all of these instances. 
 
However, this argument raises a number of problems, because Davies takes for 
granted that:  
 
1) The same conventions and procedures apply in past and current art before 
conclusively demonstrating that this is so.  
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2) The same conventions and procedures apply in all art disciplines, although 
there are substantial differences in the practices corresponding to many of 
these disciplines (e.g., between theatre and sculpture, between music and 
painting or between literature and dance). 
 
3) There is no other alternative to proceduralism, because proceduralism 
cannot fail in explaining all instances of art. In his commitment to the idea 
that proceduralism will hold for all cases of art, he simply does not regard 
the possibility that this approach might fail, or necessitate the search for a 
third alternative. 
 
In fact, Davies‟s assumption that the same conventions and procedures apply in past 
and current art is based on the idea that Duchamp had performed an act of „status 
conferral‟ to transform a commonplace urinal into a work of art. Moreover, he 
argues that Duchamp had used what he believes was a traditional procedure (i.e., 
status conferral), although used in a different way from how it was previously used, 
thus allowing him to create a new instance of art. 
 
It is not at all clear, however, that Duchamp used the procedure of „status conferral‟ 
to make Fountain. Actually, there is still considerable controversy about this idea 
and even Dickie, in his later DK2 attempt to define art, had rejected the idea that 
artworks are produced by an act of status conferral (see Chapter 6). It is striking that 
Davies ignores this change in DK2, while at the same time he acknowledges the 
existence of Dickie‟s later definition of art (Davies, 1991: 83 – 84).  
 
In fact, Davies‟s assumption that all art is made in accordance with the way he 
conceives of Duchamp‟s Fountain, is anachronistic: he sees the past procedures and 
conventions of making artworks in terms of the procedures and conventions he 
proposes that Duchamp used. Thus, his theory has the same problem he accused 
Danto‟s theory of having:  it is too parochial to explain the huge diversity of 
instances of past and present art (Davies, 2001; 2001b).    
 
Besides, in conceiving of the debate over definitions of art mainly in terms of a 
divide between functional and procedural approaches, Davies can only see the 
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possibility that either one or the other can succeed in defining art. However, this 
assumption is unfair because in his argument by elimination, he admits only the 
possibility of the failure of functionalist definitions, and never the possibility that 
proceduralism could also fail. It is true that he accepts that his theory might not be 
completely correct (Davies, 1991: 3), yet he never offers an alternative to 
proceduralism. This is probably owing to his unjustified confidence that 
proceduralism will ultimately be able to explain all instances of art, by sorting out 
its common procedures and conventions. 
 
The present diversity of artistic disciplines (music, painting, literature, computer-
generated art, dance, video art, site-specific art, body art, ephemeral art, happenings, 
audio art, etc.) seems, however, to underscore a multiplicity of procedures and 
conventions in all art disciplines. It is true that, Davies could argue that while at 
first sight, there may be an irreducible diversity of first-order conventions and 
procedures in art (let‟s call them X), nevertheless there could be a second order of 
conventions and procedures (W) common to the plurality of this first-order 
diversity. But again this claim would be based on the assumption or expectation that 
there is a final unity of conventions and procedures to be found in art (whether in a 
first order or in a second order level) that would make coherent the effort to define 
art in procedural terms.  
 
But what if this is not possible either? What if the expectation of finding a common 
second order set of conventions and procedures common to all art – in short, 
Davies‟s apparent expectation – also fails? In this case the proceduralist is then 
obliged to look for a third order of conventions and procedures (V), possibly even a 
fourth order (U) and so on (T, S, R,…) until perhaps, although with no assurance at 
all, a final unity of conventions and procedures of the n
th
 order is reached which 
could account for all instances and disciplines of art.  
 
Owing to this, unless a proceduralist can provide good reasons to think that there is 
this unity of procedures and conventions, and unless he summarises and justifies 
them properly (recall that the later Dickie – and many others – categorically reject 
the act of status conferral as a procedure for artmaking), his project will lead to an 
infinite regress in the search for this unity of first, second, third, etc. order 
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conventions and procedures. This would ultimately leave art undefined (i.e., 
because of the problem of infinite regression in procedural definitions of art), unless 
an alternative to proceduralism can be taken into account to explain all instances of 
art. 
 
 
C) Is Davies’s notion of ‘proceduralism’ useful? 
 
Davies coined the notion of „procedural definitions of art‟ and substituted it for the 
notion of „institutional definitions‟ that had been used so far to refer to Dickie‟s and 
Danto‟s formulations. Presumably he did so because he believed it was more 
suitable, although he never provides any reason why the older notion of 
„institutional definitions‟ should be replaced.  
 
Given his conception of the central role of procedures in art, perhaps, he thinks it is 
more heuristically useful to use the notions of „proceduralism‟ and „procedural 
definitions‟ instead. Notions of „institutionalism‟ and „institutional definitions‟, he 
would say,  point misleadingly  towards the idea that person-institutions, such as the 
Tate Modern or the Saatchi and Saatchi gallery, play a central role in art (see 
Chapter 6, Section 6.2 for the discussion about person-institutions  and action-
institutions). 
 
At times, however, even Davies seems unsure about whether it is best to think about 
current definitions of art in terms of „proceduralism‟ or „institutionalism‟, because 
he often uses the latter notion instead of the former (for example in: Davies, 1991: 
3, 38 – 39, 78, 113 – 114). Furthermore, when he comes to examine Danto‟s theory, 
Davies argues that it is unclear whether this theory can be considered as proto-
institutionalist or as providing a fully institutionalist account: that is, he does not 
refer to Danto‟s theory as „proto-proceduralist‟ or as „proceduralist‟ (see: Davies, 
1991: 81). These explicit references to institutional theories show that Davies hasn‟t 
sufficiently worked out the need or the justification for this new term 
(„proceduralism‟) to refer to these institutional theories.  
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Davies claims that institutionalist theorists are committed, not just to the idea of 
defining art in terms of procedures and conventions, but to the idea of defining art 
in terms of what he thinks to be its common procedures. Namely, he believes that 
institutionalists support the idea that art is produced by someone with the 
appropriate authority, conferring the status of art on his artworks (Davies, 1991: 
39). Given this, and his rejection of functional definitions, he also endorses the idea 
of „status conferral‟ for his own definition of art (Davies, 1991: 218 – 219). 
 
This concept of the procedures typical in art, however, is insufficient to understand 
the philosophical divide concerning definitions of art: Davies argues that the 
debates about the different definitions of art are to be understood in terms of 
functionalism or proceduralism. Davies‟s belief that an institutionalist is committed 
to the idea that artworks are made in accordance with the procedure of „status 
conferral‟, however, implies that Dickie‟s later definition of art (DK2), is not an 
institutional theory of art. This is because Dickie, in his later works, rejects the idea 
that artworks are the product of such an act of conferral. In fact he criticises 
Davies‟s Definitions of Art for considering more highly of Dickie‟s earlier DK1 
theory and definitions that supported the idea of „status conferral‟, and that he 
(Dickie) had later rejected in DK2 („Nature/Culture‟: 21; also in: Art and Value: 38; 
see also Chapter 6 – Sections 6.1 and 6.2 – on Dickie‟s later rejection of his DK1 
definitions). In addition, if we follow Davies, DK2 cannot be classified as aesthetic 
functionalism because it doesn‟t hold that the aesthetic function of art is relevant to 
the definition of art itself.  
 
The problem with Davies‟s theory is that he never clarifies whether institutionalists 
and proceduralist claim the same thing or not. If he argues that they actually do 
claim the same thing, then the main proponent of the institutional theory, George 
Dickie, in his second DK2 period, can be grouped neither among the 
proceduralists/institutionalists nor with the (aesthetic) functionalists.  If 
institutionalists do not argue the same thing as proceduralists, it would seem that 
Dickie‟s DK2 is proceduralist but not institutionalist. However, in that case, 
Davies‟s work would be incomplete because it fails to characterize the differences 
between these two groups. As a result, it remains unclear, in Definitions of Art, 
whether DK2 is a procedural theory but not an institutional theory or if it is both. 
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Moreover, if Davies had made a more thorough examination of Dickie‟s positions, 
he would have realised that DK2 puts no stress on the idea that, in general, 
procedures in art are relevant to its definition, so as to consider him a proceduralist 
tout court. In fact, in DK2, Dickie speaks only in general terms of the act of 
„making‟ art and stresses the relevance of the cultural matrix instead. This results 
from Dickie‟s reformulation of the institutional nature of artworks that asserts that 
they are the product of action-institutions that do not require person-institutions for 
their existence. 
 
It is not surprising that Davies fails to see the profound differences between DK1 
and DK2, because he explicitly – and disturbingly – says that he is not interested in 
examining in detail the different positions but only in considering their different 
approaches (Davies, 1991: 38; see also: Davies, 1991: 79). But this is precisely the 
problem with Davies‟s Definitions of Art: He is too quick to provide a simplified 
overview of the various different theories, and more precisely of Danto‟s and 
Dickie‟s, in order to present his own as superior (in his opinion) to the others, and in 
doing so fails to afford them a fair and complete assessment (as I have shown, in 
Chapters 2 and 3 on Danto‟s theories and in Chapters 5 and 6 on Dickie‟s).  
 
As a result, his own proposal about how to define art procedurally fails, because it 
is based on a superficial account of Danto‟s and Dickie‟s different theories (i.e., D1, 
D2, D3, DK1, DK2). It also fails because it provides an oversimplified account of 
the overall debate about definitions of art, understood in terms of a divide between 
those supporting an approach akin to Beardsley‟s aesthetic functionalism and those 
supporting an approach akin to DK1. 
 
Further, Davies‟s attempt to frame the debate about definitions of art in terms of an 
essential division between proceduralists and functionalists is more confusing than 
helpful, because he never clarifies whether institutionalists and proceduralists claim 
the same thing or not. This becomes more urgent the moment he argues that 
institutionalists always support the idea of status conferral in art, something which 
the later Dickie explicitly rejects, although he still sees himself as an institutionalist. 
Davies might well respond that, in Definitions of Art, he meant that the notion 
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„proceduralism‟ would be a synonym  of „institutionalism‟, but that he nevertheless 
failed to see that perhaps not all institutionalist/proceduralists support status 
conferral in art, yet they do still define art in terms of conventions and procedures. 
It is not clear, however if this would still hold for DK2, because as I pointed out in 
Chapter 6, Dickie focuses now more upon the notion of culture and on the idea of 
artmaking as an institutionalised action, without stressing, as he did in DK1, the role 
of procedures for artmaking. 
 
Accordingly, I would suggest dropping the notion of „proceduralism‟ and of 
„procedural definitions‟. This is because Davies, in attempting to summarise the 
debate in terms of these new notions, unnecessarily multiplies the concepts used in 
a confusing (and redundant?) manner that only adds obscurity to the debate: do all 
proceduralists believe in the idea of status conferral, as Davies claims that 
institutionalists do? If so, is the later Dickie an institutionalist and a proceduralist or 
not? Davies‟s attempts to provide an overview of procedural definitions of art, 
without providing a sufficiently thorough analysis of the different 
procedural/institutional theories, only brings confusion rather than clarity to the 
debate. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Since the different institutional theories were first proposed, they were 
progressively modified in response to the criticisms they received and to the 
changing views of their proponents. However, I have attempted to stress the fact 
that, when interpreters and critics summarize the theories of Danto and Dickie, 
these variations or later changes are seldom taken into account, to the extent that 
many of the objections addressed to these theories actually refer only to part of their 
works or to their older and thus obsolete versions. Yet it is also true that some 
aspects of these different works; and especially of these older versions, provide 
interesting reflections that were dropped in later developments and are worth re-
examining in relation to the earlier body of ideas. Thus, for example, Dickie stresses 
in DK1 an important point which is dropped in DK2. This is that he is only focusing 
on Western art since the 18
th
 century, presumably to avoid the anachronistic and 
ethnocentric ideas, that Danto, for example, is unable to avoid. 
 
Further, the ideas developed in the different institutional theories of art, and 
particularly those of Danto and Dickie, are currently included in academic courses 
of the philosophy of art and aesthetics. But no book apart from Davies‟s Definitions 
of Art, explicitly addresses itself exclusively to this issue. It is true that other authors 
have attempted to summarise Danto‟s and Dickie‟s theories in their own work; we 
can point, for example, to Tilghman‟s But is it Art? and Hagberg‟s Art as 
Language. Also Carroll has briefly discussed the different institutional definitions 
of art in his recent book Philosophy of Art – A Contemporary Introduction. Even 
Dickie himself has attempted to summarise the debates on definitions of art in his 
Introduction to Aesthetics – An Analytic Approach (1997), and in other 
publications.  
 
In some of these cases, however, the object of the discourse is not to clarify the 
different institutional definitions of art; the theories offered are just used as means 
for explaining something else. Tilghman, for example, is interested in clarifying the 
misinterpretations in aesthetics of Wittgenstein‟s theories; Hagberg is interested in 
examining the relations between the different theories of art and their claims or 
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presuppositions about language while attempting also to clarify Wittgenstein‟s 
ideas. Other interpretations are insufficiently developed and do not adequately take 
into account the different periods and changes that these theories have undergone 
(as is the case with Carroll‟s book and even of Davies‟s as I stressed in Chapter 7). 
Other approaches, such as Dickie‟s, have a different problem: while he attempts 
(more than Danto) to reflect upon the developments of his own theory and upon the 
reasons for these changes, he nevertheless lacks an external perspective, and as a 
result there are elements of that development that he is unable to see. Similarly, the 
same happens with Davies‟s book when he attempts to favour the 
institutional/procedural definitions of art, and particularly his own version, over 
functionalist, historicist and intentionalist approaches: he lacks a sufficient self-
critical distance on the problems of his own approach and of his conception of those 
institutional/procedural theories of art. The fact remains, however, that Davies‟s 
Definitions of Art remains the only full length and thorough guide to this topic. 
 
Owing to this, I have attempted to fill this gap by focusing, essentially, upon the 
different versions of the institutional theories of art offered by Danto, Dickie and 
Davies, without committing (or at least not consciously) to any one version or to 
any other alternative definition of art. In doing this I hope to provide a more 
disinterested and useful guide than Davies‟s, so to provide scholars and researchers 
with more bibliographical sources that would address those hitherto neglected 
aspects they would like to discuss or examine more conscientiously concerning this 
debate. Thus, given that my own approach differs substantially in methodology, 
explanatory content and preferences from that of Davies‟s (concerning Danto‟s and 
Dickie‟s different claims), I hope this work will be of certain value for later 
researchers on this topic. 
 
Further, the different summaries and criticisms, concerning the theories of Danto 
and Dickie that I have developed in a more systematic, genealogical and contextual 
manner than Davies, should provide material for new areas of enquiry that are, in 
fact, already suggested by these same authors.  
 
Thus, Dickie in his later period (DK2) suggests modifying Davies‟s consideration 
of the debate about definitions of art from the dichotomy „functionalism versus 
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proceduralism‟ to the dichotomy „natural versus cultural theories of art‟. This new 
standpoint allows us to see Danto‟s and Dickie‟s theories, as well as those of 
Davies, Levinson, Beardsley or Carroll, in a new light. It also allows us to clarify 
some other hitherto ignored or insufficiently acknowledged aspects of those theories 
by putting them in relation, as Davies does later in his book The Philosophy of Art 
(Davies, 2006), with philosophical theories more sympathetic to anthropological or 
ethological explanations. Davies thus suggests there the idea of putting the different 
institutional theories of art in relation to the cultural theories of art of Larry Shiner, 
and the ethological-Darwinian theories of art of Dennis Dutton or Eileen 
Dissanayake.  
 
This new approach to the debate about what art is, in terms of cultural or biological 
explanations, suggested by Dickie and later supported by Davies, looks very 
promising. Recent theoretical developments and experimental research on 
neuroaesthetics, Darwinian aesthetics and evolutionary psychology conducted so 
far, do in fact provide new relevant information about the biological basis of human 
aesthetic preferences. However, these scientific approaches to art, developed from 
the fields of psychology and biology, also require a proper management of the 
concepts they use (such as those of „art‟, „aesthetic experience‟, „artwork‟, „artist‟ 
„creative activity‟ and so on)  before any further research or experimentation can be 
conducted. This conceptual clarification is required in order to avoid such often-
made mistakes as confusing, for example, „aesthetic experience‟ with the 
experience of artworks or the process of artmaking with any type of creative 
activity. Thus the methodological work of conceptual clarification is required as a 
preliminary step before developing these ideas, and before submitting any 
conclusions, supporting ethological explanations of art.  
 
This conceptual clarification can come also, for example, from the work of 
biologists such as Stephen Jay Gould and Richard L. Lewontin as well as from that 
of the evolutionary psychologist Stephen Pinker, amongst others. This clarification 
is useful owing to their criticisms of the abuse of Panadaptationist explanations 
(inspired more by Wallace‟s theory of evolution than by Darwin‟s) in biology, that 
supporters of the natural/biological explanation of art, such as Dutton seem to be 
supporting – actually, it is interesting to point out here that Davies has recently 
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published a paper defending the adaptationist position that Dutton holds, by 
criticising Gould and those supporting an anti-adaptationist explanation of art (See: 
Davies, 2010). Alternatively, Larry Shiner‟s work on the social history of art, The 
Invention of Art, provides important material for this conceptual clarification; his 
genealogical analysis of the term „art‟, and of its shifting within the evolving 
taxonomy of the arts, offers us a clearer understanding of its earlier relations with 
the notions of Techné and with the mechanical arts. His analysis also offers a better 
understanding of the progressive divergence and later re-convergence of art and 
craftsmanship.  
 
In fact, I believe, as Shiner does, that both, natural and cultural theories of art, are 
necessary to each other (Shiner, 2008) and that, also following the later Davies 
(Davies, 2006), they can and ought to be put in relation with other analytical 
approaches to the definition of art, in order to increase our understanding of art, 
about the different cultural practices of humankind, and about the specific traits all 
humans share as a result of their being members of the same evolved species. 
 
Additionally, there is a second line of development that can and ought to be 
developed and that, with the exception of particular cases such as Goehr and Vilar, 
has been scarcely explored: the connections between 20
th
 century analytical and 
continental approaches to the elucidation of what art is (Goehr, 2007; Vilar, 2005). 
This connection seems even more promising after Danto attempted to connect his 
own theory of art with that of Hegel, whose influence in 20
th
 century continental 
philosophy is evident. Thus Goehr has, for example, recently published a book in 
which she explores some of the connections between Danto‟s and Adorno‟s theories 
of art, casting a new light on certain underlying aspects or subterranean currents in 
their theories that had so far been ignored by other researchers. I have attempted 
recently to follow Goehr‟s programme, first by acknowledging the important 
differences between Adorno‟s and Danto‟s theories, and then by suggesting the 
equally important similarities in their  ideas and their underlying philosophical and 
cultural currents (Lemkow, 2011).  
 
Also, Davies later acknowledges (although without any explicit self-criticism 
regarding his earlier view), that the debate about definitions of art cannot be 
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conceived in terms of either purely functional or purely procedural terms. This 
allows us to look for the areas of agreement, and not only the disagreements, in 
these two contending positions. Thus, to understand better Dickie‟s institutional 
theories (i.e., DK1 and DK2), a consideration of Dickie‟s theoretical connection to 
Beardsley‟s metacritical theories can and ought to be taken by identifying the areas 
of agreement and not only the disagreements between these two philosophers. On 
the one hand, this would make possible a new way of understanding Dickie‟s theory 
independently of Danto‟s. On the other, it would allow us (in contrast to what 
Davies so heavily stresses) to understand Beardsley‟s theory as inspiring, and not 
only as opposing, the institutional approach. Of course, insisting too much on the 
idea of finding similarities and continuities between authors, rather than radical 
differences and discontinuities, could end in the complete misunderstanding of 
these same theories (e.g., by regarding Beardsley as a proto-institutionalist, or by 
claiming that Dickie‟s theory is not connected at all to Danto‟s because it basically 
continues Beardsley‟s metacritical project). So, to avoid this line of interpretation, 
the idea would rather be to cast aside, but only for a while, those connections 
traditionally taken into account and which have proven plausible if not correct. This 
will cast a new light upon those aspects of the theories of Beardsley, Dickie and 
Danto that so far have been neglected as a result of understanding them basically in 
terms of the received view.   
 
Finally, I would like to emphasize that I have characterised most of the previous 
interpretations of Danto‟s and Dickie‟s theories (and now Davies‟s theories also, 20 
years after his 1991 publication of Definitions of Art) as „received views‟, without 
attempting to attribute a conscious „standardisation‟ programme to those supporting 
these interpretations. In fact, I have attempted to make it clear that there are a 
number of received views, rather than just one sharing all the aspects that I have 
summarised in the introductory Chapter (in particular, in Section 1.4). There are 
thus several interpretations that have been traditionally taken for granted and that I 
have attempted to dispel by adopting a different, more historical and chronological, 
methodology. The methodology used has been to go directly and systematically to 
the original bibliographical sources, and ordering and summarising the works and 
ideas in chronological order, rather than thematically. In fact, most of these 
traditional interpretations of Danto‟s and Dickie‟s theories have been compiled (and 
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asserted as true) in a synthesis of sorts, by Davies in his Definitions of Art. For this 
reason, I wish to offer my own work in contrast to that of Davies so as to allow later 
researchers to make a comparison between our respective interpretations and 
determine whether his or mine (or both?) are correct.  
 
I acknowledged in several places, however, Davies‟s progressive change of views 
on the institutional theories of art summarised in his earlier work. However, he still 
continues to refer to his earlier book, without any explicit word of self-criticism, 
whenever he wishes his readers better to understand this debate. I hope it is clear by 
now, that I also regard this procedure critically. If Davies really wishes to make 
abundantly clear his later change of opinion favouring a less rigid understanding of 
this debate between pure proceduralists and pure functionalists, he should publicly 
distance himself from the position he took in Definitions of Art.  
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